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ABSTRACT

As the title suggests, this publication reviews and accents the activities which took place under the aegis of the National Academy of Education during 1979. The Annual Report of the President and reports of the Spring and Fall meetings, respectively, outline: events which occurred during the year: studies, books, reviews and research either underway, completed or published: activities of Academy members: and topics covered at the meetings with selected highlights. Included in their entirety are two papers presented at the Spring and Fall meetings: one entitled, "Comparative Analysis of Systems of Higher Education", and the second entitled, "On Educating the Gifted." "The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools", by Diane Ravitch was commissioned by the National Academy of Education as a review of works by a number of scholars known as "revisionists." The essays in the next section, "Revisionists Respond to Ravitch", constitute these scholars' responses to her provocative and critical review. The next two sections consist of reviews of an "Encyclopedia of Educational Evaluation" and "Reports from the National Institute of Education on the Compensatory Education Study." The amended National Academy of Education Constitution and Academy Membership lists are appended. (AEF)

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PROCEEDINGS OF

The National Academy of Education

Officers of the Academy	Stephen K. Bailey, President John B. Carroll, Vice President Martin Trow, Secretary-Treasurer

Published by the National Academy of Education

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1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION

The National Academy has had an eventful year. It has been enormously enriched by the election in May of twenty-seven new members, reducing the average age of all members by several years, and bringing stunning new talent into the life of the Academy.

The central activities of the Academy in 1979, as previously, have been devoted to the promotion of scholarship and of scholarly exchange through the Spencer Fellowship Program, semi-annual meetings, special task force reports, book reviews, monographs, newsletters, and related communications to and with the attentive press and public.

The five Spencer Fellows chosen in 1979 were:

Mark L. Davison, University of Minnesota; Harvey Graff, University of Texas at Dallas; Arthur E. Levine, Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education; Jacquelynne E. Parsons, University of Michigan; and David Rogosa, University of Chicago. I am especially indebted to Jack Carroll, Joe Nyquist, and Pat Cross for the time and energy they gave to reviewing an increasing number of superb applications. The task is now attenuated by numbers and made increasingly difficult because the fame of the Fellowships is spreading and the competition brings forth a large number of highly talented applicants. By mutual agreement between the Academy and the Spencer Foundation, the time over which the fellowships may be spent has been reduced from five to three years. But for younger scholars, Spencer Fellowship money will continue to be "golden," -- providing the kind of flexibility and freedom that promotes scholarship at its best.

The Academy's semi-annual meetings were held in Berkeley in May and in Cambridge in October, thereby bringing enlightenment from sea to shining sea. The Proceedings will contain complete synopses of the two meetings. Of minor historic note is the fact that the Fall meeting was the largest in attendance in the Academy's history. I am grateful to the Programs in Professional Education of the Harvard Graduate School of Education for its logistical services in arranging the Fall meeting.

Four Academy-sponsored books have been published in 1979, all of them commissioned during the incumbency of my distinguished predecessor Patrick Suppes. The works include:

Impact of Research on Education: Some Case Studies. Edited by Patrick Suppes, 1978.

Anthropology and Education. Report of the Committee on Anthropology and Education. Lambros Comitas, Chairman.

Education for Employment: Knowledge for Action. Report of the Task Force on Education and Employment. Clark Kerr, Chairman.

Economic Dimensions of Education. Edited by Douglas M. Windham. Report of the Committee on the Economics and Finance of Education.

Demand for Academy publications has been gratifying. Up to October 1, 1979 the Academy, in addition to disseminating a large number of complimentary copies of the *Proceedings* and committee reports, has sold or disseminated free of charge upon request 2100 items from its current publications list, 813 of which were essay book reviews. Again, these are in addition to a substantial complimentary list of members, other distinguished educators, certain public officials, and the educational and editorial press. Under the able leadership of Jack Carroll, the review program is continuing. During 1979 Jack has commissioned or requested reviews on:

1) International Encyclopaedia of Higher Education (10 vols.)

2) A series of books on cognitive psychology and instruction

3) 1976 reports by NIE on compensatory education

4) NSF's studies of science, math, and social science education

5) National Center for Educational Statistics, Condition of Education

Three extended book reviews were completed in 1979:

1) The Methodology of International Evaluation of Education Achievement.

International Studies in Evaluation (9 Volumes), International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Reviewed by Ellis B. Page.

2) The Overeducated American?

The Overeducated American by Richard Freeman. Reviewed by James P. Smith and Finis Welch.

3) How Scholars From Abroad View Higher Education in America: A Review of Essays Sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

Any Person, Any Study: An Essay on Higher Education in the United States by Eric Ashby

American Higher Education: Directions Old and New by Joseph Ben-David
The Academic System in American Society by Alain Touraine. Reviewed by Merle L. Borrowman

Two new Academy books are in the process of being negotiated: a series of essays on the Impact of Trade Unionism and American Education to be supervised and edited by George W. Angell, and a two year study of The Value Assumptions Underlying American Educational Policy and Practice.

Much of my time has been spent in organizing, conducting, writing, or editing task force deliberations addressed to current issues of educational policy. At the request of Assistant Secretary of HEW for Education, Mary Berry, the Academy undertook two studies in 1979: a study of the Appropriate Federal Role in Education, and a commemorative panel study of the twenty-five year history of the Brown decision. Both of these studies have been sent to Academy members and other copies have been disseminated widely.

"The Appropriate Federal Role..." Task Force included distinguished educators and scholars who disagreed about the desirability of creating a separate Department of Education but who were united on the basic value assumptions that should underlie the Federal government's presence in American education generally, whether or not a new Department would be created. Harry Marmion served as rapporteur. The Department is now a reality. It is hoped that those responsible for its structure and functions will ponder the Academy's report.

The Brown study, Prejudice and Pride, was a more complicated undertaking. It was also slightly traumatic for the Academy. Roughly twenty panelists representing major scholarly differences about the meaning and effect of Brown were called together under Academy auspices. The jury, predictably, was hung. Bob Havighurst ably chaired two contentious sessions. The Academy's President, acting as rapporteur, tried to reflect with care the various positions reflected among the panelists. Once the report was printed, attempts were made within HEW to "deep-six" it. Loose comments about the quality of the report were issued by junior officials of the Department. Finally, it became clear that the real issue was not the quality of the report but its "appropriateness" in political terms. HEW was embarrassed by the ensuing publicity in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and elsewhere. The report was finally officially published by HEW and, as a result of the unpredicted publicity, has done a land-office business ever since. The lesson is not that the Academy should avoid dealing with controversial issues. Risk is inherent in policy analysis. The lesson is that the Academy should not take on studies with impossible deadlines, and that it must from the beginning retain control of the publication of the materials it generates. I must emphasize that throughout the contretemps with HEW, Mary Berry was straight as an arrow, and was an open defender of the quality and importance of the Academy's work.

During the summer of 1979, under a contract from the National Institute of Education, NAEd put on two two-week workshops on Educational Research Management, for selected women and minorities. Organized and managed by John May, Peggy Dolan, and Linda Harbig, the workshops were held at Georgetown University from June 10th to June 23rd and from July 29th to August 11th. A number of Academy members participated in various aspects of the workshops. Subject matter ranged from research proposal conceptualization, through proposal drafting, to negotiating contracts, managing research teams, editing and disseminating final products, and contract close-outs. Over 350 young scholars applied. Forty were chosen -- twenty for each workshop. Most participants found the workshops valuable. A minority of members in the first workshop were highly critical. Some of their criticisms enabled NAEd to improve the quality of the second workshop. Other criticisms will be carefully noted if the Academy continues to sponsor national or regional workshops of this kind. As a result of the careful work of the selection/review committee, the workshop attendees were both spirited and uncommonly bright. It is hoped that they will develop and retain personal and scholarly relationships with a number of Academy members in like fields of interest in the years ahead.

After two years of helping to create a Washington office as a policy-related presence in the Nation's capitol, and in view of the extraordinary administrative talents of Linda Harbig, I have been able to reduce my time commitment to the Academy from one-half to one-fifth. This has enabled me to accept responsibility at Harvard for directing the Division of Administration, Planning, and Social Policy of the Harvard Graduate School of Education. I am still able to assign roughly one day a week to Academy business.

I wish to thank John May for his staff consultancies of NAEd logistical and financial planning during the first year-and-a-half of my incumbency. His services were invaluable. John has now become Director of Administration for the National Alcohol Fuels Commission.

There are difficult tasks ahead assuring the Academy of the basic resources it needs in carrying out its essential scholarly functions. It would be reasonably easy to turn the Academy into simply another soft-money entrepreneur. This, I believe, must be resisted at all costs. NAEd should take government-sponsored responsibilities only when such overtures fit into the Academy's own sense of priorities and appropriateness. My guess is that with the creation of a new Department of Education, NAEd's informal as well as formal inputs into the policy process will increase in Washington. But the heart of the Academy is the concept of unhurried and responsible intellectual activities and exchanges. If we lose that saliency we will soon be of no use to the larger society, let alone to each other.

The Academy has been saddened by the death in 1979 of two of its illustrious members: William A. Brownell and Sidney L. Pressey. Appropriate memorial essays are being commissioned.

Finally, the Academy basks in the signal honor award to one of its members. During the second week in October, 1979, Theodore W. Schultz received a Nobel Prize for his seminal work in human capital.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen K. Bailey

Stephen K. Bailey
President

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION SPRING MEETING
The Claremont Resort Hotel/Berkeley, California
May 11-12, 1979

Friday, May 11	9:00-11:45 a.m.	The Carnegie Council, Past and Future
		Clark Kerr, Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education Ernest L. Boyer, U. S. Office of Education James G. March, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Roger W. Heyns, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
	2:00-3:30 p.m.	The Educational Implications of Carnegie II
		Wilbert J. McKeachie, Center for Research on Learning and Teaching, University of Michigan Stephen K. Bailey, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University
	3:45-5:00 p.m.	A Comparative Study of Higher Education
		Burton Clark, Yale University Martin Trow, University of California, Berkeley Torsten Husen, University of Stockholm
	Pre-dinner Address	Decline in Basic Skills David S. Saxon
Saturday, May 12	7:30-9:00 a.m.	Business Breakfast
	9:00-10:15 a.m.	The Concept of Freedom Schooling
		Vincent P. Franklin, Yale University Ronald Batchelor, Brooklyn College
	10:30-11:45 a.m.	The Loss of Local Education Control: Illusion or Reality
		Michael W. Kirst, School of Education, Stanford University Ewald B. Nyquist, Pace University Francis Keppel, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Harvard University

REPORT OF THE SPRING 1979 MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION

by Marilyn Tobias*

The National Academy of Education convened its Spring 1979 Meeting on May 11 and 12 at the Claremont Resort Hotel in Berkeley, California. Formal presentations included a symposium on "The Carnegie Council, Past and Future," with Clark Kerr, Roger W. Heyns and James G. March; an analysis of "The Educational Implications of Carnegie II" (Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting) by Stephen K. Bailey and Wilbert J. McKeachie; a presentation on the comparative study of the organization and government of higher education, "Comparative Analysis of Systems of Higher Education," by Burton Clark with commentary by Martin Trow; a report of a proposal for improving the motivation and achievement of students in urban public schools, "The Concept of Freedom Schooling," by Vincent Franklin and Ronald Batchelor, and a discussion of "The Loss of Local Education Control: Illusion or Reality," by Ewald B. Nyquist and Michael W. Kirst.

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*Rapporteur for Spring, 1979 meeting. Currently President of Potomac Educational Resources, Inc., Washington, D.C.

David S. Saxon, President, University of California system, was the after-dinner speaker at the evening session on May 11. He discussed the problem of the decline in basic skills of high school graduates and explained how the University of California system is trying to deal with this problem through the Bay Area Writing Project.

The Carnegie Council, Past and Future

The morning session was devoted to a symposium on the Carnegie Council. Clark Kerr, Roger Heyns and James March discussed the history and achievements of the Commission and Council and offered suggestions regarding the future work and operation of the Council.

During his introduction of the first guest speaker, Academy President Stephen K. Bailey paid tribute to Clark Kerr for his "extraordinary work" over the past decade as chairman of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1967-73) and the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education (1974 - present; Kerr is scheduled to retire in 1980). Bailey noted that the "thoughtful, literate, policy-oriented books" that were produced as a result of the Commission's and Council's efforts had an "important impact on state/federal legislation," and will be referred to in coming generations" for historic and heuristic reasons.

Kerr began his presentation with an overview of the origins, nature and rules of operation of the Commission and the Council. He noted the precedent of other large-scale inquiries initiated by either the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching or the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Such inquiries include: the Flexner Report in the earlier part of the century which helped to transform medical education, the work of the Commission on Financing Higher Education in the late 1940's and early 1950's, and James B. Conant's Study of the American High School in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

The trustees of the Carnegie Foundation, Kerr explained, decided they would like to follow up Conant's work on secondary education with a large-scale study of the financing of higher education. When Kerr was invited to chair this special commission, he argued that the financing issues could not be studied adequately without a broader examination of the structure and functions of higher education. Agreeing with Kerr's observations, the trustees of the Foundation designated the project "the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education," a name soon shortened to the "Carnegie Commission on Higher Education."

"Originally," Kerr continued, "the members of the Commission were well-known leaders of higher education, primarily members of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching." Over time, other members were added to make the Commission more "representative in composition." With the establishment of the Council in 1974, "membership became representational...This change in composition, aimed at making the group more progressive and liberal, made for some important differences in the orientation of the group," Kerr noted. When the Commission was composed of "well-known leaders," the organization was "more daring in what they did and more willing to stand up to all of higher education." Ironically, "when it was more representative, the organization ended up being more cautious and conservative."

Kerr explained that in the process of formulating the Commission's basic rules of operation, the members looked at earlier studies and considered the recommendations of a number of individuals and groups. Conant, for example, advised them to make recommendations which were "absolutely specific," and to report to "an audience able to act." The Zook Commission (Presidential Commission on Higher Education, 1946-7, chaired by George F. Zook) had urged that "not too many recommendations be made in any one report." That Commission also cautioned that the recommendations not be "too far out," while the Association of American Universities advised that the "recommendations not be completely supportive of the status quo."

A "basic rule of operation," of the Commission, according to Kerr, was its independence. Kerr noted, for example, that in its first report, Quality and Equality: New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education, the Carnegie Commission "came out against federal lump sum grants to institutions at a time when all of higher education supported this proposal." Instead, the Commission supported federal grants to students, especially low-income students. Eventually, the Commission's proposal was adopted by Congress. Kerr stated that there are two areas of controversy regarding the operation of the Council in the next decade: "Should more time be spent on dissemination?" and "Should the reports be based on the view of the people on the front line rather than research, as has been the practice?"

Following his discussion of the Commission's basic rules of operation, Kerr reviewed the various reports and special studies of the Commission and the Council. The Commission produced 22 reports including five on equality of opportunity, six on academic reform, four on financing, three on governance and four special reports on health, college graduates and the labor market, evaluation of higher education and black colleges. The Council's reports include four on financing, two on equality of opportunity, one on health. two on governance and two on academic reform. The Commission and Council also sponsored more than 100 volumes of special studies. Among the Council's recent publications is a report on the ethical decay in higher education -- Fair Practices in Higher Education: Rights and Responsibilities of Students and Their Colleges in a Period of Intensified Competition for Enrollments. In this volume, Kerr said, the Council calls for "internal reform to combat such disturbing signs of ethical decay as high default rates on student loans, cheating on examinations, competitive giving of grades and deceptive advertising." The final report of the present Council, More Than Survival, focuses on the decades of the 1980's and 90's.

Kerr reflected upon the purposes and impact of the Commission and the Council, stating that the Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, like its predecessor, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, "sought to be an independent, friendly, informed voice on higher education." The Commission and Council "sought to inform practitioners and the public and to influence policy." In assessing the Commission's and Council's impact, Kerr stressed the importance of the group as a private commission. Such a commission, Kerr remarked, "can have a wider range of impact than one that is set up by political leaders." Political commissions are frequently "fraught with delays, draw fire, and are often used as trial balloons." The Commission and the Council, in contrast, have been "able to dispense real advice." Analyzing the impact of the Commission and Council, Kerr noted the difficulty of evaluating a body which is only making recommendations -- a problem like that of considering the impact of a book.

In deciding whether the Council should continue after Kerr's retirement, Kerr said that a survey was conducted of knowledgeable people in the field of education. These education leaders concluded that the Council's reports and studies made an important contribution to higher education literature, and that the Commission's and Council's description and analysis of higher education contributed greatly to the level of the discussion and debate. They noted that the recommendations of the Commission most clearly affecting national policy were those relating to federal student aid and health, indicating that they had a direct impact on federal student aid legislation and the Health Manpower Act of 1971.

Kerr concluded his discussion by describing how the educational environment had changed from 1967, the period in which the Commission was established to the present. "One has to be impressed with how much higher education has changed over a short period of time," Kerr remarked. "The issues have changed -- it is a less dynamic period -- and both public support and public interest are down," Kerr observed. In his assessment of higher education, Kerr noted the "enormous diversity of higher education in this country." "No generalization about it is true," Kerr stated, adding that higher education is characterized by a "great adaptability to changing circumstances." In this country, higher education is "run by the market; the market is almost supreme." One is struck by "how much tension and antagonism there is below the surface," Kerr continued. This is illustrated, he noted, by the "intensity of battles in many of the states between community colleges and comprehensive institutions." "Below the genteel surface," Kerr concluded, "there are a lot of difficult battles being waged."

Following Kerr's presentation, Roger W. Heyns, President of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and James G. March, Professor of Management, Stanford University, provided varying perspectives on the evaluation and impact of the Commission and Council and proposed agendas and methods of operation for the Council in the decade of the 80's. Heyns began his appraisal with a perspective on "the process of social and institutional change drawn from John Gardner's observations about the development of federal policy." According to Gardner, "Very few, almost no, major policy innovations are enacted at the federal level that are not preceded by years (say three to ten years) of national discussion and debate. The national dialogue is an untidy but impressive process. Ideas that will eventually become the basis for some major innovation in federal policy are first put into circulation by individuals and small groups." (John Gardner as quoted by Harlan Cleveland in Cleveland's address before the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, July 12, 1977.) "While Gardner is talking about federal policy," Heyns remarked, "it is equally applicable to educational policy at any level--inside an institution and at all levels of government. The appeal of the Gardner quote lies not only in its descriptive accuracy, but also because of the skepticism about the methodology of evaluation brought about by training as a psychologist."

Keeping this perspective in mind, Heyns asked, "What did the Council do?" He answered, "The Council assembled a group of thoughtful, intelligent and respected people and gave them the opportunity to reflect upon virtually all of the problems of higher education for more than a decade." It "provided a unique man, Clark Kerr, with the resources to direct his energy, daring and impressive intelligence to these same problems." And it "created the opportunity for a very large number of scholars to produce monographs and books on these same problems." This was "a remarkable assemblage of talent over a prolonged period on problems of significance." It was an important thing to do, and the studies that were produced were generally of high quality," Heyns remarked.

Turning to the future work of the Council, Heyns suggested policy issues which might be examined, and addressed the question of the Council's future method of operation. "Internationalizing the curriculum," Heyns noted, "is an item of unfinished business... we are not producing international citizens. Although Stephen Bailey's book, Higher Education in the World Community (1977) has done much to prop up the idea, we are still only paying lip service to this issue," he continued. The Carnegie Council "should also do a study of schools of education. A Flexner Report on schools of education is needed during this time of concern about quality of public education. A third issue the Council might explore," said Heyns, "is the question of moral/ethical education. The Council," Heyns commented, "should not concentrate on the lack of money; they should find problems to which the solution need not be more money."

Regarding procedures to be followed, Heyns suggested that "some studies be done in collaboration with other establishments, such as centers for the study of a higher education, associations and institutions such as Brookings." "A partnership with existing agencies would elevate the quality of the study and help in the implementation process," Heyns concluded.

March framed his appraisal of the Council with an analysis of the evaluation of policy/planning studies and the problems of planners/policymakers. He noted the "illusion of impotence and wrong recommendation" when we attempt to answer the question, "what marginal difference did the Council make for American education policy, and how much?" While there are "some areas of connection between recommendations and outcomes," March stated, "if we try in any systematic way to make this type of connection, it is hard to show that anything makes a difference." It is "hard to justify anything at the margin; it is at the cumulative level" where it makes a significant difference. "We need to ask more analytical and experiential questions," March stated.

March highlighted the dilemmas of planners/policymakers and the problems for planning and formulating policy. "Most planning and policy analysts exclude unlikely events from their focus; they focus on a vision of the world where no unlikely events occur." This leads them to "concentrate on the consequences of likely change" and to ignore "unlikely dynamics." They thus "plan for a future that inevitably will not exist." Another problem is that "every policy proposal is an intervention, not a solution, but a strategic action." The attempt to be "politically strategic becomes more severe the closer one comes to a change or real importance in the policy planning process."

According to March, we need "some unsensible planners" who can "solicit trust and be influential through the gradual change of the world view by communication and dialogue." In contrast to Heyns' advice to tie policy studies to implementation, March suggested that the Council "maintain some distance from immediate planning and policy." They should "move toward areas of irrelevance."

The Council's impact, method of operation and future work were probed further in the exchange between the panelists and the audience. In discussing the past and future of the Council, discussants also raised questions about funding and structural arrangements for research at the higher education level, and the future of universities as major research centers.

Torsten Husén discussed the importance of the Council as an independent commission, its impact in helping to equalize educational opportunities, and the use of the Council's research in Europe.

"One has to be aware of the distinct advantage that the Carnegie Council has as a private enterprise," Husén remarked. He stressed the ability of the Council to operate in an independent manner as compared, for instance, to governmental commissions in Sweden, which "have to operate within the context of reasonable consensus."

"A good example of the impact of the Council," Husén noted, is the "federal student aid legislation based on recommendations made by the Commission." Citing the results of a review by a panel set up through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, he stated that the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants have been "successful in equalizing educational opportunity in America." Husén also reported that the social science research of the Commission and Council has had a "great impact on the European continent, where it is widely read and discussed."

Martin Trow noted the importance of the Commission and Council "in raising the quality of the discussion of higher education. "They talked about problems in ways in which people in individual institutions were not able to," Trow observed, adding that the Commission and Council "helped to shape the discussion, to legitimize higher education to the larger society and to dignify the enterprise at large."

Several discussants offered suggestions regarding the future work of the Council. Stephen Bailey stressed the importance of studying the "role of the academic professional association in this world of detrimental budgets... an issue that should be reexamined in relation to the health of higher education." Bailey asked, "What is going to happen to disciplinary strength if these associations go under?" Responding to Bailey's query, Lyman Glenny stated that this may be a period in which we "have to re-think what these professional societies stand for and what kinds of associations are really needed in the disciplinary areas."

Lawrence Cremin suggested that the Council undertake a study of schools of education and of professional education. "In so far as people have looked at higher education and written books, historically they tend to see the definition of the problem as liberal vs. professional." "I hope," Cremin noted, "that when Boyer (Ernest Boyer will succeed Clark as head of the Carnegie Council) redefines the problem, higher education becomes more of an inclusive category and the old definition is discarded... If the Council considered the history of professional education in this way, they would find a fresh field of work."

In suggesting possible agendas for Boyer to consider, the panelists and audience also commented upon the question of the internationalization of education. Bailey stated that while he was at the American Council on Education, he spent some time considering what the phrase "global education" means. While his efforts resulted in his editorship of a book aimed at confronting this issue, (Higher Education in the World Community, 1977) he stressed the problem of how "fragmented" this area is.

Several discussants raised questions about funding and structural arrangements for research at the higher education level and the future of universities as centers of applied and basic research. Citing the human impact and privacy laws regarding social science research as examples, Bailey commented upon the problem of "government putting an increasing number of constraints upon the conduct of research." Under such conditions, and during a period in which obtaining adequate funding is a problem, universities will have to make "tough decisions to preserve the integrity of the research function," Bailey stated.

H. Thomas James remarked that we must recognize the fact that foundation funds for research are now quite limited and that most of the "research funding is going to come from the government in the future." Trow responded by stressing the importance of this private funding, "even if it amounts to only the one percent that James stated." Referring to a possible problem with the use of government funds, Trow noted the danger of researchers "picking up clues" as to what results are wanted when they examine controversial issues. The limited funds available from the foundations are important in helping to "maintain the integrity of the research effort," Trow stated.

Regarding the future of universities as major research centers, March indicated that we must consider the possibility that universities are declining as centers for research. "Young, well-trained, principal investigators are now less likely to be found in universities, and they are drawing money away from the universities," March stated. Citing the decision of the Ford Foundation to withdraw support for developing universities abroad, and the consideration of the Rockfeller Foundation to do the same, Kerr stated that these actions are reflective of "the idea that universities are not so useful to society and, therefore, why should we support them?" "With the use of government money and private researchers," Kerr continued, "education is often looked on as less of a resource, and is being used less in helping to solve problems." "There is a danger," Kerr remarked, "that by the year 2,000, universities may not be looked on as the home of science and social science research."

Suggesting possible reasons for this situation, Heyns cited the inability of the universities to marshal resources when they face problems, and noted how "slowly universities adapt to environmental changes...All our theories are about growth. There is no theory about vitality in this period," Heyns remarked. And while government regulations are serious problems, "a lot of these intrusions came out of our own atrocities."

Glenny stated that one reason "universities are suffering in the research angle," is that "most outside agencies that conduct research for the government are better able to force interdisciplinary activities and team work" that are needed for these research efforts. Hilgard referred to the organization of universities into disciplines as a source of the problem. He noted that research problems often "fall between the disciplines, and there is much romanticism in the universities about the disciplines and the desirability of each having their own headquarters."

Ralph Tyler took a different view, stating that, historically, there have been successful attempts at interdisciplinary research and team efforts at universities. Citing his experience at the University of Chicago under Hutchins, Tyler reported that in addition to departments in the disciplinary areas, they had eight interdisciplinary committees (e.g. Social Thought, Human Development, International Relations).

There was much "interdisciplinary research and team teaching," Tyler stated.

March stated that when we consider research and development problems for the university, we should differentiate between fundamental and applied research. He cautioned that when we think about the extent to which the university wants to engage in applied research, we consider "the consequences for the university culture."

The Educational Implications of Carnegie II

During the first part of the afternoon session Stephen Bailey, Professor of Education, Harvard University, and Wilbert McKeachie, Center for Research on Learning and Teaching, discussed the implications for education of A Public Trust (Bantam Books, 1979), the report of the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting.

Bailey provided an overview of the background of the first Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting (1967), the problems of the present system of public broadcasting and the convening of Carnegie II. The first Carnegie panel "looked at the need for a system of public broadcasting in the U.S.," said Bailey. Many of the recommendations of the panel became part of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. As a result, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting was established and the CPB created the two present organizations for public radio and TV, National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting Service. The plan, however, has proved "unsuccessful in several important ways," according to Bailey. Carnegie II was convened to examine the present system and to make recommendations, including, he said, "what a public system should do in the instructional field."

Bailey then explained several flaws in the present system. The first, he said, is "structural problems involving an overlap in jurisdiction." Due to design problems in the process of creating the PBS and CPB, questions arose "as to who was to control the system, who would dominate the field, how much money to keep, what was going to be produced, and how it would be disseminated."

A second flaw, Bailey noted, is the "failure of the device to insulate the system from politics, especially during the Nixon Administration." The CPB board was "supposed to act as a buffer between attempts of politicians to control TV and producers of the programs." Nixon tried to "take over the CPB, and succeeded, and the programming decisions reflected this." Nixon "appointed friends of senators to the board positions, and these positions began to become political chips."

"Problems of elitism and problems of mediocrity" are the third flaw, according to Bailey. Programming was skewed to an elitist mode, catering to an upper-middle class audience interested in cultural programs. Even with this audience, however, there were "a lot of mediocre programs."

Flaw number four is "problems of finance." This, Bailey characterized as a "tale of woe... In order to aggregate enough money," Bailey noted, "veto power was given to corporations supplying the needed funds, and this created problems editorially. Flaw Number five, Bailey said, is minimal use of the public broadcasting system in the instructional field.

Bailey had served on the Carnegie II panel; other members included Chairman William J. McGill (President, Columbia University); Red Burns (Executive Director, Alternate Media Center, New York University); Henry J. Cauthen (Director, South Carolina Educational Television Network); Peggy Charren (President, Action for Children's Television); Wilbur B. Davenport, Jr. (Professor of Communications, Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Virginia Duncan (Board Member, Corporation for Public Broadcasting); Eli N. Evans (President, Charles H. Revson Foundation); John W. Gardner (Common Cause); Alex Haley (Author); Walter W. Heller (Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota); Jessie R. Johnson (Board Member, National Public Radio); Kenneth Mason (President, Quaker Oats Company); Kathleen Nolan (President, Screen Actors Guild); J. Leonard Reinsch (Chairman, Cox Broadcasting Corporation); and Thomas Rivera (Executive Vice-President, University of Texas at El Paso).

According to Bailey, the panel heard testimony from 227 people, visited two dozen places around the country (including major TV and radio stations), and spent considerable time in internal discussion.

The panel came to the conclusion that "the Corporation for Public Broadcasting was beyond the point of salvage even with someone like Bob Fleming as the head." (Fleming recently assumed this position.) The panel recommended that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting be set aside and the Public Telecommunications Trust be established in its place. A number of structural changes were suggested in order to eliminate problems in the present system. The PTT would be governed by a 9 member board, serving staggered nine-year terms that could not be renewed. The President would appoint members from a list drawn up by a panel headed by the Librarian and including members of the Smithsonian Institution, the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation.

The second recommended structural change was the establishment of a Program Services Endowment within the PTT, with its own board. This would help to ensure the separation of administrative responsibilities of the PTT and the programming responsibilities of the Endowment. The 15 member board would serve staggered three-year terms, and they would choose a director. The Endowment "would make decisions on program dollars." This, Bailey noted, "would give the program part a substantial buffer against what happened with Nixon." The Commission also recommended that "most future federal financing be tied to a matching-grants formula." Public radio and television stations would receive $1 in federal money for every $1.50 they raised. The Endowment would receive federal funds equal to half of the total matching funds given to the individual stations.

In discussing the recommendations relating to technology and learning and the educational implications of Carnegie II, Bailey stressed that "dramatic changes were coming with the technological revolution...No one really understands the economics of telecommunications devices coming down the pike (e.g. cable, satellites, video tapes, computers, discs, use of fiber optics), but it will make obsolete what we have now...There is no way of knowing what will happen, but these developments should be monitored for instructional purposes, and funds should be made available to people working on instructional frontiers."

Bailey noted that the panel called for an increased federal investment in the instructional use of telecommunications. They recommended more funding for research on what the media can teach best, and for the development of programs that test and demonstrate the potential of telecommunications for learning. We also need to "improve the capacity of teachers to use the machinery" and to "upgrade the production talent as well as the resources in order to eliminate the unevenness and mediocrity of programs." "In terms of straight pedagogical material, the telecommunications revolution will be friendly to the learning process in comparison to the linear model," Bailey concluded.

McKeachie approached the question of "The Educational Implications of Carnegie II," from the perspective of our knowledge of the teaching-learning process and the impact of TV on education. "According to psychologists," McKeachie stated, "students are learning all the time. But usually when we talk about learning, we are talking about certain types of education, generalized beyond the given situation...TV is particularly good for providing situations in which we can learn visual discrimination." Research, McKeachie noted, also indicates that we see people on TV as models, and that "we can learn better from seeing how the model does the thing, then by doing it ourselves. The media tends to heighten focusing." Citing the role of the media in the Proposition 13 movement, McKeachie stated, "A nascent social movement gets publicity and makes it a self-fulfilling prophecy. If there are no countervailing forces, the influence of TV may be very great... When we think about education and TV, we ought to think about both the formal and informal aspects. The informal may be more potent than we think of generally...TV creates agendas, provides stimulus, enhances interest and establishes a sense of the range of particular behaviors about something...Its indirect influence on the way children and adults structure their world may be more important than the direct."

McKeachie then considered the ways in which we can enhance the use of TV for instructional purposes. "If we are concerned with conceptual learning," McKeachie stated, "we should emphasize straight content." To increase the effectiveness of lecturing, it is important to take pauses, to keep things well-paced. "If we are going to use the material, we need ways of getting people to do things in their head with what they see on educational TV." We need, McKeachie said, to stimulate family or group discussions. There should be a greater connection between people in the telecommunications area and teacher-trainers, and teachers should be trained to use media-related material. It is very important to "develop a cadre of educational TV producers who are constrained somewhat by what we know about educational television, and who are commited to education on TV, and we need to provide them with a source of income. The recommendations of Carnegie II should be helpful in accomplishing this," McKeachie concluded.

Comments during the discussion period related to the role of technology in lifelong learning, teaching, and new areas of research. The more effective use of telecommunications for instructional purposes, and the influence of commercial TV on public TV were also discussed. In reference to the first point, Cross stressed the importance of the new technology in providing a great variety of learning options and its potential role in lifelong learning. She cited the recent experience of having her lecture at a community college videotaped as one example of the institutional use of technology. "Community colleges," Cross noted, "use such instructional aids far more than four-year institutions." Claire Weinstein commented that the impact of the new technology on potential areas of research has not been well-addressed. "Now, through the use of simulation," she said, "we are able to study problem-solving strategies, and this promises to be an exciting area of research."

Cremin noted that when we consider the more effective use of telecommunications for instructional purposes, we should recognize the fact that what is shown on public TV will be influenced by what is happening on commercial TV. "Whatever public TV teaches, it teaches within the context of what commercial TV does," Cremin remarked. In considering the use of TV, we must realize that what the child learns on TV "is mediated by the family." An important pedagogical problem, Cremin stated, is the use of TV to teach students a "critical mode of viewing."

A Comparative Study of Higher Education

During the afternoon session, Burton Clark, Yale University, presented a paper prepared for the Academy on a comparative study of the organization and government of higher education. Martin Trow, University of California, Berkeley, and Torsten Husén, Stockholm University, served as respondents. The complete text of Clark's paper, "Comparative Analysis of Systems of Higher Education," is to be found on page 60.

Following Clark's address, Trow and Husén discussed the concepts and analysis outlined by Clark, and provided additional perspectives on the study of comparative higher education. Trow began his review by stressing the importance of the concepts developed by Clark. These concepts "help us to clarify and explain the situation in various countries, and to formulate problems for research," Trow remarked. Trow noted, however, the need "to go outside the framework" offered by Clark, and to "place it in a broader context." Citing Clark's statement that it was central to his work to "leave a huge hole in the middle of analysis until we get inside the black box of organization," Trow stated that we "may need to get outside the black box." Within this context, he stressed the importance of looking at "social and historical sources, specific historical patterns and political culture."

"A broader context," noted Trow, "will help to identify and illuminate cross-national patterns of change." He cited the importance of looking at such questions as the loss of authority of the professoriate, the general decline of the acceptance of authority in society, the roots of the present corporatism in Swedish society, the distribution of power and authority in the university, the greater politicization of the university and the intrusion of political considerations into the curriculum, teaching and learning.

Husén discussed Clark's paper from a perspective similar to that of Trow's. He commented on changes in the Swedish system of higher education since the 1950's (especially since the Higher Education Acts of 1963 and 1975, and the recent legislation on participation in decision-making at the work-place, and on job security). "We should try to pursue the discipline of the comparative study of higher education along the lines Clark is spelling out, but we should not be limited to the black box," Husén remarked. "We should view it," Husén continued, "in the larger social context."

Turning to the example of the Swedish system, Husén stated that "the changes that in all respects have taken place in higher education in Sweden since the mid-1950's have been more dramatic, not to say revolutionary, than in America. The involvement of American society in university affairs has been evident since the establishment of the land grant colleges. "Two things in particular happened much more dramatically than in the U.S.: the enrollment explosion and the change in the social composition of the students." In the U.S., "enrollment has been soaring over a long period since the 1940's, and has not been concentrated to about one decade, as has been the case in Sweden."

In Sweden, until about 1950, only one percent of the 1821 year-olds from working class backgrounds were enrolled in the universities. "The total enrollment in higher education by 1955 was about 15,000 students," Husén stated. "It increased almost tenfold over less than 15 years," Husén reported. As a result of changes in the last few years, enrollment has increased even further.

There are also marked differences in the nature of the student body. In addition to academic criteria for admission into the university, Husén noted, "age, work experience and participation in community affairs are also taken into consideration." The student body now includes many students age 25 or older who are enrolled on a part-time basis, and who want to limit their course of study "to specific courses that can be fitted into a careerweb. Swedish higher education now faces a "tremendous conflict between excellence on the one hand and equality on the other."

Husén discussed changes in the governance system since the enactment of the Higher Education Acts of 1963 and 1975, and the recent legislation relating to job security and participation. In 1950 when the universities were considered "high prestige, ivory-tower institutions of limited significance for people in general, higher education was pretty much left alone." That was the "era of professorial feudalism." "Now various public interest groups have come into the university governing bodies," Husén stated. This development is in line with the "increased corporativism in present-day Swedish society." There is a "strong tendency in Sweden for big labor to move into a political role it did not have before." This has had a "tremendous effect on the university," and one now finds "significant conflicts between the principle of competence on the one hand and participation on the other," Husén concluded.

Decline in Basic Skills: The Bay Area Writing Project

The evening session featured an after-dinner address by David Saxon, **President**, University of California system. Saxon discussed the problem of the decline in basic skills of high school graduates, and explained how the University of California system is trying to deal with this problem through the Bay Area Writing Project.

Saxon began his remarks by noting that four years ago in his talk to the Academy meeting about the "Problems and Potentials for Higher Education in the Next Decade," he had referred to the marked decline in English and mathematics skills of entering students. Citing the situation at the University of California as an example, he noted that this problem is not limited to minority students. Despite the fact that the University of California admits only the top one-eighth of the graduating class, many of these students were deficient in the basic skills competencies such as writing and math.

"The problem," he noted, "cuts across the board." It is "not just something to do with bringing in minority students." The general concern, nationwide, regarding "the decline in basic skills of high school graduates has continued, and that decline is far from arrested," Saxon remarked.

We are dealing with a "twin pair of problems: the characteristics of the students who come into the university and the students who don't make it at all," Saxon observed. Highlighting the implications of bringing minority students into the mainstream through the educational process, Saxon stated that "lots of students who don't finish high school are cut off from participation without even completing the first step, and most of these students are minority students. Faculty tend to deal with such problems, "Saxon commented, "by addressing the question of admissions standards." This, however, "is an indirect approach" and is fraught with much conflict. The issue is frequently perceived "as a battle between access and quality, and no one is willing to compromise." Much controversy is engendered over the use of objective test scores, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test, as the method of judging student potential. "The real problem," Saxon contended, "is the character and quality of the education of young people in lower schools."

Within this context, Saxon discussed the nature and impact of the Bay Area Writing Project. The Project, begun in 1974 with funds from the University of California at Berkeley, is aimed at improving the quality of student writing. According to Saxon, the assumptions underlying this project are that first, "Writing is a problem shared by the universities and the schools. The problem can best be dealt with by cooperative effort. Second," Saxon said, "although much has been learned about the teaching of writing in the 1960's and 70's, it has not been incorporated into the teacher-training programs. Third," Saxon concluded, "the best way to teach writing is to find successful teachers of writing so that they can then demonstrate their skill to others."

Saxon discussed the positive results thus far, the plans to expand the project, and the long-range importance of such programs. The percentage of entering University of California students that have to take remedial courses has declined from 50% to 30%. A comprehensive analysis, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, substantiates an increase in the quality of writing of the participants' students after the teachers took part in the program. With the apparent success of the Bay Area Writing Project, similar programs are now being thought about in mathematics, Saxon reported. They are now also beginning to focus on the junior high schools as well as the senior high schools. In order to encourage students to finish high school and to continue on to college, university faculty visit junior high schools and talk to students about college opportunities and the need for early preparation. They stress "the genuine opportunity available if the students take the initial steps," Saxon explained.

The University of California is now working with 250 junior high schools and 10,000 students, according to Saxon. "This is the largest program in the country. About one million dollars is being spent on the Project; slightly more than one-half of the funds are from the University of California, with the remainder from the state." Pointing to the potential significance of programs such as the Bay Area Project, Saxon stated that, "If every institution could do this, it could produce significant results 10 or 12 years from now."

Saxon concluded by posing three unresolved questions which should engage the attention of educators: 1) "Why can't we teach the basic skills on the elementary and secondary level?" 2) "Why have we failed in foreign language education on the elementary and secondary levels (and the university level as well)?" 3) "Why can't we turn the bi-lingual capacity of many of our students (Chicano students, for example) into an advantage?" In closing, Saxon noted that "education is a tool by which minority students enter the mainstream," and such projects as the Bay Area Project "can be important in seeing that this becomes a reality, as well as raising the achievement level of students in general."

May 12

The Concept of Freedom Schooling

During the first part of the morning session, Vincent Franklin, Yale University, and Ronald Batchelor, Brooklyn College, provided an overview of a proposal for improving the motivation and achievement of students in urban public schools, "The Concept of Freedom Schooling." Their presentations were drawn from a recent article by Franklin and Batchelor in Teachers College Record ("Freedom Schooling: A New Approach to Federal Local Cooperation in Public Education." In Teachers College Record, December 1978, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 223-248).

Franklin began by commenting on present academic and financial problems in our public elementary and secondary schools. "Most educators and casual observers of the American educational scene," Franklin remarked, "have come to realize that there are presently serious problems facing public elementary and secondary education in the

United States. Each year, while the cost of providing adequate public schooling for American children and adults increases, the traditional economic and societal benefits from providing this schooling decrease," Franklin stated. "Our proposal," Franklin stressed, "offers one possible way to confront academic achievement and motivational problems facing urban public schools." The freedom schooling proposal reflects "a present educational reality," the fact that "most successful and effective learning experiences seem to be taking place in alternative public and private schools."

"Freedom schooling," Franklin explained, "is an educational concept that refers to the new relationship or partnership between the federal government and local school districts, to introduce alternative educational practices, programs, and structures into American public elementary and secondary education. Under the Freedom Schooling program," Franklin stated, "the federal government would evaluate alternative programs and institutions, and provide financial assistance to public school systems actively involved in providing successful alternative schooling."

"The federal government, through freedom schooling, would assist in the establishment of viable alternative education, especially in the arts, while requiring that the alternative schools also improve the basic skills of the publics enrolled," Franklin continued. "With freedom schooling, the emphasis would be on the 'content' as well as the larger curricular objectives, and students will be motivated to learn the basic reading and writing skills through participation in the new and stimulating educational environments." This program "would improve public educational experiences for American children, and bring about improvements in academic achievement levels through the stipulation that funding is tied to the requirement that pupils attending freedom schools demonstrate mastery of the basic literacy skills and achievement in the field of specialization of the individual schools." Teachers and administrators would be held accountable for the progress of the students enrolled, and parents, students, teachers and administrators would work together in this effort.

Franklin stressed that this program could be implemented at little increase in expense to the public, and would greatly improve many federal programs aimed at elevating the quality of educational services in the local school district. "The basic flaw in this strategy," Franklin noted, "is that while federal funds have continued to flow into these local school districts, the academic achievement levels of students throughout the country have continued to drop. "Federal officials," Franklin stated, "have generally not required that some kind of academic or non-academic educational achievement be demonstrated by recipients of federal funds for special programs."

"More recently," Franklin noted, "the federal government has made funds available for the development of 'magnet schools' to help to bring about desegregation in the local school districts." Since "federal officials have not required that public school districts applying for magnet school funds also submit plans for guaranteeing the academic achievement of minority and majority students enrolled in the magnet schools, we have no way of knowing whether or not the enriched alternative educational environments in the magnet schools had any significant impact on the academic and non-academic (i.e. artistic, musical, dance, etc.) achievement of the students enrolled." And as regards the desegregation issue, "reports indicate that magnet schools have not been attracting sufficient numbers of white students."

"In the case of freedom schooling," Franklin emphasized, "from the outset, school districts applying for funds would be required to submit plans for assessing the achievement levels of the pupils to be enrolled. It is our hope that the high quality of the program and instruction available at freedom schools opened in black and predominantly minority school districts would also attract majority students back into the public schools, thereby advancing the desegregation of the individual freedom schools," Franklin stated. Thus, "at no great increase in the expense to the public, freedom schooling would work to improve the motivational, academic and non-academic achievement levels of public school children, assist in school desegregation and most importantly, change the lock step character of American public education," Franklin continued.

Following Franklin's overview of the proposal, Batchelor described their plans for gathering support to implement the program. He outlined three possible alternatives: 1) -- convene a conference on freedom schooling in which various educators would be able to exchange ideas, and enlighten others about alternative schools and magnet schools. 2) -- organize an evaluation team to identify those alternative programs which are successful in bringing about significant changes in the academic and non-academic achievement levels of the students enrolled, and 3) -- designate an experimental school district in which academic competency would be monitored and evaluated.

Batchelor concluded the presentation with a brief report of several alternative schools and programs, and highlighted the importance of the arts in the freedom schooling program. Programs and schools he cited, include the Foreign Language Academy in Houston, the Booker T. Washington School for Engineering Professions in Houston, the Jane A. Berry School and the Epic Heritage Program in Boston. The curriculum of the Foreign Language Academy is designed around the study of the Spanish language and culture. Batchelor stressed the "total curriculum integration," one of the main concerns of the freedom schools. The Booker T. Washington School for high achieving students interested in mathematics also provides "a totally integrated experience," Batchelor stated. At the Jane A. Berry School, an ecology school, and the Epic Heritage Program now being started in Boston, "students," Batchelor explained, "get involved in the history of the particular ethnic groups in the area."

Batchelor stressed the importance of the arts in the freedom schooling proposal. His particular interest is in the "total integration of the performing arts into the curriculum."

"The latest research on the importance of the arts in the social, emotional and intellectual well-being of the young child...as well as the previously successful experiments in using the arts as the content area for instruction in the basic literacy skills, have convinced many educators that the time has arrived for increased utilization of the arts in the rejuvenation of American public education," Batchelor stated. He noted his favorable experience as director of a drama project in Brooklyn, and stressed his concern about "showing the students that they have options and that they can determine their own destinies."

"Public school districts, especially in urban areas with high percentages of low-income students who appear unmotivated by the traditional course of study, would be able to apply for grants to assist in the opening of freedom arts schools where students would be taught the basic reading, writing and mathematical skills through participation in various visual and performing arts programs," Batchelor concluded.

In the question and answer period following Franklin and Batchelor's presentation, Ewald Nyquist asked Franklin to compare the freedom schooling proposal to other programs for improving the education of minority youth, such as Jesse Jackson's program -- EXCEL or PUSH for Excellence. "In Jesse Jackson's program," Franklin replied, "there is no real emphasis on content...Reliance is placed upon a charismatic personality to get the students to go to school and learn." The freedom schooling proposal, on the other hand, suggests that "the student will experience success in the education program involved by mastering a certain body of knowledge." They will want to be there, and they "will stay in school." This eliminates the "need for anyone to say, 'I am good,' as Jesse Jackson's program stresses."

In answer to Nyquist's question, Lawrence Cremin commented that there is an important difference between two predominant models for building effective schools. The Fletcher and Batchelor model "says the problem is a motivational one: teachers who want to teach and students who want to learn." The other model "says it is a matter of building an instructionally effective system with such practices as time-on-task, and in this way there will be an upward spiral...Are we going towards a systems model or a motivational model?" Cremin asked. Franklin responded by saying that he did not consider the two approaches "mutually incompatible. Even in a systems approach," Franklin stated, "it is good to have incentives." In freedom schools "there is a carrot. Funding allows a new system to evolve, and people have a vested interest in the new system."

Torsten Husén asked Franklin for further explanation as to how the program would be financed. Franklin indicated that many elementary and secondary school programs financed by federal funds have not resulted in increasing the academic or non-academic achievement levels of the students. Some of the funds now allocated to programs, which is aimed at increasing the quality of educational services and targeted for specific disciplines, could be shifted to the freedom schools. (Note 28 on p. 248 of the article in Teachers College Record refers to elements which might be shifted to the program.) Thorndike asked if the program would not develop elite schools. Franklin, in response, remarked that the freedom schools "will be considered elite schools because students will learn, and schools will be held accountable."

Clark expressed concern about the "top down effect," and asked why an alternative to the regular program could not be accomplished within the regular schools. Franklin replied that he feels "that the approach they are planning is from the bottom up." Once a school district knows funds are available, it can decide if it wants to get the funds, and to be held accountable for them. In terms of working within the existing school structure, he noted that this is how magnet schools function. One problem with these schools is, that there is "little articulation" between teachers of different disciplines. The freedom schooling program, on the other hand, will have "integrated art schools, science schools, engineering schools, etc." The freedom schools "will hold administrators and teachers accountable for the academic and nonacademic progress of the students."

Ernest Hilgard expressed concern that, given the specialized nature of the education they were receiving, students might have problems if they wanted to transfer to another school. Batchelor stated that "if the school district had five or ten different options, students could experience numerous options within their learning experience." Franklin responded that "since they are building in accountability by grade level, students should have no difficulty in transferring back to different types of educational environments should they want to." Bailey commented upon the curricular balance mandated by state boards of education, noting that Franklin and Batchelor had stressed only a topic area and basic skills. Batchelor replied that he did not see this concern as a major problem: it is "a question of restructuring what is learned." Kerr commented that Batchelor and Franklin were attempting to organize the instructional program "in a way that is perceived by the learner as connected."

The Loss of Education Control: Illusion or Reality

In discussing "The Loss of Local Education Control Illusion or Reality," Ewald Nyquist, Pace University, and Michael Kirst, Stanford University, approached the question from their varying perspectives and experiences.

"Control," Nyquist remarked, "is an amoral term." It becomes good or bad depending upon how the power is exercised. Nyquist cautioned against our being overly nostalgic about what we perceive as past educational practice. Although local control may have meant that local citizens could influence policy decisions more directly, and that the local education authorities had a greater degree of freedom in conducting the schools in response to the perceived needs of the particular area, "it had significant negative aspects." "The denial of equal treatment to those who were powerless, segregated schools, shabby treatment of women, blacks and the handicapped" were among the inequities which resulted, he said.

In the past two decades, Nyquist noted, there have been "important changes in educational governance," including an "erosion of traditional conceptions of local control. Since 1960 there has been a redistribution in the decision-making power; it is more centralized and dispersed laterally," he remarked. "With respect to the vertical rise," Nyquist continued, "there has been an upward drift of decision-making, rising expectations of the importance of education, and an increase in the pressure and influence of special interest groups seeking to shape educational policy." As we reflect upon an educational governance structure, we should consider the possible ramifications of the establishment of a federal department of education. If such a department is established, Nyquist stressed, "the pyramid which represents federal/state/local partnership will be abandoned and thrown on its apex in an inappropriate way."

In delineating "trends contributing to the erosion of local control," Nyquist cited school district consolidation (local school boards are now more remote), the polarization of local school boards and the difficulty of getting people to serve on these boards, the growing influence of narrow-interest advocacy groups, regulations imposed by federal statutes, and the influence of court rulings, especially court-mandated equalized funding (this has increased state interest and sparked demands for state-mandated accountability).

Nyquist mentioned, also, the funneling of federal funds through state education departments (this had tended to increase state education agency staff and influence), the growing political influence of teacher unions on the state level and the unionization of middle managers (school principals), and social movements such as the drive for equality of minority groups and women. "The interlocking complexity is increasing the erosion of local control," Nyquist observed. "The old version of local control is dying out," and "we have to develop a new theory of educational governance."

Kirst began his discussion of local control of schools and the changing nature of educational governance by stressing that "we should be careful in making national-scale generalizations." He cited a study by Frederick Wirt in the early 1970s which found significant variations in the 50 states regarding centralized vs. local control ("School Policy Culture and State Centralization, by Frederick W. Wirt, in Jay Scribner, ed. Yearbook on the Politics of Education, Chicago, 1977). Using an index of local control vs. centralized (0, high local control to 6, high state control), Wirt found great variation in the states ranging from a high of 6 in Hawaii with total state assumption of schooling to a low of 1.86 in Wyoming with high local control.

In assessing the changing governance structure, Kirst emphasized the difference between the 1890-1958 period and the period from 1958 to the present. He noted that 1890-1958 was the "golden era of the local superintendent. Lay boards set out a zone of consent in which superintendents operated, and local administrators had much authority." There was "a great deal of control and initiative by professional educators who shaped decisions." In the period from 1958 to the present, "nobody is in charge." There are "so many key pressure points; it is very pluralistic." Now the federal influence has increased; the state influence is up; the courts are tremendously active; private interest groups have increased in influence and pressure; and there are important interstate networks and social movements which have led to changes in the pattern of governance. A number of superintendents, Kirst remarked, "have adjusted well to these changes. The superintendents able to stay on are brokers who play one coalition off the other."

In considering the "erosion of local control and the reforms which have had an actual impact on the system," Kirst stated that those reforms that have "left a deposit in the system have had three major characteristics." They 1) "are structural additions or changes or a reorganization," 2) "are fairly easily monitored," and 3) "create a bottom-up constituency to keep them in place." Other reforms are really "an illusion, and give the appearance of power without really changing the system." He cited, for example, the California Teachers Evaluation Act, which he characterized as "a paper shuffling device."

Kirst remarked that certain current events are now "invigorating local school boards." Difficult decisions have to be made regarding school closings; local boards are forced to confront these issues. School boards are also moving into the area of collective bargaining. In both cases, in contrast to the 1890-1958 period in which the education literature characterized the local school boards as weak and the superintendents as dominant, "the superintendent loses out." In conclusion, Kirst stressed that "while there are states where local control is in danger (such as California), we need to look at the complexity of the situation and avoid national generalizations."

The impact of school district consolidation, the problem of getting people to serve on local school boards, and the role of the courts, were issues raised in the discussion period that followed the three speakers. Husén noted that the trend toward school district consolidation has also occurred in Sweden, and asked Kirst to comment upon the consequences of consolidation for decision-making in the U.S. "One problem," Kirst replied, "was that school district consolidation has eroded the effectiveness of the local school board. People running do not necessarily have good roots in the whole community they represent," Kirst remarked. Initially, district consolidation "tended to enhance the power of the superintendent, but, ultimately it undermined community support for the schools."

Bailey mentioned the problem of getting people to run for school boards and the difficulty, even if they do decide to serve on the board, of getting them to take their responsibilities seriously. Kirst added that during "a period of expansion," it was a pleasant experience to serve on a school board. Now in this "period of detrimental mentality," when the experience is not so pleasant, many people are not interested in this position of responsibility.

Clifford asked Kirst to comment upon the role and influence of the courts in contributing to the changing governance pattern and administration of the schools. Kirst noted that the "courts operate through the politics of rights; they kick off a political process." Courts, however, "don't have a good enforcement mechanism." Their decisions are "most effectively carried out when they have allies in the system." Bailey referred to the need to study the "politics of judicial implementation," and reported that one session of the Academy Meeting in October will be devoted to a discussion of the attempt of the courts to move in the area of the administration of school systems.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

By

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Yale University

(Paper prepared for an address given at the meeting of the National Academy of Education, Berkeley, California, May 11-12, 1979)

Cross-national research on higher education is a potentially large field of inquiry that can extend to many countries the major areas of research we pursue in the American setting, ranging from the psychological development of students to the control of national systems. Whatever we analyze at home can be studied to advantage abroad, since it is by means of comparative analysis that researchers identify what is unique to particular settings and what is basic to education everywhere. The possible gains may be likened to those already realized in such fields as comparative politics and comparative economics. We have learned a great deal about American democracy -- and alternatives to it -- from the sustained and illuminating inquiries of those political scientists, sociologists, and historians who have held our particular governmental institutions up against the light of forms in other democracies and in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. We clearly will gain in effective knowledge about American higher education when its forms and practices have been thoroughly compared to those found in other countries.

In its current, initial stage of development, comparative higher education is not a field suitable for comprehensive review. Approaches, concepts, and methods may be drawn from history, political science, or economics; anthropology, sociology, or psychology; organizational analysis, public and business administration, or education itself. The field is a holding company, a conglomeration, in which research properly wanders off in different directions, according to the interests of the varied disciplines, *and* in response to disparate practical problems that have shifted in priority in just the last decade among such varied concerns as the causes of student protest, the reactions of universities to recession and retrenchment, the provision of education for older adults, and the transition of youth from education to work. Hence it is appropriate to be selective in coverage and point of view, to err in sticking to the cobbler's last rather than in posing as observer of all things international.

My interest is the organization and govern-

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ment of higher education, across all the many ascending levels that stretch from department and chair at the bottom to the national ministry, chief executive, and national legislature at the top -- an analytical interest that began in the sociology of organization and which has been gradually expanded by a growing interest in the politics of higher education and by a deepening concern about the effects of the ever-stronger tendency to locate higher education within the administrative apparatus of the modern state. A dictum of this approach is, that we leave a huge hole in the middle of analysis until we get inside the black box of organization; that, for example, it makes little sense to do research on problems of access to higher education without first understanding the internal composition of the systems involved; or, that to understand the connections of higher education to work one must disaggregate the structure of higher education as well as identify the substructures of labor markets. When organization is made the central concern, analysis can then branch outward systematically to consider how higher education is related to components of the environment, including the push of consumer demands on the input side and the pull of labor markets on the output side. In such matters, it turns out, the study of other countries has much to teach Americans, not by way of specific items that can be wrenched from historical and contemporary context and readily imported, but in a more sophisticated understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of different educational structures and processes as they have been evidenced in other systems. When our counterparts in other societies have gone down particular roads ahead of us, lessons of history are then often to be found outside our own system. Such lessons from abroad may allow us to reduce the injury wrought by unanticipated, undesired consequences, such as the bureaucratic and political pressures toward uniformity that will follow in a decade or two if we create a national department of education. If we concentrate on enlightment rather than narrow engineering, cross-national research can be relevant to policy.

This type of research -- organizational and governmental -- in a virtually virgin field requires methods in the main that are not currently in vogue in American social science and psychology. If one looks at country configurations of organization and governance, appropriate materials are qualitative or only primatively quantitative. Given little knowledge and a weak state of the art, the compelling context is one of exploration and discovery rather than of hypothesis-testing and validation. The good news is that, in the context of discovery, some serious progress has been made in the last ten to fifteen years. We clearly now know more, and can arrange what we know in useful categories, compared to 1960 or 1970.

What then do we now know cross-nationally about the organization and government of higher education? In what basic ways is the American system similar to and different from the British, the French, the German, the Japanese? What are some of the more promising analytical approaches and problems for the near future? I will treat in turn three topics: how national systems structurally allocate and support academic activities; how they coordinate and control those activities; and, lastly, how they handle a set of basic insistent values that pull in different directions and require all the delicate arts of muddling through that mortal persons can muster.

A CROSS-NATIONAL VIEW OF THE ACADEMIC DIVISION OF LABOR

It turns out that nations "assign" academic work quite differently and with fateful effects. The many assignments can be conveniently organized in four categories, as horizontal and vertical, within universities and colleges and among them. When we observe the main subunits within universities that are arranged side by side at the operating level, an important difference emerges immediately: in the United States, we have the department as the core unit, with departments of English, Economics, and

Chemistry side by side, joined by the many departments or divisions of the professional schools. But most national systems have not been organized this way, to the surprise of Americans, but rather leave the operating level to Chairs, a unit synonymous with a person, the Chair-holding professor, who has hegemony over a set of assistants in a realm of teaching and research and who, if need be, organizes and heads a research institute. It turns out that our old-fashioned unit, the Department, is a major goal of hopeful reformers in many countries, as a way of supplanting the powers of the Chair which have grown dysfunctional in an age of mass higher education. The Chair can be, and has been in so many settings, turned into a citadel of personal privilege, institutionalized in the old days of smaller and more informal systems but now appearing as too autocratic in an age of participation and popular democracy and as too ineffectual administratively in an age of large organization. So, it turns out, a reform that transforms Chairs into Departments -- impersonal units that can receive a delegation of university authority in the name of a discipline -- is much to be desired in many countries. Which certainly casts a useful light on the value of departments in the American structure, in the face of criticisms that portray the department as the stronghold of selfish specialization and a formidable redoubt that shelters rogues from those bent on saving the university.

And then what can one possibly say about vertical arrangements in the university that go beyond dry-as-dust analysis of hierarchical structures? Again, it turns out, when we compare nations, that there are major differences. In the U.S., we have located general education and a modest amount of specialization in a first major tier of post-secondary education, giving an Associate of Arts degree after two years and a Bachelor's degree after four. Then, true specialization begins, in the graduate school with its master's degree and Ph.D., and the professional schools with their specialty degrees in architecture, social work, veterinary medicine, education, management, etc., as well as law and medicine. This two-tier arrangement was an historical accident, a grafting of advanced specialization and research on to a deeply institutionalized collegiate structure. However, the European and dominant worldwide pattern is quite different. Students come out of the secondary school and directly embark upon a specialty, in law, medicine, and other professional fields, as well as in the basic disciplines. The first major degree is a certification of professional or academic competence, with the holders expecting to be placed accordingly. There is essentially a one-tier arrangement, and more advanced work has been handled largely informally by those whose base of operations is in the first tier, that is, no separate graduate school or sets of graduate schools formally occupying educational turf beyond the first level. What are the effects of this cross-national difference? They are fateful indeed. As Joseph Ben-David and others have suggested,[1] research and advanced training fare best when given their own sturdy bases within the university, units within which they are the primary business. And, most of all, the multi-tier arrangements soften the inherent conflict between mass and elite higher education, between open-door admission and selection. This conflict is a wrenching one for all systems that enter into mass higher education with simple undifferentiated structures, since then democratization, equal opportunity, and open access means that large waves of less-selective students enter directly into the single major tier of the old university that promises competent doctors and lawyers, economists and historians, when certification is made a few years later. Hence the issue of selection -- the new installing of numerus clausus -- has waged across the European stage. We have been saved from this, with no one seriously attacking the legitimacy of selection at the graduate level, and particularly for the professional schools of the most advanced professions, since the open door for Everyman is at entry to our first tier, with that tier serving as a buffer zone before selection exercises its sharpest bite. Increased vertical differentiation, of degree levels and organizational levels, is now and will be for some time to come a major road to travel in the reform of structures to accommodate mass higher education.

The most interesting form of differentiation is on the horizontal plane among institutions, the setting apart of different types of universities and colleges or what we generally call sectors. Here we can quickly identify four national patterns. The first is a single system nationally with one type of institution. We observe a thoroughly nationalized and unified system, operating under a national ministry, and the system consists essentially of only one institutional type, the national public university, containing 85 percent or more of all enrollment. The most extreme case of this form in Western Europe in the 1960's was the nationalized system of public universities in Italy, where 98 percent of all students in higher education enrolled in universities. Sweden traditionally, before its recent reforms, also fell in this pattern, with a national system composed largely of a handful of university-type institutions that in the mid-1960's still absorbed 90 percent of the students. Spain and Portugal appear also to be systems mainly of this type. The second pattern is similar in that there is only one formal and all-inclusive national system, again with a bureaucratic center, but there are two or more types of institutions. This seems to be the most common pattern worldwide; it exists in Communist societies, Western democracies, and Third World nations alike. Typically, the main sector is a set of universities, with one or more "nonuniversity" sectors organized around vocational instruction, or teacher training, or both, but occasionally around an esoteric function prized by the government. All sectors are financed primarily by the national government, sometimes through a single ministry but often through several ministerial channels. France is a striking case of this pattern, with its historical differentiation of universities and grandes écoles, specialized schools that rank above the universities in prestige since the most noteworthy of them are sharply elite in selection and placement. There are additional small sectors of Institutes of Technology (IUT's) and other enterprises devoted to technical education and teacher training. In the face of international sterotypes of French educational uniformity, a recent study of French higher education noted: "The institutions of postsecondary education form a disparate group. They are responsible to different ministries."[2] Of course, the claim of heterogeneity depends upon one's point of comparison.

We can immediately see a qualitative difference in system linkage from that of the single-sector national system: the major elements are likely to have different histories, clienteles, and structures of governance. The various sectors often have semiautonomous governmental sponsors to articulate and press their claims. Therefore, the parts are more difficult to relate and to change deliberately in a balanced way. In all the crises, governmental intervention, and planned reforms experienced in French higher education since 1968, the grandes écoles have remained off to one side, largely untouched. This sector receives protection from many sources, and not the least from its graduates who are in the top governmental posts. Privileged access to the corridors of power is a solid underpinning for privileged autonomy. Hence, in a system often portrayed as having unitary centralized control, the presence of several sectors has meant uneven control, even a dispersion of control within government. And we should expect some similar dispersal even in those countries where the several sectors come under a single ministry, since the sectors themselves become anchored in different subbureaus within the ministry, with the bureaus pushing and protecting the interests of the sectors for which they are responsible. This has been shown in countries as diverse as Mexico, Thailand, and the Iran of pre-1979.

A third major pattern of sector differentiation occurs when formal control is divided between national and lower levels of governments. Countries have generally evolved into this pattern from a background that combined private sponsorship and decentralized public control. The influence of the national government generally came later, after World War II and as recent as the period of expansion after 1960. At the same time, private sectors gradually vanished or became reduced to less than 15 percent of student enrollment.

West Germany is an excellent case in point, where basic control has been deeply institutionalized at the level of the eleven Lander governments, but various bodies in the national government and at the national level have become more influential in the years since 1960. Central administrative machinery now plays a key role in determining who is admitted to universities and fields of studies, and national courts are now active in specifying system-wide regulations. West Germany remains a federal system, but one in which formal interests in national standardization have grown quite strong.

Great Britain has not been a nationalized system in the style of its Continental counterparts, nor a truly federal system with separate state or provincial governments, but neither can we any longer include it with the systems in our fourth pattern below which is characterized by private sponsorship as well as public control. Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, and England operate in higher education as public authorities -- with the Scottish subsystem long rooted in its own distinctive set of characteristics -- and Local Educational Authorities (LEA's) traditionally have had a strong role. Thus, control has been public but pluralistic, and there have been multiple sectors: universities of several types, from Oxford and Cambridge to the University of London, to the civic universities, and the set of new universities of the last two decades, as well as a host of technical and technological enterprises, teachers' colleges, and a diffuse set of institutions offering "further education." The British system manages to have a nomenclature almost as confusing as that found in the United States, which is a good indicator of a traditional lack of control by national departments. But now, post-1965, there is much national-government influence, operating through a national Department of Education and Science (DES), and such buffer bodies as the Universities Grants Committee (UGC) and the National Council for Academic Awards (NCAA) which are clearly more centrist-oriented than they were a decade ago.

Our final pattern is one in which formal control is in the hands of private parties as well as public authorities, to the point where 15 to 20 percent or more of the students are in institutions that receive most of their financing from nongovernmental sources and have boards of control selected through nongovernmental channels. This is the most heterogeneous pattern of control, one that coexists generally with a multiplicity of institutional types. Japan is a prime example with some 75 to 80 percent of its students enrolled in private institutions. The country has numerous major sectors and subsectors: a small set of imperial universities supported by the national government; a larger number of additional public institutions, supported by city and provincial as well as national government; a large number of private universities and colleges, varying widely in quality; and over 500 junior colleges, mainly private ones. As in the United States, each private institution has its own board of trustees. The imperial universities set the pace: and, within this small group of elite institutions, the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto are widely recognized as a distinctive subclass whose status and privileges within the system are virtually unmatched anywhere in the world, including the _grandes écoles_ in France and Oxford and Cambridge in England. At the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, admission and placement are tight: certain faculties virtually monopolize placement to certain bureaus and firms. But in other institutions within the system, admission is lax and placement problematic; the great heterogeneity of sectors entails great differences in selectivity and job possibilities. The Japanese system is deeply involved with mass higher education, virtually on a par with the United States, with a rate of participation double that of most European countries. And, the evolution into mass participation came about primarily by expansion in unselective private institutions.

Our own system obviously falls in this fourth pattern, with 3,000 institutions almost equally divided into about 1,500 private colleges and universities and a similar number of public institutions, the latter all within the fifty subsystems of the states. Thus public control as well as private control is fragmented: traditionally, the national government has played a small role, much less than in Japan, and the influence of national bureaus has developed quite late and in an uneven fashion.

The final form of differentiation needs only to be briefly mentioned, since it has been referred to above. There are vertical arrangements among institutions, on grounds alone of task allocation, as in the case of community colleges feeding students to four-year colleges and universities -- short-cycle units existing under long-cycle units -- and on grounds of accrued status. Institutional status hierarchies vary in steepness: very steep in Japan, France, and Britain; moderately steep in the United States; and relatively flat in West Germany and Italy. And with what effects? Steepness in the institutional hierarchy increases the likelihood of: (a) an examination hell for students, since so many will yearn for so few top openings; (b) monopolies and near-monopolies of placement from prestigious institutions to elite positions; (c) academic inbreeding, which has been as high as 100 percent in key faculties in the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto; and (d) academic drift, in which less-noble institutions, if at all autonomous, will freely and voluntarily converge upon the more prestigious models.

In short: relatively straightforward analysis of how national systems compose themselves, allocating tasks to organizations in various horizontal and vertical combinations, can suggest fundamental similarities and differences that are worth more exacting and discriminating research, but which in the meantime can alter, at least incrementally, how we view our own system. Even more from without than from within, our own national system stands out as deviant -- radically decentralized in any formal sense, highly disorderly, full of inequalities, inconsistencies, overlaps, and redundancies, and hence ready for the touch of the central analyst and administrator who will save us all. Which brings us indeed to coordination and control.

COORDINATION AND CONTROL

The above descriptive types of national systems may be more analytically dissected and compared if we consider the respective strength of four forms of coordination in each of them. The systems may be coordinated by bureaucracy, profession, politics, and the market. The bureaucratic means are well-known, inherent in the formal structure of administration referred to in the conventional usage of the term coordination. These means have grown in strength virtually everywhere in the last quarter-century, as administrative echelon has been piled upon administrative echelon in the unremitting quest for comprehensive order. The bureaucratization of higher education occurred as it became big business and shifted to large-scale organization. The professional means reside in the power of expertise within evermore specialized and numerous esoteric disciplines and professional fields, retaining much coordinating influence within the operating units of bottom-heavy structures and giving academics local springboards to national power, as in the staffing of the National Science Foundation in the United States, the calling of prestigious professors to national offices in European countries, and the institutionalization of national academic oligarchy in such key models of buffer organization as the University Grants Committee in Great Britain.

The political means are the forms of linkage and supervision that allow external and internal interest groups as well as regular political officials to have influence. Nearly everywhere issues in higher education are increasingly divided along the lines of party politics, legislative coalitions, and power exchanges among central executives. External interest groups are more systematically included, forming a corporatist or semi-corporatist relation with those formally responsible for state policy. Sweden is the leader among democratic nations in this new corporatism, with several hundred representatives of interest organizations, particularly from Big Labor and Big Business, systematically participating in governing boards nationally and locally. Internal interest groups have also tended increasingly to cast themselves as formal political groups, as the small and the informal have given way to the large and the formal, with the rise of the academic union a striking example in our own country. Following models of worker participation in industrial management or of one person-one vote citizen participation in the general political arena, various European systems have swung in the last decade to formal schemes whereby students and non-academic personnel as well as junior faculty have designated blocs of votes alongside those of senior faculty.

It has been left primarily to political

economists to grasp and explain the ways in which market interaction coordinates the behavior of individuals, groups, and organizations. As put by Charles Lindblom: "All social controls have elements of the automatic, unintended and unconscious;" and, in market life, people are "deliberate and conscious; but their acts accomplish feats of coordination of which they are not necessarily conscious and which they do not intend."[3] Exchange is a basic form of interaction that stands in contrast to authoritative command. It can be seen not only as a method for reshuffling the possession of things but also a method of controlling behavior and of organizing cooperation among people in higher education, as elsewhere. Even in the most state-dominated systems of higher education, processes of market coordination will be at work. In higher education, there is always a consumer market, in which students make choices and often some payments. As students vote with their feet, flowing from unattractive to attractive parts, within and among institutions, they promote certain components at the expense of others. There is always a labor market, constituted by faculty and administrative employment. So long as personnel can make some choices of where and for what duties they offer their services, free to make some exit choices, there is such a market. Thirdly, there is something like an institutional market in higher education in which organizations deal directly with one another. This is all quite unclear, but prestige seems here to be the main commodity of exchange. Institutions rank each other, take up locations in prestige hierarchies, compete for prestige, establish trade agreements, and voluntarily imitate, and converge upon, the most prestigious institutions.

These four forms of coordination -- bureaucratic, political, professional, and market -- appear in different combinations in different systems. The most elemental continuum running through the four types of national systems identified earlier is from tight to loose linkage; from unitary structure, to pluralistic national government control, to federative federalist arrangements, to market linkage. Such democratic planning-minded nations as Sweden are not far from the first pole, followed by a somewhat more heterogeneous and conflictful France, then to such federative cases as West Germany, Britain, Australia, and Canada, and then to Japan and finally the United States, the competitive market system _par excellence_, with the historic pace long set by autonomous private institutions and with the habit of competition institutionalized within as well as among the many state systems.

But this simple continuum soon becomes a triangle, and then a four-sided conceptual scheme -- and then a series of mixed-up statements -- as we get inside systems and consider their true complexities. Integrated systems may be ruled by academic oligarchs, which has happened often in Europe, as well as by bureaucrats or political figures. The best model in the world of how to take governmental money without governmental control -- the British University Grants Committee, between 1920 and 1965 -- is a great case of a trusted academic elite ruling responsibly. In other countries, centralization means that political figures and central administrators join together to declare professors and market forces alike as undependable and untrustworthy coordinators. In still another, e.g., Yugoslavia, decentralization does not mean a strengthening of the market but appeasement of local academic oligarchs and a strengthening of guild-like forms of linkage among barons who control bits of the countryside.

In short, we are only at the bare beginning of analysis of the organization and government of higher education. But our elementary categories at least point the way, transporting us away from simplistic views that equate coordination with state planning and administrative structure and toward the true complexities of behavior and action in an evermore diverse realm of human activity. As example: conceiving of the market as a form of coordination and then distinguishing consumer markets and labor markets, allows us to distinguish analytically between Japan and the United States, the two leading "market systems." Both types of markets operate strongly in the United States, with personnel as well as clientele having a relatively high degree of choice, even in times of market sluggishness. But, in Japan, the consumer market is strong, with 75 percent of the students paying their way in the private sector; while the labor market is weak, since, for various reasons of Japanese work-group loyalty, the baronial powers of chairholding professors, and a high level of academic inbreeding, as modeled by Tokyo and Kyoto, academics do not easily move from one institution to another. The market concept, when more precisely subspecified for higher education, should help us tease out a number of inter-nation similarities and differences, and to explain otherwise baffling contradictions.

A second example of where we can make headway in more powerful analyses is what I call "political markets." Within the broad framework of state authority, in one government after another, administrators struggle against one another. The more socialist the country, the more does the interest-group struggle have to take place within the corridors of government. Ministries, departments, bureaus, and divisions -- and indeed legislative bodies -- balkanize around specific domains and clienteles and resist mightily the efforts to pull them together. They compete for power and prestige, as means of protecting and advancing their own work, and competition between governmental power centers becomes a form of coordination. In a classic essay written thirty years ago, Norton E. Long identified such competition as perhaps the most effective instrument of coordination in complex government. He noted:[4]

> "The position of administrative organizations is not unlike the position of particular firms. Just as the decisions of the firms could be coordinated by the imposition of a planned economy so could those of the component parts of the government. But just as it is possible to operate a formally unplanned economy by the loose coordination of the market, in the same fashion it is possible to operate a government by the loose coordination of the play of political forces through its institutions."

Or, as put in the recent outstanding work of Lindblom on politics and markets: "large-scale politico-economic organization is possible either through unilateral coordination in hierarchy-bureaucracy or through mutual adjustment among authorities who practice an extended use of their authority in order to control each other."[5] Such reasoning is particularly applicable to higher education, a sector characterized by unusual task complexity, ambiguous goals, and competing forms of authority. The superstructures of higher education generally have no clear apex, but instead at the top, exhibit a melange of boards, bureaus, committees, and commissions.

In short: we come to know little about how the actions of persons and organizations in higher education are concerted when we look only to the formal plan and the formal hierarchy. Much of the coordination is going on in other ways, including through the struggle, exchange, and mutual adjustment of officials at the higher levels.

THE CONFLICT OF VALUES

In all advanced societies, fundamental problems in higher education must necessarily arise from the need to express three, often conflicting, national interests. One is an interest in social justice, which in higher education primarily takes the form of equality of access and, then, secondarily, equality in treatment and outcome. As publicly interpreted virtually everywhere, particularly in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, this interest presses hard for open-door admission, so that everyone can get in, and uniform standards, so that everyone will be treated equally and fairly. The equity issue is a permanent one in all democracies, not solely in the United States, and should be studied comparatively. The second national interest is in diversity of response, the ability of a sub-system of a nation to accommodate to increasing heterogeneity of demand and to adapt differentially to a high rate of change. This interest becomes ever stronger in higher education, as consumer demands, labor-force connections, and knowledge cultivation all become more varied than in the past. It presses for a multiplication of types of institutions and levels of training, so that different parts of the system can handle different tasks and spontaneously adapt to different environmental demands. The needed responses are too complicated, ambiguous, and contradictory to be handled by central administration and uniform regulations alone, necessitating the risk of varied and unplanned reaction by semi-autonomous segments. Yet, the "market" can also lead to convergence rather than divergence, and we need to identify the conditions in large academic systems that promote the one or the other. The third major national interest is in competence, the capacity of the highest levels of the educational system to produce and distribute knowledge and to send forth people well-prepared for occupational performance and civic life. This interest can be served in part by administrative efforts to establish minimal, average, and high standards. However, the comparative experience of many countries suggests that such efforts are often self-defeating, given the special task structure of higher education. Competence is probably best upheld by a moderately strong, but open institutional hierarchy in which status is awarded to persons and institutions on the grounds of perceived quality -- and in which institutions are able, on this basis, to compete for elevation.

In effecting such disparate national interests, the structures of national academic systems must necessarily be full of inconsistencies, compromises, and contradictions. Equity has to be limited by the structural arrangements that accommodate diversity and induce competence, e.g., private sectors, highly selective entry to certain fields and institutions. Diversity is compromised by the arrangements appropriate for equality in access and outcome, e.g., administered uniform standards, and by the convergence occasioned by imitation in status hierarchies. And competence is restrained by actions carried out in the name of equity and by the uncontrolled fragmentation of programs and standards that inheres in extensive diversity. Thus, it is no wonder that modern systems of higher education should at this time exhibit a bewildering mixture of the traditional and the modern, the open and the closed, the flexible and the rigid, the elitist and the democratic. In making the transition from elite to mass education, national systems come to embody new sets of elemental strains and dilemmas, each system doing so with forms and practices firmly institutionalized in previous decades and interlocked among themselves as well as with a variety of structures in the larger society.

I would like to close on a research note by offering four "leading ideas" (statements too loose to be called hypotheses) that can be pursued on the reconciliation of equity, diversity, and competence in higher education:

(1) conflict among these competing basic interests is reduced by increased differentiation within a national system. As explained earlier, the differentiation can be analyzed along horizontal and vertical dimensions, within institutions and among them.

(2) the crucial form of differentiation for the protection of the diversity interest is horizontal differentiation among institutions -- the creation and maintenance of different institutional sectors. Systems that do not have such differentiation cannot handle mass higher education as well as the countries that do.

(3) the crucial form of differentiation for the protection of the competence interest is vertical differentiation among institutions -- the creation and

maintenance of institutional hierarchies that are open to the circulation of institutions. Efforts to equate institutions formally in terms of prestige weaken modern national systems by failing to serve this interest.

(4) the required sectors and hierarchies will tend to be perceived as sources of inequality. Given that unlike segments will be cast as "noble" and "less-noble," rich and poor, high and low, equal treatment of students across the institutions of a system will not be possible in the sense of a promise that everyone will receive training and degrees of similar quality.

(5) Hence, the definition of equality that best allows for the play of the other values is the traditional one of equal opportunity in entering different segments, rather than the definition that leads to, and follows from, efforts to develop equal institutions.

On such matters, other national systems have had extended experiences that are relevant to our own ongoing efforts to reconcile these interests. And since these interests are becoming more manifest to larger publics, it is crucial that public definitions be more informed by appropriate broad-gage research. Otherwise, the rapidly-growing formal coordination we are experiencing at state and national levels is likely to lead to more unwanted effects than we care to know.

Footnotes

[1] Joseph Ben-David. Centers of Learning: Britain, France, Germany, United States. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.

[2] Alain Bienayme. Systems of Higher Education: France. New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1978. "Introduction," p. 1.

[3] Charles E. Lindblom. Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977. p. 39.

[4] Norton E. Long, "Power and Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol. 9, 1949, pp. 257-264. Quotation, p. 262.

[5] Lindblom, op. cit., pp. 29-32.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION FALL MEETING

HGSE Conference Center, Gutman Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts
October 19-20, 1979

Friday, October 19	9:00-10:30 a.m.	Philosophy of Education: The State of the Art Thomas F. Green, Syracuse University Israel Scheffler, Harvard University Frederick Rudolph, Williams College
	10:45-12:15 p.m.	Human Development: The State of the Art Robert LeVine, Harvard University Cyril O. Houle, University of Chicago Hope Jensen Leichter, Teachers College, Columbia University
	2:00-3:15 p.m.	The President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies James A. Perkins, International Council for Educational Development Oscar Handlin, Harvard University Guido Goldman, Harvard University
	3:30-5:00 p.m.	Education of the Gifted: The State of the Art Julian C. Stanley, Jr., The Johns Hopkins University J. W. Getzels, University of Chicago Robert Glaser, Learning Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh
	7:00 p.m.	Dinner After-dinner remarks by Paul M. Ylvisaker Dean, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University
Saturday, October 20	7:30-9:00 a.m.	Business Breakfast
	9:00-10:30 a.m.	The Boston School Desegregation Struggle: A Panel Discussion Robert Dentler, Abt Associates, Cambridge Charles V. Willie, Harvard University Joseph Featherstone, Harvard University

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION FALL MEETING (continued)

Saturday, October 20	10:45-12:15 p.m.	The Role of Schools of Education in American Research Universities Harry G. Judge, Oxford University Martin Trow, University of California, at Berkeley David Riesman, Harvard University
	1:30-[illegible]:30 p.m.	Executive Council Meeting

Report of the Fall, 1979 Meeting of the National Academy of Education

by

Ian McNett*

Lively discussions of educational philosophy, human development, and the teaching of the gifted marked the National Academy of Education's fall meeting, October 19 and 20, at Harvard University's Graduate School of Education Conference Center, Cambridge, Mass. Politics and educational issues were in the atmosphere as more than 30 academy members plus guests convened for the meeting. Academy member Willard Wirtz interrupted his attendance to appear at the dedication of the John F. Kennedy Library. The re-emergence of racial violence provided a somber context for a panel discussion of Boston's school desegregation struggle.

Thomas F. Green (Syracuse University) described the state of the art in the philosophy of education. He argued that questions of civility and worth had been lost during the development of an independent educational system in modernized regions of the world. Julian C. Stanley, Jr., (Johns Hopkins University) called for a school system that provided enrichment and acceleration for gifted children. Stanley reported on the state of the art in teaching the gifted. And Robert Levine (Harvard University) described the domination of the field of human development by psychologists in his state of the art presentation.

Robert Dentler (Abt Associates) chronicled the successes and failures that followed Boston's court-ordered school desegregation plan. Charles V. Willie (Harvard University) decried the lack of political leadership that contributed to the violence and resistance that followed the court order. Joseph Featherstone (Harvard University) emphasized the importance of neighborhoods in understanding Boston's school problems. The role of schools of education in American research universities tends to be peripheral and somewhat amorphous, according to a report by Harry G. Judge (Oxford University), who is examining six schools. James A. Perkins (International Council for Educational Development) previewed the recent report of the President's Commission on Foreign Languages and International Studies, which found the field in a state of retreat and disarray.

Stephen K. Bailey (Harvard University), NAEd President, welcomed members, Academy Spencer Fellows, and participants in the workshops

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*Rapporteur of Fall Meeting: Free-lance writer.

on educational research management for women and minority members that were sponsored by the Academy and the National Institute of Education this summer. The participants were invited, he said, to establish relationships with Academy members as possible mentors or reviewers. He commented that total attendance was "the largest number we have had at a meeting."

Philosophy of Education: State of the Art

Ten years of experience in trying to apply his background as a philosopher to the problems of education "has driven me in two directions," declared Thomas F. Green (Syracuse University). He said he was sorry that this experience did not give perspective on "the newest problems, the freshest inventions of method, and all the things that the next Manhattan Project of philosophy should address. But, as a friend of mine observed many years ago, in philosophy none of us has our Manhattan. We are left, each of us, as Plato was, only with our Syracuse, some location in the world where even the best drawn plans of academic heaven will doubtless run amuck."

One direction of his inquiry, Green said, was to attempt a systematic account of policy arrangements, "but to go beyond that to describe the structure and dynamics of the educational system itself." The second direction "is to attempt once again to understand the nature of virtue, especially civic virtue or political excellence, and to discover whether in the pursuit of such studies there is a way to grasp, once again, the rudiments of moral education." He said the attempt might lead to asking that most elusive educational question: "What is it that has educational worth?"

Dynamics of the System

By educational system, Green said he meant a "set of social arrangements for schooling." He argued that an educational system has emerged in every "modernized" region of the world within the past 100 years, but had appeared in the United States only in the second decade of this century. "Wherever it appears it has the same structure, acts under the same necessities, and displays the same principles of behavior." It becomes an independent sector of modernized societies, acting according "to its own dynamics in a manner substantially independent of economy and polity," Green stressed.

"Prudence requires," Green stated, "an understanding of the system's underlying principles including its control, its rules of distribution, and most of all the dynamics that require the system to expand and, by its very expansion, to transform both the social meaning of education and the political arguments that can be offered in its support. Why is it, for example, that at a specific point in its growth, the system can impose its own demands for expansion?" Or why, Green wondered, do the "last to receive a certain level of education inevitably obtain the least benefit from doing so?"

"Is it, or is it not an irony of huge importance than in the effort to spread the benefits of schooling, we end merely by rendering it a necessity; that we convert the aggressive pursuit of something valuable into a necessity required for defense against personal disaster. What are the inherent dynamics of the system that, in this way, seem to subvert our most cherished dreams of utopia into our Syracuse?"

A widely accepted view assumes that if society changes in substantial ways the educational system will also change. Green said he believed such a claim rested upon a doubtful claim. There are alternative policies for the system, but no alternatives to the system, he said. "If we truly understand those arrangements that constitute the educational system, and grasp the principles of their behavior, then we are likely to forecast its victory even through very substantial social change," he declared.

The importance of understanding the system is underscored by the emphasis of the federal government on educational equity, Green said. If we grasp the system's principles. "it may become...apparent that though we need a more equitable system..., we may need even more a weaker educational system, one that is less fateful in shaping the lives of people," Green stressed. "Yet I know of no proposals advanced in the cause of equity that do not entail creating a stronger, more powerful system, one that is increasingly compulsory for more and more persons."

He said it may become necessary to carefully reduce the systems power in order to secure equity.

The theory of the system he described, Green said, was not a theory of education. It deals instead with the politics and policy of the system, but "not with its educational foundations." He argued, however, that such an approach was necessary in understanding that a system "must be compatible with a great variety of educational theories. We do not need educational theory to form policy. We need a social theory and a political theory, and though such domains of philosophy deal with good and evil and with law, they do not exhaust the domain of value. There is also educational value or educational worth. If we had to agree on our educational philosophy before we could agree on policy, then, policy would never be framed."

The Nature of Virtue

Green approached the question of educational and civic virtue from the vantage point of educational evaluation. An evaluation might find that educational program A was more cost effective and cost efficient than program B, and also have a larger constituency, superiority in meeting social needs, and greater success in raising achievement scores. "Can we conclude, nevertheless, that B has greater educational worth? It does not seem to me that there are any grounds a priori to rule out such a possibility. To reply "No" to the question commits one "on grounds of sheer logic to one or the other of two different points of view," Green argued. One view would be that no sense can be given to the notion that educational worth exists.

The other view would conclude that educational worth does exist, Green stated, "but its meaning is exhausted in whatever it is that we measure by achievement levels, by size of constituency, by social needs or cost... I know of no argument sufficient to persuade anyone of either of these two responses... I say this after some persistent effort to ask the question of practitioners in the field of evaluation. I have received no persuasive argument in response to the open question."

Green concluded that "we do acknowledge that there is such a thing as educational value, and it is not exhausted by those measures that we typically secure in educational evaluation. But if this is true, then it follows that whatever is evaluated in typical exercises of educational evaluation cannot be construed as the educational worth of anything."

If educational evaluation continues to develop without addressing problems of educational worth, it probably will become only a useful tool in the hands of those who seek to manage the system, Green said. The field requires the aggregation of particular sorts of data that are required for policy analysis, he said. Policy analysis can be viewed as a technical problem, for which neither a theory of education nor a grasp of educational worth is needed. Green says he raised the question, not to pick on evaluation, but because it is the domain of current practice that most overtly claims to assess educational worth, but which "most transparently does not."

The unanswered question in educational evaluation, Green stated, is what constitutes educational worth. However, the difficulty he saw was "not so much that the question remains unanswered, as that it remains unasked." The question was the "presiding one in the educational thinking of John Dewey," said Green. "Being armed with an answer, he was able to say some significantly important things about the nature of learning, and to say those things in such a way that the study of learning could become linked to the practice of teaching and of education."

The study of learning, Green said, does not provide a direct route to the study of education. "We can learn falsehoods, blasphemies, lies, deceits, and all manner of barbarisms. The study of learning can lead us to grasp how we can learn such things more efficiently and spread them more effectively." But the theory of learning provides nothing to instruct one on "the difference between lies and truth," Green said.

Green then turned more directly to the problem of civic virtue. The fact that change comes hard in education or elsewhere "ought to be viewed as a blessing," he said. If change came easily, decent gains could be more easily reached, "but it follows that they could also be more easily wiped out." He said the difficulties presented by education "are precisely why it is worth the effort to try. If we succeed, we may do something worth doing, something that will last." His experience has led him to be more interested in the peculiar virtues of those who make policy rather than in the problems of public policy, Green said. He believes that "perhaps the most important single need from philosophical studies is a work that attempts to trace and make explicit the moral resources that such persons must draw upon to do their work -- how do they come to terms with the absence of privacy, with the seductions and illusions of power, and especially with the terrible realization that one's best efforts may have little lasting consequence."

People who make public policy may draw upon moral resources "that stem more from their personal histories and even their religious apostasy, than from any technical competence they secured in school," Green said. He said he found little help in understanding the elements that form conscience in "any of the currently contending views of moral development." He listed what he called "a simple enumeration of what seem to me the intractable facts that would have to be salient in any adequate attempt to deal with the development of conscience."

The first "fact" is that human beings are not, by nature, heroes, Green stated. It follows that few persons will be moral where that requires heroism, he said. "The costs of virtue must not be too great, and neither, in balance, must the benefits of evil." The first reality is strongly related to the second, Green said: "looking after one's own interest is not something that needs to be taught." However, being moral does need to be taught. It means, at times, giving up one's own good for the good of others.

From the first two realities, Green derived a third: "If moral education is to occur at all, then it requires a most clear-headed and sensitive distinction between the concepts of 'need' and 'desire.' Needs are limited; desires are not...Needs, insofar as is practical, I suppose, should be satisfied. But desires should not." Lacking this distinction, Green argued, educational programs designed to satisfy need, will "lapse into a kind of unbridled satisfaction of desire. The outcome will not be moral education. It will be the nurture of nihilism."

A related point, he said, is that moral education cannot succeed without dealing with the formation of emotions. "Moral knowledge cannot and never does exist independently of moral emotions." Any theory of moral education that rests upon only the cognitive aspects of learning "is a theory of education about matters that do not matter," Green asserted.

A fourth reality, he said, is that there can be "no adequate view of moral education that does not give central importance to the place of history in the formation of character." He stressed that he did not mean history as taught, but "history as remembered." The development of morality rests upon human capacity to develop social as well as personal interests, he said, "Without the formation of a social memory it will be impossible to establish the sensibilities of an I-Thou relation in the context of an I-We relation. "Without it, in other words, moral education is likely to become merely an individual and private affair."

The general theme of his remarks, Green said, was related to the fact that "there was a time when the most important educational question was how we can become the kinds of persons who value those things that have worth. But it is hard to talk about what has worth in an age when we speak not of value and worth, but of values." The high points of educational history, he said, were those in which "the vocational purposes of education have been truly discerned as subservient to the ends of civility, civic life, and service, and not as parallel, or on a par, much less superior to those ends."

Recent Philosophical Contributions

Israel Scheffler (Harvard University) reviewed four areas in which philosophy has examined educational issues: (1) the critique of educational research, (2) the analysis of teaching and curriculum, (3) the theory of mind, and (4) social theory and history of philosophy.

Educational Research. Rather than being the handmaiden of psychology and the social sciences, philosophy confronts them "with questions of meaning and method, of sense and significance," Scheffler asserted. The past two decades have produced abundant philosophical critiques of educational research, he said. Most have been based on logical and epistemological considerations, but "in some cases also on considerations drawn from moral theory." An extensive consideration of psychological developmentalism, "with special attention to Freud and Piaget," has been led by R.S. Peters of the London Institute of Education, Scheffler said. He cited a recent "massive collection, *Education and the Development of Reason*, edited by R. D. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters, as an example. He also mentioned a new journal from the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children which is devoted to the study of children's thinking.

In addition, Sheffler said, a central focus of philosophical attention has been on every aspect of Lawrence Kohlberg's work on moral education. He noted the collection, *Moral Educa-*

tion, edited by Clive M. Beck, R. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan. Philosophers increasingly are becoming interested in the field of testing, Scheffler said, citing the volume of Ned Block and Gerald Dworkin, The IQ Controversy, as a recent example.

Teaching and Curriculum. Scheffler cited many studies from the past 20 years that focus on teaching and curriculum, including work by himself, Green, B. O. Smith, R. S. Peters, Gilbert Ryle, and several others. Joseph Schwab has made important contributions to the critique of the curriculum field, Scheffler said. A recent collection of Schwab's articles, Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education, contributed important ideas on the role of science in the curriculum, on the status of practice in college education, and on the nature of liberal studies, Scheffler said. He also noted works in particular curriculum areas such as the status of the humanities (Frederick Olafson), the implications of Kuhn's conceptions of science education (Harvey Siegel), and the "disciplines" movement in curriculum (Jane Martin). In the areas of conceptualizing educational content, Scheffler cited the work of Vernon A. Howard as "one of the most important studies now in progress." It is devoted to "an analysis of skill, craft, and art, in the context of a theory of symbols," Scheffler said. "Inspired by the work of Nelson Goodman on symbolism, Howard's study is sure to have significant ramifications not only for the analysis of learning and teaching, but also, and in particular, for our understanding of the tasks of aesthetic education."

Theory of Mind. Gilbery Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* has exerted a large, though now waning, influence on the concepts of the mind and mental processes, Scheffler commented. Younger philosophers were, for a time, influenced by Chomsky's mentalism and innatism, he said. But they now seem more interested in the functionalist views of H. Putnam. *Mind Language and Reality*, Daniel Dennett, *Content and Consciousness*, and others who are "more closely associated with the field of computer science." These views have as yet had little effect on the philosophy of education, he said, but the situation may change. Scheffler also mentioned the "landmark contribution" of Nelson Goodman, whose *Languages of Art* and *Ways of Worldmaking*, "represent one of the most important developments of semiotics since Pierce's original work one hundred years ago."

Social Theory and History of Philosophy. Analytical social and political theory has "undergone a miraculous revival" since the early 1960's, Scheffler stated. On the theoretical side, he said, the work of John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, had the largest influence. Conceptions of "utilitarianism" and "welfare" came under increasing fundamental criticism, and "contract notions experienced a rebirth," as exemplified in Robert Nozick's Anarchy State and Utopia and by Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously, Scheffler said. Parallel trends were at work in the philosophy of education, with several works on rights, including a special issue of the Harvard Educational Review on the rights of children. In the history of educational philosophy, Scheffler said, "perhaps the most significant new venture was the inauguration of a new journal, Paidaea, edited by Albert Grande and George Simmons, and devoted to scholarly studies of major figures in philosophical history, with emphasis on their educational thought."

A Historian's Questions.

Philosophy and history have different tasks in the understanding of education, said Frederick Rudolph (Williams College). He found that "philosophy was more ready than history to proclaim ordered significance and principles for institutional behavior." History, as well as philosophy, is needed in the examination of educational policy, Rudolph asserted. History asks more about what happened than about what is good and bad about policy; more on how policies respond to the demands of the time than on questions of educational values and worth, Rudolph stated.

Not wishing to elaborate on Green's insights and observations, he said, "I would feel more comfortable if the points were more fully spelled out." What, he wondered, would history disclose if Green's insights were developed? For example, he said, history might have some answers on further questions but the fundamental duty of the federal government, which Green said was equity. If pursuit of equity is the fundamental purpose of federal educational policy, possibly the duty of the federal government is, "at times, to keep its hands off," Rudolph speculated. He continued, "In the pursuit of equity, is educational policy more or less significant than health policy" or other social policies? And why, he wondered, are quality and the training of leaders not as appropriate as equity and equality as concerns of government? Turning to another point that historians might illuminate, Rudolph raised questions about the "dynamics of the educational system," which Green said was virtually independent of economics and policy. If Green is right, he suggested, historians have a challenge before them to prove him so.

Robert M. Gagné (Florida State University) said he was surprised that people who value evaluation measures of education were unable to say what they believed to be the worth of what they were doing -- that measures of student achievement were not indicators of the worth of the system. Green responded that it is still possible to ask if a program that has fewer of the qualities which the evaluations measure may be more worthwhile. Bailey recalled when a New York City program for more effective schools doubled the number of teachers and greatly increased spending. The result, he said, was not much difference in student achievement. However, parents said that for the first time their children were going to school regularly, combing their hair, and beginning to talk to other kids in a "nice tone of voice." The parents felt that cognitive skills might come later on, Bailey said. The worth that the program added to the educational offerings was not measured by the evaluation instruments.

In response to a query from Burton R. Clark (Yale University), Green elaborated on his point about the emergence and independence of the educational system. "I'd be prepared to argue that the educational system emerged in the decade between 1910 and 1920. High school enrollments began an intractable rise" about 1910, he said. The comprehensive secondary school did not take its position in the school system until the 1915-20 period. And the historic trend is for the system to become more and more independent; "It expands when the economy expands, and it expands when the economy declines."

A fuller discussion of the educational system appears in Thomas F. Green's book, _Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System_. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980 (written with the assistance of David Ericson and Robert H. Seidman).

Human Development: State of the Art

The dominance of human development by psychologists has "seriously compromised the interdisciplinary ideals of human development and brought with it a number of problems that were foreseen long ago, but have not been prevented," declared Robert A. LeVine (Harvard University). These problems include "excessive reliance on experimental approaches and neglect of the natural ecologies of development, excessive attention to cognitive development, and neglect of social and emotional development, excessive attention to middle class American samples, and neglect of the non-Western majority of humankind," LeVine stated.

The interdisciplinary strategies that were developed to deal with these pitfalls as long as 30 years ago were swept away by forces that emerged in the 1960's, LeVine said. During this period, a great expansion of developmental psychology coincided with powerful intellectual and social currents. LeVine cited "the influence of Piaget's structural account of cognitive development...; the renewed prestige of experimentation, especially with children; the effort to contribute to domestic social reform through intervention programs designed to improve cognitive performance."

This imbalance now needs correcting, LeVine stressed, and he cited certain efforts in that direction: a book by Urie Bronfenbrenner on the ecology of child development to "counter the excesses of experimentalism," and a Social Science Research Council Committee on Social and Affective Development during childhood "to remedy its neglect in favor of cognition."

"In other words, he said, some of the current trends in the field are attempts to rectify an imbalance created during the last 15 years. I'm not sure I would want to call this progress."

But there has been progress, LeVine emphasized. Increasingly, studies focus on the entire lifespan rather than on just "verbal children and adolescents, from nursery school to college." It has been found that both "infants and the elderly are more competent than they were formerly thought to be," LeVine said. "Infants are capable of sensing and processing environmental information from birth; the implications for early social development are profound and are being pursued. The elderly, represented in older research as the victims of age-related decrements in cognitive function, have been demonstrated to be the victims of methodological errors confounding later age with less educated and sophisticated cohorts in cross-sectional studies."

LeVine stressed that research on infancy was an exciting and growing field, with collaboration increasing between pediatricians and psychologists. "Our knowledge of infancy has already been transformed radically, and I believe a permanent contribution will emerge," he remarked.

New and serious interest in the adult years includes gerontological research, the lifespan perspective on behavior and development, and attempts to establish stages of adulthood, LeVine said. While this area is becoming active, it remains more diffuse than research in infant development, he said. The field lacks a consensus on how to conceptualize life after adolescence, or even whether a developmental model is the appropriate one for adult behavioral change, LeVine said. Much of the work in this "new and necessary frontier for human development...must be considered preliminary," LeVine stressed. "The establishment of an SSRC (Social Science Research Council) Committee on Lifespan Development is a significant recognition of the promise this area holds and of its need to find coherence."

In the active area of child language research, "the significance of the work...goes far beyond the simple documentation of language acquisition in our own and other cultures," LeVine said. Investigators are extending their focus to the function of speech in interpersonal contexts, he said. Thus, they are establishing "a systematic method for examining the acquisitions of communicative competence and cultural styles of interaction."

After his brief review of the "state of the art," LeVine turned to some current controversies, including the sociobiology debate and the debate over the degree of influence early experience has on human development. "I am impressed," LeVine said, "with how investigators of sex differences in behavioral development in our field have shown themselves capable of letting the chips fall where they may, regardless of the increasing temptation to take sides in an ideological combat."

Turning to another controversy, LeVine noted that Jerome Kagan and others had challenged the notion that early experience has a long-lasting influence on human development. Commenting on a number of books on the subject, LeVine predicted that "the psychological data available by the end of 1980 will not settle the issue one way or the other... The controversy stretches developmental research beyond its capacity to provide scientific solutions. I doubt that it will move the field ahead, though it will further expose its weaknesses."

The Contribution of Biology

In the past, psychology, sociology, and anthropology have contributed more to education than the biological sciences, commented Cyril C. Houle (W. W. Kellogg Foundation). However, he asserted, "fresh new ideas relevant to education are more likely (in the future) to come from the biological sciences than from the social sciences." In his readings in the social and biological sciences, Houle said, he found much relevant to human development in biology, but not much interaction or intersection between biology on the one hand and psychology and the social sciences on the other. "I'm disturbed by this," he stated.

As an example of material relevant to adult education, Houle cited biological research into the "onset of senescence." There are many theories on this subject, he said, one of which is that senescence is related to the formation of "certain kinds of globules of protein" in the brain. It is possible that this condition "could be prevented or reversed," he said, "If this is true, it seems that senility might be delayed or prevented or alleviated through dietary or biochemical means with enormous educational consequences." He suggested that psychologists and social scientists could learn a great deal about how to cope with many of the problems of education at all ages of life through collaboration with biological scientists.

The study of the whole life span in human development requires looking at a far wider range of institutions and problems than has been done in the past, stressed Hope Jensen Leichter (Teachers College, Columbia University). She said such an approach raises new conceptual problems and emphases. If the study of adults across a wider life cycle and a wider span of situations is taken seriously, "we need to understand a whole range of institutions and settings where the development takes place, and the way the experiences in different institutions are combined by the individual," she said.

It is not enough, Leichter said, to understand the individual's psychological experience, nor the particular situation in which the person finds himself. This implies the need for a broader methodology that includes ethnographic, biographical, and observational approaches to permit an affirmation of the structures and organizations where the development takes place, and enables mapping the way in which the individual moves from one setting to another, she said.

Jerome Bruner (Harvard University) quipped that "wicked psychology is experiencing a profound revolution." Psychologists, he said, are examining behavior in the contexts in which it occurs. This trend is clearest in the field of language development, which cannot be grasped by psychologists and linguists alone, Bruner asserted. "Speaking as a wicked psychologist, I would welcome help from the outside," he said.

Nathan Glazer (Harvard University) wondered if human development research was sufficiently developed to offer teachers and administrators advice about the ethnic and racial composition of classrooms. LeVine said advice is being given in a wide variety of areas. However, he said that a social science perspective is needed in the policy area, because "it is dangerous to go from limited psychological studies to policy interventions without a lot of sociological work in between."

Nelson Goodman (Harvard University) was concerned that too great a focus on emotional development, sociological research, and nonexperimental studies could lead to mushiness and lack of rigor in the field. Martin Trow (University of California at Berkeley) wondered if avoiding sensitive political problems might lead to research that is marginal rather than central to human concerns. LeVine stressed that his remarks were not intended to indicate that less rigor was needed. Psychologists have studied affective expression during the past few years, but their work is not well integrated with cognitive development research, he said. And he contended that sociological research is as scientifically rigorous as that done by psychologists.

The President's Commission on Foreign Languages and International Studies

International and foreign language studies in the United States are in sorry shape, Academy members were told, in a preview of the report of the President's Commission on Foreign Languages and International Studies. James A. Perkins, Chairman of the President's Panel, said the report was to be released in November.

Academic interest in foreign affairs and foreign languages is declining at the same time that U.S. involvement in world affairs is increasing, stressed Perkins (International Council for Educational Development). He said, "No one subscribes to the notion that the next decade will not produce increased U.S. involvement in the outside world." But, "on the other side of the teeter totter," Perkins saw a sharp decline in the capacity to deal with the world and in programs to prepare people for that capacity. Foreign language study is down because it has been downgraded as a requirement for entrance into college or as a condition of employment. Even the U.S. State Department eliminated foreign language proficiency as a condition of employment, he said.

"The Foreign Service had a terrible problem," Perkins stated. "Black and poor students said the requirements favored wealthy students. White students complained that Spanish-speaking students could pass the tests without taking a course. With Solomon-like judgment, foreign service officials said, let's eliminate a foreign language requirement on entrance, but stipulate that mastery of a foreign language is required by the end of three years. "I'm not talking about a technical matter, but about a complicated social problem that interacts with educational issues."

Perkins outlined some of the dimensions of the problems. For one thing, he said, isolationism has not vanished. People recognize intellectually that America must be involved in world affairs, but privately "wish the problem would go away." Another factor, he said, was a "deep psychological feeling" that Americans were superior to other nationalities. The attitude invades the whole business of the relative importance of foreign languages. "If people feel superior to others, they will feel its their job to teach them, not to learn from them" he said. The feeling of superiority is buttressed by two related issues. Because English is a substantial second language around the world, many Americans think they do not need to learn a foreign language. People for whom English is the second language are at a disadvantage in international dialogues. In addition, the U.S. "melting pot" tradition has fostered the attitude that people who cannot speak English are uneducated, he said. This idea still has weight, although it is giving way to the "notion that ethnic differences do not mean ethnic inferiority." Finally, Perkins stressed the difficulty of instituting change in American education. "Our whole educational structure is devised so nobody on one level can give orders to the level below," Perkins said.

"All of these reasons are why we have had such difficulty developing competence and preparation to the level of our increasing world responsibilities."

Perkins then outlined "four or five general problems the Commission tried to deal with:"

1. There is a widespread view at the secondary school level that there is no way they can improve foreign language teaching and numbers in foreign languages until higher education reinstates language as a requirement as a high priority or, at least an indicator to applicants that it improves their chances for admission. Over the past decade, colleges requiring a foreign language for admission declined from 34 percent to 8 percent, he said.

2. A better measure of competence is needed than how many years of foreign language were taken. Foreign language, Perkins said, was

the only subject he knew that measured competence by how long someone took the subject. He urged the academic world to look at proposed Foreign Language Institute testing scales which would measure oral and written competence on a scale of 1 to 5. He said the Chinese Language Institute teaches and evaluates foreign languages based on five skills, oral, written, writing, hearing, and translation.

3. A great controversy, Perkins said, is whether interest can be stimulated with money. The Commission recommended that every primary school that would teach a foreign language should receive a per capita grant of $35 per student. Grants also would go to high schools and colleges that taught foreign languages beyond two years. Additional funds would be awarded for teaching exotic languages, under the Commission proposal.

4. "We walked into the thicket of the problem of a multi-lingual or bi-lingual society and essentially passed," Perkins remarked. "The problem required a different kind of commission. We weren't competent to deal with it."

He then turned to the Commission's recommendations about centers for advanced study and research:

Area Centers. "That marvelous network of

40 to 45 area centers that was created after World War II is under extreme stress because declining federal funding and inflation are driving them to the wall; some states have taken up some of the slack," he said. Currently, the federal share is only 12 percent, with the states and private sources accounting for the bulk of the funding. If state support eroded seriously, some centers would be dropped and others placed in a marginal position. The Commission recommended that federal support be doubled and matched with state and institutional funds.

Issue Centers. These centers deal with problems such as population, environment, and nuclear proliferation. The Commission suggested that the issue centers and area centers establish a "symbiotic relationship." It recommended continued support for 20 to 30 issue centers that would relate more thoroughly to the area centers.

Training and Facility Centers. From 50 to 60 training and facility centers should be supported to work with the secondary schools and adult education programs, Perkins said.

Professional Schools. Perkins called for a greater effort by the professional schools to teach languages and international issues. Federal and private employers do not look for lawyers, businessmen, and other professionals who are competent in languages and international issues, he said. Employers want people with business competence amd with language abilities.

Research Libraries. The 40-45 research libraries that deal with overseas issues are facing "dreadful pressure," Perkins stated. The maintenance of these libraries is critical to continued research competence in foreign studies, he said.

Fellowships. The Commission recommended that there be "a very substantial fellowship program." A small number of the fellowships would be awarded by the centers. Most would be awarded by a federal fellowship board or through the American Council of Learned Societies under the Commission's recommendations.

Exchange Programs. The Commission recommended a doubling of federal support for the Fulbright exchange program. Perkins said the number of awards and the amount of support in constant dollars had been about halved over the past ten years. In addition, two other countries, which had become joint financers of the program, were demanding a voice in how the money was allocated. American scholars are not content to have a ministry of education of another country deciding where they should go, Perkins said.

The flow of foreign students to the United States has been increasing steadily, Perkins said. However, the growth has been distorted because students from the OPEC countries are increasing most rapidly. The Commission recommended that private institutions should receive federal funds so they can pick the areas and students and not be forced to rely on "OPEC largesse," Perkins said.

National Council. Finally, Perkins said, the Commission was concerned that its report not gather dust. It recommended the formation of a National Council of Foreign Languages and International Study, which might be supported two to three years by foundations. Council membership would "reflect but not represent" the foreign language and area study constituency, Perkins stressed. He said there would be 25 members.

Other Problems, Other Remedies.

Oscar Handlin (Harvard University) agreed with Perkins' diagnosis of the problem as far as it went, but had "difficulties confronting the remedial policies suggested by the Commission." He commented on Perkins' presentation, "Insofar as he deplores, I deplore...I second his assertions without qualifications." But he disagreed with the remedies proposed on two grounds. First, he thought the problem was singled out of a much more general crisis. Second, he objected that the primary remedy to the problems was a fiscal one.

It may be "horrible," that American youth reach age 18 without a knowledge of French or German, Handlin conceded. But "not many freshmen entering Harvard have a good working knowledge of English." High school students may be ignorant of foreign geography, he declared, but "I wouldn't bet on the number of kids who know where Missouri is. I know how few have a rounded view of American culture or history." Handlin alluded to the 1950's when everybody saw a big gap in the sciences and said, "hurry up and plug it." They forgot, "not the particularities of math and science teaching to students, but lost the total view of what schools should be doing to prepare Americans for life," he said. "I'm not ready to say every high school should require two years of foreign languages without thinking, 'instead of what.'"

Handlin then turned to the money issue: "The second aspect of the reaction to crises that worries me is that I see no assurance that large sums of money and energy will yield a solution. Suppose we said each high school would get X number of dollars for teaching foreign languages and international studies. Where are the teachers going to come from? There aren't that many. It is extremely difficult to assume that they will appear in a short time simply in response to fiscal rewards."

Handlin said he would like to see 40 to 50 area centers and 30 issue centers, but argued that there are not enough first-rate historians to staff that many centers. He recalled that the Ford Foundation had decided to create centers of excellence in the humanities and social sciences at academic institutions. "The net result was a sad dilution of resources which had a negative effect on those fields," Handlin said.

Handlin recalled that he served as Chairman of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, which administers the Fulbright program, from 1962 to 1968. Fiscal problems, he said, were but "surface manifestations of much more difficult conceptual problems." The program was started to liquidate U.S.-held excess foreign currencies overseas, and was designed to replicate Senator Fulbright's experience as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, Handlin said. It assumed that students who went to Karachi or Delhi should have the same kinds of experiences as those at Oxford or Paris. No effort was made, he said, to learn from French or German exchange programs, which "have a different way of addressing this kind of problem."

"A Dangerously Unenlightened World"

A pessimistic view of the future was presented by Guido Goldman (Harvard University), Executive Director of the Center for European Studies. He listed five basic reasons for his pessimism about the future of foreign studies:

* Declining immigration means that there are fewer non-Americans to teach Americans about other cultures.

* The decline in the value of the dollar makes it more difficult to study abroad and for scholars and institutions to purchase foreign books and journals.

* The world has become much more complex and difficult to understand in the past 20 years.

* There is substantial competition for modest resources.

* International studies has become a poor area to enter professionally. Students are not interested because they cannot find jobs.

Goldman emphasized that the sums needed to preserve the advanced centers were very modest, given the gains that would be forthcoming in terms of national security and survival. He stressed that the MX missile system would cost $30 billion. But whether the missile was needed, depended on how we read Soviet behavior, for which trained experts were needed. "If you think we ought to spend the dollars on MX missiles but not to train people in Soviet studies, we're spending money for the wrong reasons," he declared. He said the nation must "do something" to train foreign area experts or the "ramifications will be potentially destructive."

If the Commission fails and the programs are allowed to disappear, it would take a very long time to rebuild them, Goldman warned. "If the Russian Research Center at Harvard collapses, it will take a very long time before it can be regenerated." He stressed, "We live in a very dangerous and unenlightened world. I hope we can develop a strategy of how to survive until a more enlightened view takes hold. We need to keep the advanced centers alive."

Bailey warned against establishing a National Council that would be "independent of existing arrangements in Washington. I hope that part will be studied very carefully." He indicated his concern that the council not be set up with "no visable means of political support."

Education of the Gifted

At the meeting, Julian Stanley (Johns Hopkins University) presented a paper on the state of the art of teaching the gifted. The full text of this paper can be found on page 136.

Responding to Stanley's presentation, J.W. Getzels (University of Chicago) described various conceptions of giftedness that have tended to relegate gifted youth to obscurity in the schools and bureaucratic organizations. He noted that the U.S. Office of the Gifted and Talented is located in the Bureau of the Handicapped in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The off-handed treatment of the gifted, Getzels said, was due in part to conceptions that have come down from ancient through modern times. The earlier conceptions regarded giftedness as a gift either of the gods or of heredity, according to Getzels. Therefore, there was a feeling that nothing could or should be done about it. If genius is a gift of the gods, as the ancients believed, "all mortal man can do is keep out of the way," Getzels remarked. "Giftedness will find its own divine expression; programs for the gifted are not needed.

But later conceptions did not change the way gifted were perceived and treated. Galton, in 1869, wrote in Hereditary Genius that he found gifted children were usually offspring of "parents who were themselves gifted." This was another "conception of giftedness that has come down to this day and is not likely to stimulate educational intervention," Getzels said. By the 1890's, giftedness was being seen by Lombroso in The Man of Genius as a morbid condition "resembling many forms of mental disorder," Getzels continued. At the same time, psychoanalysts were placing the "root of superior achievement in psychic conflicts situated in the unconscious; that is, that part of the psyche which is least accessible to education or intervention."

Getzels summarized these pre-20th century conceptions as follows: "So, in antiquity there was divine inspiration; the 1860's, genetic inheritance; the 1890's madness and the unconscious; none are conceptions that are likely to imbue the wary schoolman with confidence that he can do anything about giftedness."

Nor were the conceptions that emerged after 1900 much more helpful. Getzels characterized these as "quiz kids are queer kids" and "early ripe, early rot." The first held that children who were intellectually gifted were probably deficient in other respects. The "early ripe, early rot" theory held that "unless the intellectual precocity was in some way restrained, these children would come to a bad end."

Terman sharply challenged these conceptions in the 1920's. He showed that bright children were not otherwise deficient, and that at mid-life they had not developed "post adolescent stupidity," Getzels said. However, Terman's work had an unfortunate side effect, Getzels noted.

Terman used IQ scores as the only criteria for giftedness, "which foreclosed attending to other sources of possible giftedness," Getzels said. In 1950 J. P. Guilford urged that the domain of creative thinking must be added to IQ in order to fully understand giftedness. Guilford subdivided intellect into convergent and divergent thinking processes, Getzels explained. Convergent thinking related to IQ, and divergent thinking purportedly related to creativity. Guilford developed a measure of divergent thinking. "The formulation had a stunning impact upon the field of giftedness," declared Getzels. "Each year, there have been more studies of giftedness than there were in the entire 100 years prior to Guilford's formulation. Unfortunately, giftedness became equated with the ability to make a high score on divergent thinking tests."

"The symbol, a high score on a test, was substituted for the substance. Children were taught to be creative by teaching them how to get a high score on a divergent thinking test," Getzels stated.

Getzels concluded his discussion of conceptions of giftedness with a comparison between the truly gifted person and the expert, between the innovative scholar and the pedant, the creative scientist and technician, the original artist and the copyist. The difference, he said, was not in the level of knowledge or skill. The expert applies his craft or skill to solving problems that already have been formulated. The gifted person applies his skills to formulating problems that still need solution. Getzels illustrated his point with a story about Einstein who was asked the difference between the ordinary and extraordinary scientist. Einstein is said to have replied that the ordinary scientist is like a detective who goes about solving a crime. If no crime is committed, no problem posed, the ordinary scientist, like the detective, has nothing to do and is glad to do nothing. The extraordinary scientist "commits his own crime, poses his own problem."

Nature of Competence

Robert Glaser (University of Pittsburgh) focused on three major points in responding to Stanley's presentation: (1) the nature of high-level competence; (2) the identification of academic abilities among neglected populations; and (3) the need for flexible schools in which individualized programs can occur.

On the first point, Glaser declared that research is finding the well-organized subject matter knowledge "influences the ability to carry out rapid mental processes." The implications of this finding for teaching and learning need to be more deeply explored, he asserted. Research has found, for example, that "density of knowledge" is a major difference between the expert and novice physicist. The expert has more integrated knowledge, more different kinds of knowledge, and a powerfully developed sense of the relationships between the relevant concepts on a particular demand of knowledge. This density of knowledge is strongly related to the expert's ability to devise problem-solving strategies, Glaser said. He suggested that creativity might be developed more efficiently by understanding and teaching subject matter competence than by teaching "creativity" per se.

Turning to his second point, Glaser said it should be possible "to identify the academically talented child in neglected populations: racial and ethnic minorities and the poor. "However, IQ tests, as selection measures, test the kinds of knowledge that a child has had the opportunity to learn. Children from neglected populations lack the opportunity to learn what IQ tests measure." Therefore, "We need to develop other methods, including family interviews, work with parents, and other kinds of assessment procedures in order to ensure that the academically talented student from neglected populations is identified," Glaser said.

Finally, Glaser called for the development of more flexible school organizations and more flexible educational programs that would take into account the individual differences in the way children learn. The kind of flexible programs that are needed are precluded by the present structure of the schools, he declared. When schools do try something new, they often pull back before the effects of the new approaches can be evaluated, Glaser said.

Most of the discussion period was devoted to the relative values of different kinds of standardized tests in identifying giftedness. Stanley asserted that the Scholastic Achievement Tests (SAT) were more relevant than IQ tests in identifying mathematically able youth for accelerated programs. Ability, he said, was not necessarily closely related to family background. "We do find high math scores among children from modest family backgrounds," he said.

Education of the Gifted: The State of The Art

On Educating the Gifted*

Julian C. Stanley

Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth (SMPY)

The Johns Hopkins University

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to think with you today about ways to improve the education of intellectually talented youths. To me, the term "intellectually talented" seems, for several reasons, preferable to the more commonly used expression "gifted." I want to consider here just those specific developed abilities that make some students especially educable within the broad context of schools. The aggregate of several such abilities can provide a measure of general intellectual ability, usually represented by an age-adjusted score called the IQ. As, undoubtedly, most of you know, the concept of general intelligence in essentially its present form dates back to Charles Spearman in 1904 and Alfred Binet scarcely a year later. Perhaps this construct-validated concept is still operationalized best via a child's carefully ascertained standard-score IQ on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale when he or she is about 7 to 12 years of age. If the educator could have but one indication of a youth's intellectual ability, this would probably be the best. Later I shall examine the wisdom of relying heavily on a single such score.

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*Presented at the meeting of the National Academy of Education in Boston on October 19, 1979. Professor Stanley's address is SMPY, Department of Psychology, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21218. SMPY's telephone numbers are (301)338-7087, -8144, and -7086.

To most somewhat knowledgeable adults, a "gifted" child is one whose Stanford-Binet-type IQ is "high." Typically, the minimum criterial score is set at 130, 132, 140, or occasionally 150. It is usually assumed, often tacitly, that all students with a given IQ such as 140 are equally educable in the usual school subjects. For example, when a high-IQ youth performs poorly in a mathematics class set up for intellectually brilliant youths, the teacher is likely to conclude that he or she is not adequately motivated and, therefore, not "working up to capacity." Actually, of course, some students reason mathematically far better than others of exactly the same chronological and mental age do. Using only IQ or MA scores to group pupils homogeneously for instruction in mathematics is foredoomed to be inefficient, compared with grouping based on more relevant criteria.

This points up the need for frequent use of tests or other assessments of special abilities that, singly or in combination, provide a more valid basis for instruction of youths talented in a given school subject than the IQ does. Which measures prove optimum will depend considerably on the type and pace of instruction in the special class. For the 12 fast-paced mathematics classes conducted thus far by the Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth (SMPY) at Johns Hopkins, high score on a difficult test of mathematical reasoning ability, augmented by a good score on a test of reading comprehension and vocabulary, has been found to be powerful. Quite a few 10 to 12 year-olds so identified, have been able to get certified via standardized achievement tests for more than 600 hours of precalculus mathematics (Algebra I through Analytic Geometry) in approximately 40 hours of instruction.

This, then, is my first point about the state of the art concerning education of the gifted: there seems to be too much emphasis on IQ as the primary homogeneous grouping variable for instruction.

Even more troubling to me, however, are the flight from the use of tests for identifying talented youths, and the strong prejudices against accelerating them academically that are held by many educators and parents. These are not new concerns, of course. They are featured prominently in Robert L. Spaulding's "review of the state of the art on research on the gifted and talented . . . for the period 1969-74," which was done in 1975 for the American Psychological Foundation. In fact, the prejudices were obvious in 1921, when Lewis M. Terman began his now-classic Genetic Studies of Genius.

Most of you are so familiar with the perennial arguments against and for standardized tests that I need not review them here. Probably you, too, are concerned, lest a large, healthy, beautiful baby be discarded carelessly while trying to dispose of a little dirty bath water. Perhaps more poignantly than almost anyone else, I realize, on the basis of my testing experience since 1938, the great value of standardized tests for finding talent. We appear to be in danger of losing some of that capacity in the name of the current "truth in testing" legislation.

Accelerating the subject-matter and/or school-grade progress of intellectually talented youths has a long history of successful outcomes. So far as Stephen Daurio could ascertain in his recent, comprehensive review of the acceleration vs. enrichment controversy, not a single substantial *study* has found the educational acceleration of intellectually talented youths harmful. Also, he could locate almost no studies of so-called educational enrichment that found it as effective as acceleration. Apparently, successful subject-matter enrichment at one level must lead to acceleration later in order to avoid boring the student and causing him or her to lose interest in the subject. This certainly has been SMPY's finding with many hundreds of youths over a 10-year period.

As concluded by Daurio and others contributing to SMPY's forthcoming book entitled *Educating the Gifted: Acceleration and Enrichment*, properly conducted acceleration tends to be enriching, and appropriate enrichment is deliberately accelerative. Thus, as the subtitle of the book indicates, it seems advisable not to contrast acceleration with enrichment as if they were mutually exclusive. Various combinations have produced happy, effective students who completed their Baccalaureates 1 to 8 years early.

This leads naturally to the concept of a smorgasbord of special educational options that may be sampled freely by intellectually talented youths. Some of these will be primarily enriching, whereas others will be chiefly accelerative. Each intellectually talented youth must have considerable guidance in order to use these options to further his or her own education most effectively.

First, though, the various abilities of the intellectually talented youth must be well known. Some multi-ability method, such as administering the eight parts of the Differential Aptitude Test Battery, is needed to find those youths who meet a criterion such as scoring in the upper 5 percent of their age group on the national norms for at least one ability. In a typical school that will yield far more than 5 percent of the students tested, the criterial percentage should be set so that false negatives will be minimized. For example, SMPY permits youths of upper-3% mathematical aptitude to enter its talent search in order to make fairly certain of screening for more difficult testing students who reason better mathematically than 98 percent of their agemates do.

After identifying the high scores on one or more of the eight tests, it is necessary to administer a much more difficult test of the specific ability or abilities on which the individual excelled. In addition, various self-reports and other information about the student should be secured. These help determine which youths have the ability to forge ahead fast and well in certain subjects or other activities. The titles of the DAT tests suggest ways to relate them to school subjects, but far more research on this is essential: Verbal Reasoning, Numerical Ability, Abstract Reasoning, Mechanical Reasoning, Space Relations, Language Usage, Spelling, and Clerical Speed and Accuracy.

A rather recent development that, as usually applied, seems to me unfortunate, is preparation of "teachers of the gifted." Who can be trained to meet all the subject-matter needs of youths highly talented in one or more subjects? In mathematics, the situation is especially difficult, because most elementary or junior high school teachers simply could not provide or supervise suitable experiences in this subject for highly talented youths.

Instead of teachers of the gifted, it seems to me that coordinators of special experiences for them are needed. These are a special kind of educational guidance counselor, seeking resources and flexibility suited individually to each student.

Related to teachers of the gifted is strong emphasis on what I would term "creativity in a vacuum" -- that is, essentially divorced from academic subject-matter. Such activity, carried along partly by the glamour of the word "creativity," seems to have been inspired chiefly by the work of J. P. Guilford and Paul Torrence. Guilfordian approaches, for instance, as done by Mary Meeker with her Structure of Intellect training, often strike me as erring in much the same way that the training of mental "faculties" did many years ago. Just because stable mental factors can be isolated via factor analysis -- and Chester Harris has cast doubt on the value of Guilford's structure of intellect -- does not mean that they can be improved by training or, even if they can, that this would have beneficial effects for learning school subjects.

Torrance's emphasis on making students "creative" often leads to the teacher's spending considerable time trying to train the presumed trait, creativity. Since two educational activities cannot occupy the same space at the same time, I wonder to what extent the displacement of emphasis on instruction in school subjects in favor of such "irrelevant enrichment," as much creativity training as it has contributed to the present test-score decline. To me it would seem better to handle subject matter itself "creatively" rather than to work directly on creativity. Even such activities as "brainstorming" can be related to specific subjects readily. In my opinion, much of the present emphasis on so-called creativity in our schools is faddish and naive.

It is at the level of differences within individuals across abilities that the most glaring problems become apparent. No single school program for "the gifted" can possibly meet those differential needs adequately. For example, if Susan reasons extremely well mathematically and is eager to move ahead faster and better in mathematics, her most pressing intellectual needs will not be met well by even the best imaginable special course in social studies, French conversion, or even computer science or chess. She needs the appropriate level and pace of mathematics now, not as a sit-in-the-corner independent studier but, preferably, along with at least several other students who are also math-able and eager. Perhaps a mathematics course, such as college algebra and trigonometry, taken as a part-time student in college or in high school several years ahead of her grade placement, will be excellent for her. Perhaps, instead, she needs a fast-paced math class for students like herself on Saturdays or Sunday afternoons.

As noted earlier, since June of 1972 SMPY has run a dozen such classes. Their chief purpose was to help well-qualified youths learn mathematics from Algebra I through the first year of college calculus as quickly as possible, depending on their abilities and motivation. While doing this, SMPY developed its diagnostic testing -- prescribed instruction method of individualizing the learning of mathematics in a class context. This approach owes much to Bob Glaser's individually programmed instruction procedures.

In principle, the DT — PI method is simple. One finds out what the math-able student does not yet know about a school subject such as Algebra I, and helps him or her learn just that. No time is wasted on repetition of what is already known, as inevitably must be done in the usual school class, where there are many unknowledgeable, uncomprehending pupils.

A brief description of how SMPY's fast-paced math classes were conducted during the summer of 1979 may help make the DT — PI model clearer. In SMPY's January 1979 search for youths who reason extremely well mathematically, 3675 boys and girls of upper-3% math ability, most of them seventh-graders 11 or 12 years old, participated. About 300 of these from a six-state area met the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score criteria for being invited to be in a fast-paced precalculus class last summer. Of those, 96 accepted the invitation. All but two of these completed the program.

The students came for 5 hours per day, one day per week for 8 weeks, preceded by a day-long standardized testing to help determine initial placement. Thus, about 32 enrolled for Tuesdays, 32 for Wednesdays, and 32 for Thursdays. To work with the 32 on a given day, were 3 instructors and 4 teaching assistants, all of them graduates of SMPY's earlier math-facilitation efforts. These teachers ranged in age from a

13-year old Johns Hopkins junior to 20-year old David Meyer, who had recently completed his B.A. and M.A. degrees in mathematics at Johns Hopkins after having been elected to membership in Phi Beta Kappa as a junior.[1] All 7 were already experienced instructors and/or tutors.

The 10-12 students who, on the basis of the pretesting, already knew the most mathematics were put into the "top" section and worked with on an individualized basis by David and the 13-year-old junior. The next most knowledgeable group of 11 or 12 students received their individualized instruction from another instructor and his teaching assistant, both of whom were especially skilled in working at this level. The group with the least background, who did not even know Algebra I well yet, had its own specially trained instructor and teaching assistant. (The fourth teaching assistant helped where needed.) Some shifting among the groups occurred, as students forged ahead at considerably different rates. Each student was encouraged to proceed as far as possible along the route from Algebra I through analytic geometry. Six of the 96 went the whole distance, thereby becoming prepared for calculus by the beginning of the eighth grade. In the approximately 35 hours of working time, most demonstrated mastery of at least two school years of high school algebra.

Results during the fast-paced summer math program of 1978 had been even better, probably mainly because the selection criteria were higher then; only 62 of 2800 upper-3% youths had qualified. Thirty-three attended, and 12 of them completed all the precalculus subjects well.

While highly successful, SMPY's various procedures occur only because the age-in-grade Carnegie-unit lockstep of schools, both public and (especially) private, makes such heroic measures essential. If schools were organized differently, SMPY would not have been necessary, nor, indeed, would the present special provisions for most slow learners. In my opinion, age-grading for instruction in academic school subjects has crept insidiously upon us as we have moved from tutorial instruction and the one-room schoolhouse to the current situation. It needs to be reversed. Of course, that will not be done easily or quickly.

My proposal in the area of mathematics is for a longitudinal teaching team that spans kindergarten through the twelfth grade in a school system. Working from a mathematics leaning center, the various members of this team would be responsible for meeting all the mathematics needs of all the students in the school system. The buck would stop with them. Every student would be helped to meet clearly stated, rather substantial criteria of mathematical competence. A few students would accomplish these early, perhaps by age 8, whereas a few others would have to work hard until age 18 or so, in order to attain the minimal. Some students would proceed far beyond the minimum essentials, whereas others would stop with them and devote their efforts thereafter to other subject matter.

Much of the instruction might still be in groups, but not age-graded one. Attaining levels of achievement instead of grades of A, B, etc. would be stressed. All members of the longitudinal mathematics team would have to be highly competent, but some would specialize in helping slow learners, and others in helping fast-moving students.

Obviously, this longitudinal-teaching-teams model could be applied to other subject-matter areas such as language arts, social studies, science, and foreign languages. There might also be art, music, drama, physical education, and social and emotional development teams. Attention to individualized differences, both within areas and across areas, would be increased vastly.

I should certainly like to see a sizable public school system pioneer this approach for at least 25 years. Because of problems that one can readily anticipate, and many that one can't, almost certainly this would be extremely difficult. I believe strongly, however, that some such plan is our only hope for the educational future of America's youths. All else will be sorry stopgaps.

Though increasingly there is much drumbeating for the gifted by various associations, including parent groups, much of it seems poorly focused. Especially, avoidance of subject matter by most of them dooms their efforts to be ineffectual. They place nearly all their gold and energy in the irrelevant-enrichment bandwagon and, in my opinion, far too little of it into subject-matter emphasis and acceleration. This leaves the typical intellectually talented youth unsatisfied, because his specific intellectual hungers are not being met. "Let them eat cake" is as poor advice in this matter as it was in the historical context. We should, and certainly can, do far better than that for the intellectually talented. Intervening strongly on their behalf educationally, rather than mainly researching the status quo, is crucial. The National Academy of Education is uniquely able to promote that!

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[1] During the 1979-80 school year Mr. Meyer is studying mathematics and physics at Cambridge University as a Churchill Scholar.

SMPY'S SIX BOOKS

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George, William C.; Cohn, Sanford J.; and Stanley, Julian C. (eds.). *Educating the gifted: Acceleration and enrichment.* JHU Press, December 1979.

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The Boston Desegregation Struggle

As the panel on Boston school desegregation was gathering for the October 20, 1979, discussion, Boston morning newspapers were headlining violence between black and white students. City and school officials were warning students to return to school. The events in the street provided a somber backdrop for the discussion by a panel of three experts. In introducing the panel, Academy President Bailey said, "When we put this program together, we had no idea the subject would be in the headlines of the local papers. The story of Boston school desegregation is a story that is prototypical of some of the worst and some of the best that has happened in the field of race relations in this country. Because of the tragic shooting at a high school football game that paralyzed a black athlete, what is always under the surface of our society has bubbled up and become ugly."

The three panelists were deeply involved in the Boston school desegregation effort. Robert Dentler (Abt Associates) was one of two experts who advised Federal Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr. Dentler has been an expert in school desegregation efforts in 13 cities. Charles Willie (Harvard University) was one of a panel of masters who advised Garrity on remedies to the Boston School segregation problem. He has studied successful desegregation efforts in 10 cities for the National Institute of Education. Joseph Featherstone (Harvard University) has written extensively in the New Republic and elsewhere on school desegregation and other educational issues.

Success and Failure in Boston

Dentler declared that the federal court acted as a last resort in a Boston civil rights struggle dating back to 1855 when black citizens petitioned the Boston School Committee for desegregation of public schools. When the case reached Judge Garrity's court, there was no question that Boston schools were unconstitutionally segregated, Dentler asserted. The only arguments, he said, were "about the degree and scope of the remedies." Even attorneys for the School Committee argued that it was a problem of the scale of intent of deliberate segregation. Garrity ordered "the most extensive remedial effort in the history of public school desegregation," Dentler said. He listed the successes and failures of that effort as he saw them:

The Successes:

1. Boston has achieved system-wide desegregation to a degree that no city of comparable

size has achieved so far, Dentler said. The plan has been mandated and accomplished. Of 151 schools, only 21 failed to meet desegregation guidelines completely. Sixteen of those 21 may be closed next year under a School Committee facilities plan.

2. Teacher desegregation has been accomplished. For the first time in the 20th Century, more than 1,000 teachers were recruited from outside of Boston. Black and other minority representation on the public school faculty has increased to 14 percent from 2 percent, and will increase at the rate of 1½ to 2 percent per year until the minority proportion reaches 20 to 25 percent, Dentler said. The desegregation effort broke the monopoly of Irish-American graduates of Boston State College who dominated the teaching staff for 40 years, Dentler said.

3. Administrative desegregation has been achieved under Robert Wood, the first superintendent of schools from outside Boston in this century. "As of this week administrative appointments have exceeded 20 percent black and other minorities," Dentler stated. "Two dozen schools have principals or headmasters who are black or members of other minority groups." Before the court order, he said, 60 percent of the schools had no principals or headmasters. And those that did, he said, were filled through a patronage system.

4. Prior to the court order, parent participation was virtually unknown, except for a "vest pocket organization of parents who participated in the patronage system," Dentler said. This organization has been replaced by a network of elected parent councils which have racial and ethnic balance.

5. "By 1978, for the first time in 40 years, parent/taxpayers elected a moderate, law-abiding School Committee," Dentler said. "No longer do you find School Committee minutes commenting on the 'stupidity of black Bostonians'." The committee was elected by a coalition of moderate parents and teachers. It has begun to think about public education, Dentler asserted.

6. The court ordered the reconstruction or closing of schools, 60 percent of which were built before 1911. Garrity ordered 41 schools closed that had been condemned as "unfit for student use or human habitation" as early as 1941 by a series of panels and visitors. These included the school Jonothan Kozol described in Death at an Early Age as having broken and leaking roofs, broken windows, boilers that didn't work in winter and worked too well in summer.

Other successes cited by Dentler included: (7) elimination of political hiring and promotion of teachers; (8) a 240 percent increase in the budget for special education; (9) the introduction for the first time of bi-lingual programs, some of which are exemplary; (10) a transportation plan that reduced the number bussed from 30,000 to 22,000; (11) establishment of a firm chain of command, including principals and assistant principals in each school; (12) introduction of a computerized recordkeeping system for one which contained 5,000 to 7,000 "spurious entries" in 1975; and (13) creation of new model schools "which are competitive with or superior to schools in the 'golden suburbs'."

The Failures:

The major failure, Dentler said, was the repeated flare-up of "extreme racial conflict. Boston is not a safe and open city." This failure is due in part to Boston's long history with minority populations, including the English reception of the Irish and colonial relations with native Americans, Dentler stated. Racial and ethnic conflict are part of the cultural history of the city, he said, because no one is dealing with it as an educational issue. There is no instruction in human relations. Desegregation in the schools was not accompanied by teaching about desegregation. Teachers argued that teaching about the academic content of desegregation would be injecting their own beliefs into the curriculum, Dentler said.

The result is a perpetuation of the status quo, he declared. He listed also these other failures:

(1) The high rate of suspensions persists, with blacks receiving twice as many suspensions as whites; (2) school failures number 21 percent of the student population citywide; (3) 14 percent of the students withdrew citywide, with the rate reaching 27 percent in some schools; (4) non-attendance reaches 25 to 30 percent daily, as most schools open at 7:30 and then lock their doors at 1:15 to allow teachers time for second jobs; and (5) "the system still is dismally failing in terms of academic achievement."

Why the Violence Occurred

Violence continues in Boston because black people remain an invisible population, declared Willie, who served as a master in the school desegregation case. He said a *New York Times* reporter blamed school desegregation for the current violence in Boston. Willie noted that the violence occurred because a black student had been shot and paralyzed during a football game. The Boston community, he said, had been relatively free of violence until the shooting occurred. "Since that shooting, Boston has been experiencing turbulence in all neighborhoods." The reporter treated the shooting of a black as an invisible event.

Willie blamed the political leadership of Boston for the racial violence that did occur when the school desegregation order was handed down. "It was not until June of 1976 that the mayor told the citizens that desegregation would not go away," Willie declared. Before that, the mayor had joined the appeal of the order and had implied that desegregation was not legal. Symbolically, Mayor Kevin White was saying when he joined in appealing Judge W. Arthur Garrity's order, that the "city fathers were indicating that the court order was possibly illegal," White asserted.

"Ruffians do not understand the niceties of the legal process," he said. "If they hear that a court order is illegal, then there is no basis for them to be law abiding." When the mayor let it be known that he believed the court order was unlawful, "he placed the city's law enforcement authority in jeopardy," Willie said. "I don't think the problem is a social class problem, but one of people being politicized and polarized for political reasons."

Despite the violence and declining test scores, some people believe educational quality in Boston has improved since desegregation, Willie said. A survey of middle level opinion makers found 48 percent thought quality had improved, 23 percent thought it declined, and the rest thought it both improved and declined. These opinion makers included police officers, fire company officials, members of certain civic organizations. Willie said that some black parents whose children were bussed to suburban schools before the court order wanted the children returned to Boston schools because they believed quality had improved.

Featherstone emphasized the importance of understanding the school desegregation struggle from a local standpoint. There has been extensive variation in the desegregation story due to local differences, he said. "Boston is a city of neighborhoods." He said, "When reporting is done, the kinds of things people tell you do not necessarily add up to a tidy story. An administrator said the situation in Boston was a quagmire, like the Viet Nam war. But teachers and parents say that things are happening in the schools that were not possible five years ago."

The Role of Schools of Education
In American Research Universities

Academy members received a preliminary report from Harry G. Judge (Oxford University), who is taking a look at six schools of education in major research universities. Judge, Director of Oxford's Department of Educational Studies, offered his comments in a "tentative and speculative mood," stressing that nothing he said was meant to be "proscriptive or censorious." He said he found a great puzzle about the proper role and mission of schools of education. Nobody seriously doubted, he said, that education should be, or is, central to the mission of the university. And nobody would deny that educational questions were "difficult and intractable."

Judge said he found that schools of education tended to be peripheral in the university. They seem not to have a discipline or recognized body of knowledge. And they tend not to be professional schools. "Neither do they fit neatly into the world of the arts and sciences." He found that the status of schools of education was lower in England than in the United States. To change the low estate of schools of education, he argued, would require changing the structure of the educational system and the values of the academic community. He listed several speculations for the lack of clarity about the role and mission of the schools of education.

Judge contended that education and schooling are not synonymous and that education is not central to the mission of the university. Pedagogy is not regarded as a proper study for the university. Yet, he questioned, "If schools of education aren't about pedagogy, what are they about? Why should there be special institutions to do something that isn't professional? What is the knowledge base peculiar to education?"

A second difficulty in clarifying the situation, he said, is the low status of teaching as a profession. Educators who want to change the system must try to do so from this low status position. Judge speculated, "It may be that the reason law and medicine occupy a higher status in the university is because they occupy a higher status in society." He noted that the stature of teaching is lower in the United States than in other countries. This makes it unlikely that universities will be concerned with elementary and secondary schools, he said.

The market for teachers and teacher training is declining, Judge commented, noting declining funds, birthrates, and enrollments. Therefore, the place of schools of education is declining also. Finally, he remarked, it is especially difficult to profess education in a university context because everybody considers himself or herself an educator or teacher. "There is a kind of built-in resistance to the idea of education as a profession or to the idea that teacher training is needed," he said.

Universities, Judge said, are preoccupied with training leaders, scholars, scientists, or policymakers. They do not want to know what proportion of their graduates go into teaching, he said. "They won't admit that they produce people who go into sales and advertising. They don't want to admit that they're producing large numbers of teaching professionals."

Judge characterized schools of education's attempts to improve their position as universalism, leadership, and banditry. Universalism, he explained, represented an attempt to broaden the purview of schools of education to include everything. They argue that everything has to do with the educative influences of society; libraries and museum, television, the mass media, the family, and so on. "They try to deal with the world by a kind of cultural imperialism. All things become the property of schools of education. Thus, they achieve cosmic success by taking over the world." The problem with this approach is that it gives the impression that schools are too difficult, since nothing can be done about them, Judge stated.

The leadership approach seeks to produce high grade research workers and those who run the system at the highest possible level, Judge commented. "As a God-given rationale," this approach is enormously attractive, especially in times of expansion and development, he added. The problem is that the approach is exclusive. If everybody becomes a leader, Judge said, there are few people left to be lead. The question must be asked, he said, of leadership for what?

The "banditry" approach seeks high class research by "seducing scholars from other fields and planting them in schools of education where we can admire the leaves, the foliage, and the fruit," declared Judge. Banditry represents a clear way to establish a position in the ratings system, he said. It moves education toward graduate school rather than education school status, toward the Ph.D. as the highest degree rather than the Ed.D. This approach gradually would reach a dead end as long as it depends on securing scholars from other fields and not generating them in schools of education. "It leads," Judge asserted, "to a kind of odd discontinuity between personal and professional reputations; the scholar produces an odd apologetic cough when he says he's from a graduate school of education."

Judge raised five questions about schools of education based on his observations at the six schools. They are briefly as follows:

1. "What's all the fuss about?" The situation is so much better than it is in England where the schools of education have an even lower reputation. Since they've "always muddled through, why not continue?"

2. "Why did I get little sense of pressure for teacher training to become exclusively graduate?"

3. "How is the world of schools of education to be related to the field they allegedly serve?"

4. How big should the schools of education be? Why are some reluctant to accept that they might become very much smaller?

5. How autonomous should educational activity in the university be? How far should schools of education seek to define their own territory, machinery, resources, and budgets; or how far should they try to move back into a closer relationship with the university as a whole?

Toward Altering Schools of Education

David Riesman (Harvard University) attributed the low status of teaching in part to the quality of the faculty at undergraduate programs in state colleges and universities, as well as at small denominational colleges that award 40 percent of their Baccalaureates in elementary education. To profoundly alter American society and improve education "as well as to moderate sexism, hearty males who also coach soccer and football should be teaching art and English in elementary school, while attractive -- dare I say 'sexy?' -- women should be teaching mathematics, chemistry, and shop," Riesman declared. "This might have the added benefit of reversing the present dismal trend...in SAT scores."

Riesman declared that "high scholarly" Jesuits do teach in "some of the very top secondary schools in the country, from which even now I am confident that graduates can write flawless prose and do explication de texte." He noted that these schools were not coeducational. "I have argued for many years," he said "that I want single-sex schools, uniforms, and other such quixotic hopes." He argued that "coeducational is one of the reasons for the low status of schools, and hence of the appalling situation of teachers in them."

Turning to schools of education themselves, Riesman argued, "There is no rational defense that I can think of for entanglement of education with undergraduate work." The master's degree "is perhaps the worst farce," Riesman said. It results in teachers "getting paid by the state, in order to be able to be paid still more by the state." Master's and doctoral degrees "at a distance" also diminish the status of teaching, he said. These degrees for "life experience, and other such dilutions of quality" reduce the possibility that making education a post-Baccalaureate field could be a solution, Riesman said.

However, he argued, graduate schools of education should not seek to become mini-universities. He also deplored the tendency of some liberal arts schools which exhibit snobbery toward practice. He said the arts and sciences faculty of engineering schools often take the position that they are teaching barbarians, who actually are students "with as high verbal scores as anybody in the country." These faculties often try to convert students to "their" subjects rather than adapting themselves to the needs of the students, Riesman declared. He said business schools offer a good teaching model. The Harvard Business School has "the most serious emphasis on teaching anywhere in the University, much more so than at the Harvard Graduate School of Education where there is no emphasis on pedagogy by the pedagogues," Riesman said. The case method is an admirable way to bring practice into the classroom, he said. But where it has been done at Harvard, the case method has been used to train administrators, but not teachers.

The Effects of Change

Martin Trow (University of California at Berkeley) urged that schools of education be examined from three perspectives: their similarities, their differences, and the impact on them of changes in the public schools they serve.

In terms of the similarities, Trow called for "a kind of comparative sociology of professional education" in focusing on the constituencies and processes that institutions share. This would include comparisons of programs and institutional status, and the consequences this holds for the school's relations with other departments. It would look at the research done in schools of education, taking into account the "enormous significance of educational psychology in defining and shaping education research."

The interest in differences would be related to the similarities, Trow said. It would require a look at: origins of schools of education at each institution, including the myths about origins; the nature of early leadership and how that shaped institutional identities; the school's relationship to the host university; how various revolutions shaped the character of the institutions; leadership styles; and the nature of the school's relationship to federal agencies and other "external funding bodies."

The Influence of Change

The important change, especially in urban education, was a shift away from middle class values, Trow hypothesized. The emphasis in the past on middle class values included: moving up social ladders, using a formal and increasingly complex language, valuing status over performance and achievement, self-restraint and postponement of gratification, a stress on hard work; persistence, equality of opportunity; truthfulness, patriotism, and respect for elders and others in authority.

The counter culture on the 1960's was hostile to middle class values, Trow said. The counter culture was incorporated into the mass culture. Its view was abetted by black, Chicano, and other ethnic hostility to middle class values. These combined forces, Trow contended, have in many places changed the culture of the classroom. The emergence of ethnic subcultures has changed teaching styles, the curriculum, and the character of the schools, especially in the central cities. In the past, he said, the schools served the lower classes by resisting capture by those cultures. This may have enabled the schools to serve the function of social mobility rather than the formation of subcultural stability, Trow asserted. As the public schools relinquish the former functions of acculturation and social mobility, those functions are served increasingly by other institutions, particularly parochial schools.

"The changes in the schools have demoralized many, especially older teachers and administrators who are no longer sure what their mission and function is," Trow noted. They have lost their conviction in their guiding norms and principles. "I think we're seeing a loss of self-confidence among professionals who work in the schools, especially those representing middle class culture," Trow declared. Other forces impinging on the schools and eroding the confidence of school people include: the debate over bi-lingualism, children's rights, community school boards, and the politics of big city school systems, Trow said.

He saw the conflict in urban schools affecting also the morale and mission of people in the schools and colleges of education. What we need is to try to think through in great detail the way the fundamental democratization of urban schools affects the authority and confidence of schools of education, Trow said.

Thomas F. Green (Syracuse University) suggested that research universities were not the correct context for studying schools of education. These institutions are the ones where there is "likely to be maximum distance between the professional schools and the populations served," he said.

Robert M. Gagné (Florida State University) wondered, "What obstacles are there from the university community of arts and sciences in perceiving schools and colleges of education in the same way they do medical schools?"

"Largely male," Riesman commented.

"Other professions are much smaller than education," said Nathaniel L. Gage (Stanford University). Medicine and laws don't begin to have two million practitioners. If we have to have two million members, we reach pretty far down into the barrel of talent. The education profession can never be as elitist as medicine and the law."

Jeanne S. Chall (Harvard University) noted that medical students usually are taught by practicing doctors. This is not generally true in education, where the faculty has little experience in teaching at the secondary and elementary levels, she said. "People who teach as professors look down on the practice of teaching. So they don't keep up with practice themselves," Chall declared.

Gage concluded the discussion by observing, "Schools of education ought to teach how to teach. Research on teaching should be central to the development of what schools of education have to offer."

Revisionists Respond to Ravitch

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Revisionists Respond to Ravitch

I Introduction

In the Spring of 1976, Diane Ravitch of Teachers College, Columbia University, prepared an essay-review on the works of a number of American scholars popularly known as "revisionists."[1] The review was commissioned by the then President of the National Academy of Education, Patrick Suppes. Later, Professor Ravitch's review was expanded into a book, The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

The choice of Professor Ravitch to undertake a serious review of several works by revisionist historians and economists was not dictated by any malice of Academy members towards various authors or toward a particular historical point of view. It was the judgment of informed Academy members that Professor Ravitch would be likely to write a spirited and thought-provoking essay. Her own recent work on The Great School Wars had received critical acclaim. She was known personally to a number of Academy members as a bright and lucid writer.

What emerged from Professor Ravitch's pen, first as a review and then as a book, was greeted by some readers as an unduly polemical attack upon courageous and responsible scholarship; by others as an overdue correction to the polemical historiography of some of the revisionists themselves. In any case, few undertakings by the Academy have provoked a more vigorous and contentious response. In the light of the reaction to the initial Ravitch review, President Patrick Suppes asked a number of revisionists to respond to Professor Ravitch, and assured them that their responses would be appropriately published by the Academy. At that time (April 1977), no revisionist responded to President Suppes' proposal.

In 1979, as the new President of the Academy, I renewed the Academy's offer to collect and publish responsible rejoinders to Professor Ravitch. This time a number of revisionists responded positively. What follows are their reactions to Professor Ravitch's critique. The Academy gave Professor Ravitch an opportunity to comment on the rejoinders. She demurred, expressing the belief that her book spoke for itself.

The Academy, in the spirit of free academic discourse, is pleased to make the revisionists' responses to Professor Ravitch available to the attentive public. The officers of the Academy are grateful to those who have prepared the following papers and have granted the Academy the privilege of publishing or republishing their points of view.

Stephen K. Bailey

President
National Academy of
Education

[1] *Schooling in Capitalist American: Education Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life*, by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. New York: Basic Books, 1976. 340 pp. $13.95.

Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy, by Walter Feinberg. New York: Wiley, 1975. 287 pp. $11.00.

War, Technology, and Education: Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education, edited by Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975. 222 pp. $10.00.

The Great School Legend: A Revisionist Interpretation of American Public Education, by Colin Greer. New York: Basic Books, 1972, 206 pp. $6.95.

Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century, by Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring. Chicago: Rand Mcally, 1973. 243 pp. $5.95.

Shaping the American Educational State: 1900 to the Present, edited by Clarence J. Karier. New York: Free Press, 1975. 439 pp. $10.95 (paper, $5.95).

Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America, by Michael Katz. New York: Praeger, 1971. 158 pp. $5.95.

The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-nineteenth Century Massachusetts, by Michael Katz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 325 pp. $14.00 (paper, $2.95).

Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, by Joel H. Spring. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. 206 pp. $7.95.

A Primer of Libertarian Education, by Joel H. Spring. New York: Free Life Editions, 1975. 157 pp. $3.95.

II. Dewey as a Cultural Symbol: A response to Diane Ravitch*

by

Walter Feinberg

I. The Sustaining Influence of Liberalism

To a large extent the debate over Dewey, which Diane Ravitch focuses upon in her treatment of my book, Reason and Rhetoric,** is really a debate about the viability of the liberal model for social change and the possibility that it holds for human progress. Before looking at Ravitch's treatment of Reason and Rhetoric and of Dewey, I want to look at the image of American society as it is revealed by her treatment of the question of the extent to which progress marks the experience of blacks in recent times. The question of black progress is important in my case, because it, along with the Vietnam War, was a major factor in bringing me to question the liberal model of social organization. Thus, by looking at her treatment of this issue I hope to highlight a major point of disagreement between myself and some others who, like Ravitch, continue to find the more traditional liberal arguments persuasive.

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* I wish to thank Eric Bredo, Linda Houghton, Ernest Kahane, Stephen Norris, Philip Steedman, and Jeffrey Tank for their helpful comments in preparing this paper. (A draft of this paper originally appeared in The Gadfly, Vol. 1, Nos. 5, 6.)

** The full title is Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Educational Policy, N.Y.: John Wiley, 1975.

In her monograph Ravitch treats a number of issues among which the question of black progress is but one. And while she, herself, does not connect up her treatment of this issue with her treatment of Dewey (contained in her critique of Reason and Rhetoric), they can be related in the following way: one of the major reasons why Dewey focused so much of his attention on schools was that he believed not only that they could be used to ameliorate some of the harsher effects of technology, but also because he felt that they could serve as a key instrument for social progress. They could be the instrument through which society purposefully reconstructs itself. In recent times, however, this belief has come under serious challenge as some scholars have argued that schools tend to reproduce the social division of labor. In focusing upon the recent experience of blacks and arguing the case for progress through education, Ravitch is, albeit implicitly, providing us with a contemporary restatement of Dewey's point of view. Ravitch therefore provides an occasion to see just how significant this idea continues to be in the contemporary liberal's vision of things.

Ravitch acknowledges that discriminatory practices have resulted in disadvantaged positions for blacks and some other minorities. While she agrees that discriminatory practices still exist, she sees a number of hopeful signs, among which is a reported decrease in the number of black families below the poverty line between 1964-1974. Yet the analysis that she gives of this fact overlooks a number of considerations. She attributes this reported decrease largely to liberal policy regarding housing, education and jobs, much of which, she rightly points out, took place under the Johnson administration. Yet Ravitch fails to entertain the hypothesis that at least some of the programs mentioned resulted in part, from the economic stimulation brought about by the Vietnam War, a hypothesis which is at least reasonable given the general stagnation and high level of unemployment (especially among sectors of the black population) which have reoccurred since the war. Nor does she entertain the possibility that such programs were only partly a function of administration policy, and she does not consider the role of grass roots movement for civil rights in promoting change. Of course, if the issue is merely one of administrative policy, then Ravitch is correct; a certain amount of domestic progress was accomplished during the Johnson administration that had not been accomplished prior to it. Yet if the question is broadened to ask what are the conditions and limits of progressive legislation in a society like the United States, then it is also important to see the extent to which such progress has been sustained. Thus Ravitch argues that such progress has continued, and an examination of aspects of this argument can reveal a good deal about the modern liberal perspective. Ravitch writes:

> The overall income gap between blacks and whites remains large, though it has narrowed. Black family income in 1974 was only 58 percent of white family income compared to 54 percent in 1964. But poverty was not randomly spread among blacks. Young black families in the North and West, those in which both spouses were employed, had incomes that were 99 percent of the income of equivalent white families; even in the South, where black earnings were lowest, these families earned 87 percent of the income of corresponding

white families.[1]

Ravitch uses these figures to indicate a trend toward greater equality between blacks and whites, and to conclude that: "those blacks who are under thirty-five, well educated, and middle-class have achieved virtual full economic equality with their white peers."[2] And this further indicates for her that "for the first time in American history, blacks can achieve equality through some of the same mechanisms that other groups have used and from which blacks have previously been excluded."[3] The fact that Ravitch takes the black middle-class as a major index of progress is problematic in itself. For surely one would want to know not only the relative well-being of the black middle-class in relation to its white counterpart, but also the relative sizes of the middle-classes in each group as a percentage of the whole group. And one would also want to know the relative well-being of the lower classes in relationship to the middle-classes in both groups. Even given the indices she does use, however, the picture is not as optimistic as she paints it. Nevertheless, parity between the groups that Ravitch mentions appears impressive. Indeed, in a later Bureau of the Census report the ratio of black to white median income for 1974 is even slightly higher for young, two-working-parent families in the North and West than the one Ravitch cites --

1.07 (although only .84 for the South.)[4] That is, it appears impressive until one realizes that Ravitch is writing about a group that comprised, as the above census report describes it: "a very small proportion (6 percent) of all Black families in this country in 1974."[5] Of course, when considering only such families in the North and West as a portion of the whole the percentage shrinks even more.

There are other factors as well which Ravitch fails to note, but which also cast doubt on her view of black progress. For example, a chart in the earlier government publication which Ravitch cites shows that when all families in the North and West are taken into consideration there was, surprisingly, an actual comparative decline in the proportion of black to white income between the years 1959 and 1973 (from .71 to .65) after an initial increase in 1969 and 1970. The same is true of all families in the North and West where the head is under 35 years of age, although here the major decline is from 1969 to 1973 and seems to include all regions except the South where there is a comparative gain (from .62 in 1969 and 1970 to .66 in 1973, as compared to .74 in 1969 to .61 in 1973 in the North and West).[6] Second, and more important, Ravitch fails to note that there has been an actual decline in black husband and wife families as a percentage of all black families from 1970 to 1974. Indeed, since 1960 when 66% of non-white children lived with both parents, the figure is reported to have fallen to 49% in 1975.[7] Since the percentage of all such families is on the decline, and since the young families with two parents working comprise but 6% of the total of all black families, these figures surely cannot be used unambiguously to indicate a trend towards equality.

It is instructive at this point to quote from a passage (not quoted by Ravitch) from the report that Ravitch uses but which provides quite a different picture of black progress than the one she draws.

> As is noted in the Family section of this report, black husband-wife families as a percent of all black families have declined; virtually no changes have been observed for their white counterparts during the period 1970 to 1974 (income year). (See table 72). The husband-wife families generally have median incomes which are higher than those of other types of families, primarily because they are more likely to have at least two earners. In 1974, black husband-wife families had a median income of $12,982 compared to $7,942 for black families headed by a male with no wife present and $4,465 for black families headed by a female. Thus, the decline in the proportion of black husband-wife fam-

ilies would have a downward influence upon the median income of all black families (table 16).

In the past, not only have proportionally more black than white wives worked to supplement the income resources of their families, but their contributions have been greater. Since 1970, the proportion of black husband-wife families with wives in the paid labor force has fluctuated; however, the percentage in 1974 (54 percent) was the same as that in 1970. During the same time period, the proportion for their white counterparts had increased from 38 to 42 percent. (From 1967 to 1970, both racial groups had experienced increases in this proportion.) The income levels of black husband-wife families with a wife in the paid labor force has risen from 1970 to 1974; but, these families have not improved their income status relative to comparable white families. (Black to white income ratio was about 78 percent for these families in both 1970 and 1974.) Between 1970 and 1974, the decline in the proportion of black husband-wife families has reduced the proportion of all black families with wives in the paid labor force. This pattern combined with changes which have occurred among white families has produced a downward effect upon the overall income ratio of black to white families in the '70's (tables 15 and 16).[8]

Thus the question of whether black progress continues would seem to be indeed more mixed than Ravitch's report indicates. It is true that among all younger families with both husband and wife present (whether working or not) there has been an increase in comparative income from 1970 to 1973 on a national scale. However this increase nationally seems to be a function of an increase in the South alone whereas the figures for the North and West show a decrease. What Ravitch does not emphasize, however, is that according to another chart in the publication she cites, when all families are taken into account nationally, there has been a slight comparative decrease in black family income from 1967 to 1973 when compared to white family income.[9] And even though other studies indicate a gain from 1973 to 1975,[10] nevertheless, in virtually every category black unemployment is significantly higher than white (generally about twice as high).[11] Some indices which Ravitch does not cite but which are included in the same publication from which she drew her earlier figures serve to make the issue of progress even more complicated. In 1973 the black infant mortality rate, although improved in absolute terms, stood only slightly better than the white rate did in 1950.[12] Perhaps even more striking is the fact that black males in every age category from one year through age twenty-five could expect to live longer in 1959-61 than they could in 1973, and those in forty-year-old age group could expect to live exactly as long in 1973 as they could in 1959-60. On the other hand, in each of these categories white men have shown reasonable gains as have both black and white women, although a black female infant can still expect to live about six years less than her white counterpart.[13]

Before I attempt to draw some general conclusions from Ravitch's discussion, it will be useful to emphasize just how ambiguous is the issue of progress among the black population. It is true that given traditional indices of material progress there are reported significant gains in such areas as educational attainment, rise in income, and occupational prestige during the 1960's. Moreover some of these gains are reported to have persisted even during the depressed economic years of the early 1970's. Others, such as the unemployment rate, did not. In appraising the significance of these gains, Farley correctly notes that:

> Reductions in inequality are small when compared to remaining racial differences on many indicators. A continuation of the trends of the 1960's and 1970's offers no hope that racial differences will be eliminated soon. For instance, a higher pro-

> portion of white men in 1940 than black men in 1976 held white-collar jobs. The purchasing power of the typical black family in 1974 was equivalent to that of a white family twenty years earlier, and the earnings of black men lag far behind those of white men.[14]

A section of the census report which Ravitch did not use strikes a most discouraging note for blacks as well as whites as it examines developments in 1974 and 1975.

> The employment situation for both black and white workers deteriorated during 1974 and early 1975 in line with the general downturn in the economy. Large increases in unemployment coupled with fairly widespread cutbacks in employment were experienced by both races. In contrast, there had been substantial improvements in employment for blacks and whites between 1972 and 1973.
>
> Unemployment rates for both blacks and whites had declined to 3-½ year lows in the third and fourth quarters of 1973 and were 8.6 percent and 4.3 percent (seasonally adjusted), respectively, during the fourth quarter of 1973. As labor market conditions deteriorated, jobless rates surged during late 1974 and early 1975, reaching

13.7 percent for black and other races and 7.6 percent for whites in the first quarter of 1975. For adult men, the jobless rate for both black and other races and whites doubled from late 1973 and was 11.1 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively, during the first quarter of 1975. For teenagers, the jobless rate for black and other races reached 39.8 percent in early 1975, compared with 18.0 percent for whites (tables 30 and 31).

The steep rise in unemployment was accompanied by sharp cutbacks in employment for workers of both races. Employment, which stood at 9 million for black and other races and 75.2 million for whites during the first quarter of 1975, was down sharply from high levels posted in early and mid-1974.

Paralleling these developments in employment and unemployment were increases in the number of persons of both white and black and other races who were nonparticipants in the labor force. Of particular interest within this group are those persons not in the labor force due to discouragement over job prospects. (These persons, often called the "hidden unemployed," want jobs but are not looking for work because they believe their search would be in vain.) Their number, which had averaged about 525,000 white and 160,000 persons of black and other races in 1974, began to rise sharply in late 1974 and reached levels of about 800,000 and 315,000, respectively, during the first quarter of 1975. Among persons not in the labor force in early 1974, 4.4 percent of the black and other races and 1.5 percent of whites were discouraged workers.

Even though Ravitch grants that inequities continue to persist, the image that she draws is one in which progress within the black population continues. Her view suggests that such progress can be best explained by the kind of administrative policies which were initiated during the Johnson administration, and which, if continued, will assure that it persists. Moreover, in her treatment of such issues as federal support for compensatory education, she reports that "the amount appropriated by the federal government was not 'drastically reduced'" and in the specific cases she refers to, was increased.[16]

While many factors, including at one point the highest unemployment rate among blacks since World War II (a level which may have been reached after Ravitch's monograph was published but before her book was printed), would cast doubt upon Ravitch's image of continued progress, there is clear evidence that progress in many areas has slowed significantly since the 1960's. Moreover, the decline seems generally immune to whether a Republican or a Democratic administration has been in office. If Ravitch is correct about the continuation into the 1970's of certain key administrative educational policies that were begun in the 1960's, and if she is suggesting that the reported fact that the continued level of funding in the area of compensatory education is typical of other programs as well, then a reasonable question should be: why then the general slowdown in most areas and the retreat in others? Ravitch avoids asking such a question, and thereby also avoids considering what the limits to social reform might be in societies like the United States.

It is in the failure to ask this kind of question that I believe Ravitch shares some important ground with Dewey. However, the issue is less what Dewey believed than it is what he has come to represent. While Dewey's belief that the schools could become the institution through which society progressively reconstructs itself has become a guiding principle of liberal policy, he also warned that problems need to be considered in light of their own peculiar circumstances. This warning could lead one to speculate that even Dewey might now agree that his belief in schools has been overextended. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out elsewhere[17], by focusing so heavily upon the school, and by dismissing prematurely a class analysis of American society in favor of the interest group theory, Dewey was unable to examine some of the structural limits to progress. In addition, his strong belief that social institutions needed to be consistent with the potential for technological growth made it difficult for him to reflect upon the traditional measures of progress. Ravitch, writing under somewhat different circumstances, still finds little reason to reflect upon the traditional measures of progress, and indeed holds firmly to the idea of continuing progress even in light of evidence that is at best mixed. For example, she finds significant the fact that young, black, two-parent families have approached parity with similar white families, but she does not find the fact that the percentage of two parent families is decreasing significantly enough to warrant even a footnote. Similarly her vision of progress is maintained by overlooking the fact that young black families with two parents working comprise but 6 percent of the total of all black families.

Yet to show that the signs of black progress are more mixed than Ravitch suggests, and to leave the matter there, would be to confine the debate to her terms and to grant more than is reasonable. Implicit in Ravitch's argument is the view that the progress of our society is to be judged on the basis of how closely the distribution of status and rewards within one group approximates the distribution to be found among the dominant group. On one level the approach is understandable especially when applied to blacks. Given the legal sanctions that have historically been forced upon the black population, some indication of parity would at least show that administrative policy can be used (given grass roots pressure) as an effective corrective measure. Whether Ravitch makes this case convincingly depends of course on how comprehensive is her review of the various indices. Yet even if we were to agree that the prospects are as encouraging as Ravitch believes, an uncritical acceptance of the standards that she used would commit us to accepting a large amount of inequality within different groups. In other words, if we are concerned primarily with indices of comparative well-being across groups, then the question still remains as to how well-being is to be distributed within groups. Ravitch implicitly cites the distribution pattern of the dominant group as the criterion by which to judge the progress of blacks but one might reasonably hesitate in acknowledging that the level of inequality to be found in that group should be taken as anything but a provisional index of social progress.[18]

While Ravitch's treatment of the question of black progress is interesting in its own right, I believe that it is also useful for understanding the protective reaction of liberal scholars towards Dewey. Overlooking some of the empirical problems with her account of the economic situation of blacks, Ravitch arguing that present liberal structures are sufficient to sustain such progress and, implicitly, that existing standards of social progress are essentially non-problematic. One of the major concerns of Reason and Rhetoric was to bring into question these two beliefs, and the treatment of Dewey and other like minded theorists was intended to explore the limits of the liberal ideal among even its most progressive adherents.[19] Rather than addressing Dewey in these terms, Ravitch insists upon viewing the analysis presented in Reason and Rhetoric as a personal attack on Dewey, and thus does not feel obliged to examine the extent to which the liberal model that Dewey and others articulated is able to sustain progress in our contemporary society. Nevertheless there are some important issues about the nature of an adequate interpretation which Ravitch implicitly raises. By addressing these issues we will be able to see some of the important factors which generate conflicting interpretations of Dewey.

II Dewey, Liberalism, and the Problem of the Interpretive Frame

Ravitch begins her treatment of Reason and Rhetoric by offering the following defense of Dewey:

> Dewey comes in for a large share of Feinberg's criticism, and much of it is based on the presentist assumption that Dewey should have known then what Feinberg knows now. For example, Feinberg perceives social class bias in John and Evelyn Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow, but radicals who were Dewey's contemporaries saw it differently. The Modern School Journal, a publication of educational radicals in the early twentieth century frequently recommended the book that Feinberg now calls "class biased."[20]

In her concern to defend Dewey, Ravitch unfortunately misrepresents what I said. The misrepresentation can be used productively; however, by examining it closely, we can begin to understand some of the factors by which two different interpretations are generated.

To begin, the words "class biased" appear in quotes in Ravitch's original passage preceded by the words "that Feinberg now calls" and are followed by the footnote number 81 in the National Academy Publication which refers the reader to pages 108-111 in *Reason and Rhetoric*. This gives the impression that I used this term in those pages to describe the Dewey volume referred to. Yet nowhere in those pages is the term "class bias" as referring to *Schools of Tomorrow* to be found (nor could I find the term anywhere else in the book). Now this may seem like a small point given the fact that those three pages are in fact discussing certain observations made by Dewey which could properly be termed bias, and given too that few texts are immune from editorial errors. Yet, Ravitch's particular error *is* significant because she builds her major criticism of my book on it. Indeed, her claim that I called Dewey's treatment "class biased" in the place where she refers to it suggests that I was primarily interested in the origins of Dewey's perceptions (in some kind of social class heritage on his part) when in fact I was interested in something else entirely -- the nature of the perceptions themselves.[21] Of course, the attribution of the words "class bias" to me allows Ravitch to dismiss many of the details that were present in my treatment of Dewey on this issue. However what is more important to notice is the fact that the term "class bias" is *Ravitch's*, not mine, and that while she draws it as a conclusion from the analysis which I gave, she does not refute that analysis. I believe that *her* conclusion is in fact a reasonable one, but of course, Ravitch does *wish* to deny the validity of the conclusion she draws. She attempts to do so by noting that a journal which she calls "a publication of educational radicals" recommended Dewey's book. Yet while this fact may speak to the pervasiveness of Dewey's views among certain groups, it is difficult to believe that Ravitch really means it to be sufficient for an endorsement of them, given her general treatment of contemporary educational radicals. Nor, of course, does it speak to the question of class bias since if it is the case that Dewey was class biased, and if the "radical" publication that Ravitch mentions agrees with him in those cases where he displayed his class bias, then its views would likely be subject to the same analysis. Ravitch says nothing about these issues.

The more interesting and the more cental point of Ravitch's analysis however, is her view that my criticism of Dewey is based on a reading back into the past of knowledge that has been attained in the present. There is a certain irony in this criticism because in an article of mine which appeared contemporaneously w[illegible] the publication of Ravitch's monograph, and I attempted to understand the difference between traditional and revisionist treatment of American schooling in terms not all together dissimilar from the one that Ravitch applies here.[22] I argued that part of the force of some revisionist critiques rests on a shift in the way in which equality of opportunity is to be understood. While it is unnecessary here to reiterate the details of that article, it is useful to note that while the point that I made was similar to Ravitch's the tone was substantially less critical. To understand what lies behind that difference in tone will help provide a vehicle for understanding some of the interpretive differences between Ravitch and myself. This issue has much to do with the nature of historical scholarship.

To begin with it is useful to make a distinction between a treatment which adopts the point of view of a certain historical figure, and a treatment in which the author feels obliged to fairly articulate that point of view in the course of providing a critical appraisal of it. Some may wish to argue that the first approach is the only legitimate way to do history, but others may believe that this is an overly narrow view of historical research. Yet even if we accept that the first approach is the only legitimate way to do history, this does not deny that scholarship which chooses to maintain a critical point of view has a legitimate and important role to play. Some people may not wish to call it history, but the label is not very important. What is important in the case under consideration is whether in arriving at this critical view I either left out Dewey's point of view, or distorted it in some way that works to his disadvantage in the reassessment of his work. My concern was to render a fair exposition of the theoretical aspects of liberalism, and where anomalies occurred in the doctrine or its practice, to try to establish a framework in which they made sense. What Ravitch overlooks is that the criticism of Dewey that was offered was done so in the context of an attempt to understand Dewey's point of view. While it would be presumptious of me to assume that no distortions could be found throughout the pages of Reason and Rhetoric, we can at least look at my treatment of the work that Ravitch does cite, Schools of Tomorrow, in order to understand the difference between her and my understanding of the nature of historical interpretation in this instance.

Ravitch is not very clear about her precise objection to my treatment of Schools of Tomorrow, (especially since she is mistaken about the one specific point that she cites, i.e., my use of the term "class biased"). I suspect, however, that one of the things that is making her uncomfortable in the pages that she refers to, which deal in part with Dewey's observations about a black vocational school, is my suggestion that Dewey was acquiescing to a segregated institution. In other words, what she may be feeling is that in my treatment of Dewey I imposed certain contemporary values onto the past. If this is indeed the source of her discomfort, then it would be useful to note that integration is not a totally new idea. More significant for understanding Dewey, however, is the fact that given the tone of his general philosophy, it is surprising to find him not addressing that problem even when directly confronted by it. Such an oversight would seem to call for an explanation. If the understanding of this event is adequate, it should not only enable us to perceive the deficiencies of Dewey's response in light of our own contemporary values, but should also enable us to perceive the way in which he understood what we now hopefully can agree was in fact an oversight. The point of difference between Ravitch and myself may be illustrated by quoting from selections of the three pages in Reason and Rhetoric which Ravitch cites for its treatment of Schools of Tomorrow. I wrote:

> One of the schools that Dewey reported on in the latter part of the book was P.S. 26...P.S. 26 was an all black school in a poor black slum. In view of the condition of the families in the neighborhood and the poverty that Dewey described, the school was carrying on some worthwhile programs and was rightly included...He observed that the school was not attempting to solve the race problem but that it was developing good citizens. If the experiment were to succeed, it would "mean a real step forward in solving the race problem." Yet the program that Dewey then described was strictly a vocational program albeit an excellent

one, where much of the school and the neighborhood served as a shop for the students. At a time when much black labor was unskilled or employed as farmhands, a program of skill development was an advance forward. Nevertheless, black boys learned how to cook and black girls how to sew... A more serious shadow is cast over Dewey's evaluation of the experiment as he suggests its greatest value to lie among the youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents...From one point of view, it could be claimed that the school was serving the goal of equality of opportunity since it was providing a passage for some black youngsters into occupations that might otherwise have been closed to them. Moreover, in defense of the school's program it could be argued that training on a higher level might well have proved disfunctional even to the children themselves since the more advanced academic programs...were generally closed to blacks....

Yet this defense highlights the problems as well as the merits of this approach...Had Dewey so chosen, the description of the school might have provided a suitable occasion to affirm equal opportunity as an ethical value and to analyze the social structure that made vocational education especially appropriate for black and immigrant children.[23]

If my views about the source of the difference between Ravitch and myself are accurate, then it must be said that Ravitch would be correct on at least one point: I was not surrendering my own critical values to the material -- but it is not clear why someone should be expected to do that. I was, however, attempting to show the dilemma that Dewey was caught in (although he did not seem to recognize it as such) and to suggest a reasonable way in which the dilemma might have been resolved. My larger point, made elsewhere in the book, was that Dewey's general philosophical point of view hindered the kind of social analysis which would have been useful in this kind of situation. And that is of course the point which Ravitch seems not to be able to address.

We can understand the difference between Ravitch and myself on a more general level by returning to her observation that a journal published by "educational radicals" frequently recommended Dewey's book. This observation is, of course, intended to chastise me for not taking this fact into account. However, implicit in this remark is more than a criticism of me or a defense of Dewey. In addition, she seems to be proposing that if we wish to capture the significance of the works of a historical figure, we must attempt to see those works in the context of their own times and not impose our own meaning on them. Now regardless of whether Ravitch is or is not correct in her criticism of my treatment of Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow, she has certainly raised, albeit implicitly, an important issue for historical interpretation. On its deeper level this issue involves an epistemological question about the nature of our understanding of traditions that are removed in time from our own, and about the extent to which our prejudgments can or should be put aside in appraising such traditions. Yet the issue can also be addressed on a surface level, on a level which involves the methods and evidence that are appropriate for analyzing and appraising different texts.

After noting some of the deeper issues involved I want to address some of the surface issues raised by Ravitch.

There is no doubt a need (as Ravitch suggests) in historical interpretation to be sensitive to the meaning that an author intended to convey when writing a work, and to try to avoid imposing a new, and perhaps more contemporary meaning on the concepts that the author uses. As Gadamer has written: "Whoever has a sense of the historical knows what is possible for an age and what is not, and has a sense of the difference of the past in relation to the present."[24] An adequate interpretation of historical texts presupposes that to whatever extent possible the interpreter remain true to the meaning that was originally intended. However the same term can be used to communicate two different concepts -- an older one and a newer one -- the need for the interpreter to remain faithful to the meaning of the term as originally used does not preclude an appraisal of the value of the concepts in their own rights. If, for example, equality of opportunity means one thing to educators writing in the 1840's, and another to revisionist interpreters assessing their work in the 1970's, then these differences can be revealed and arguments brought to bear on behalf of each of them.

Yet the fact that interpretation requires that one try to recapture the original as it was then intended does not mean that the task of interpretation must end at that point. Subsequent perceptions add a significance to historical events that go beyond their original comprehension. For example, when the film "Birth of a Nation" was previewed in President Wilson's White House it was likely shown because of the technical advances in film making which it illustrated. However, what is also significant about this even for us is the fact that its glorification of the Klan was not even raised to the level of significance by the officials who previewed that film.

Ravitch, of course, only approaches these issues obliquely, and does not reveal a full understanding of some of the questions involved. Nevertheless, she does lay down as a first criterion that the original meaning of the text be captured in the interpretation of it. It is questionable, however, in the one place in her examination of Reason and Rhetoric where she treats a passage from Dewey's work whether she actually does this. Ravitch begins by reiterating my treatment of a passage written by Dewey for the New Republic and directed by him at the pacifist movement during World War I. My citation of the passage actually occurs in a footnote in Reason and Rhetoric in the context of a discussion of Dewey's value theory. The intent of the larger discussion, which Ravitch does not allude to, is to argue that Dewey's provisional view of values weakened some of the conceptual safeguards against the manipulation of people for the purpose of achieving "desired" social ends. The discussion of this issue is somewhat complex, and it is not necessary to treat it here. However it should be said that the section was written in the context of an examination of some revisionist writings, and I was attempting to assess first the extent to which the progressive point of view could be seen as manipulative, and second, the degree to which the charge of manipulation can be construed as an ultimate critical category. In other words, I was concerned with the question of whether or not manipulation can ever be justified, and if so, then in what way the charge of manipulation, when directed against progressive theory and practice, can be taken as criticism. This discussion is bypassed by Ravitch and instead she chooses to focus on the passage cited in the footnote. Given this, it will be useful to look at the passage along with Ravitch's and my treatment of it. Dewey wrote of the pacificists:

> If at a critical juncture the moving force of events is always too much for conscience, the remedy is not to deplore the wickedness of those who manipulate events. Such a conscience is largely self-conceit. The remedy is to connect conscience with the forces that are moving in another direction. Then will conscience itself have compulsive power instead of being forever the martyred and the coerced.[25]

My comment in the footnote which Ravitch picks up is that the passage leaves little room for the moral prophet unless he is able to develop a political movement behind him, and that the statement leaves little room for the pacifism of the First World War. Ravitch then comments: "This is an odd ground on which to criticize Dewey. Obviously, he was not trying to silence moral prophets; on the contrary, he was urging pacifists to organize in order to have an impact on policy....it is clear that Dewey was urging pacifists to get involved in political action..."[26] It is important to notice here how Ravitch begins by escalating my language. She moves from my claim that Dewey would have little room for the moral prophet who did not have a political movement behind him, to her refutation of a different claim, which she wrongly attributes to me, that Dewey was attempting to "silence moral prophets." Secondly, her interpretation of the passage from Dewey simply assumes that the pacifists were not organized (or, at least that Dewey thought that they were not) and that they were not engaged in political action. Certainly these assumptions seem counter to our general knowledge and clearly deserve an argument. Ravitch provides none. Thirdly, the unstated implication of Ravitch's response seems reasonably clear: Dewey was on the side of the pacifists in opposing the war while objecting only to their ineffective methods in pursuing their cause. Clearly this is wrong. It is true that in the New Republic article, Dewey joins hands with the pacifists on an abstract level. He writes: "The more one loves peace (of course I do not mean by peace the mere absence of military war) the more one is bound to ask himself how the machinery, the specific concrete social arrangements, exactly comparable to physical engineering devices, for maintaining peace, are to be brought about."[27] However this was but on the abstract level and clearly bypasses the immediate issue of the involvement of the United

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States in the First World War.

Ravitch misses the point of this entire discussion (which is not surprising given that she focused her attention on a footnote). What is more interesting however is the way that she misses the point. For the issue was not whether Dewey did or did not support the First World War, nor was he being chastised for attempting to silence the pacificists -- he did not attempt this and no claim was made that he did. Dewey wanted the pacifists and others to be allowed to speak, but the interesting issue is the reason that he gave for allowing them to do so. In the same footnote, of which Ravitch cites the last part, there is a reference to another Dewey article written for the New Republic where I note that Dewey argues against the efficacy of force to remove dissent. Rather he writes: "We recall (from past movements) that such attempts at direct suppression of thought have usually ended by increasing the vitality of obnoxious beliefs ...We are surprised that leaders had not enough common sense to allow unpopular ideas to burn themselves out or to die of inanition."[28] And, "What is denied is the efficacy of force to remove disunion of thought and feeling."[29] In this article, the pacificists are only mentioned in passing (they are not the focus of Dewey's remarks) along with other dissenters, but there is little doubt that Dewey's argument for free speech at this point rests upon what he believes is necessary for the prosecution of the war. What Ravitch fails to address when she confuses my statement about the moral prophet with her own interpretation of that statement (as an accusation that Dewey was attempting to silence the moral prophet) is that arguments for free speech generally have not been made on grounds of efficacy. Dewey's argument here is far removed from those which, for example, see freedom of speech as a prerequisite for truth, or as part of the inherent right of human beings.

Ravitch's failure to notice as significant Dewey's rationale for allowing the pacificists and other dissenters to speak reveals what I believe is a major difference between our two interpretations of Dewey. It also points out different ways of approaching historical events. Ravitch lets stand the argument that Dewey enunciates on the basis of efficacy. Her interest lies in the fact _that_ Dewey supported the freedom of the pacificists to speak, and she wants this fact to stand for itself. My concern, however, was to highlight _the reasons_ on which Dewey based his argument, and then, in the context of the larger discussion on manipulation, to subject these reasons to scrutiny. Had Ravitch approached her task without distorting elements in my book, and had she also revealed the different standpoints of analysis in a reasonable way, there would be little question that her interest would have been a legitimate one.

For if we are concerned only to appraise Dewey and his work in the context of his own times, then it is certainly important to know where he stood on such vital issues as free speech. Given this objective, one may even wish to claim that the fact that someone supported such important values, in the context of perhaps great pressure to do otherwise, is more important than the reasons that were given for that support. (This would be a controversial claim, but not obviously unreasonable.) To make this kind of analysis in Dewey's case would then lead one to look at the different pressures and views expressed during the war.

Yet this kind of analysis is addressed to the question of a person's character, not to an examination of the reasons that a person may have given for a particular activity. However the reasons may endure long after the event or its agent, and therefore are important in their own right.

The difference that these two perspectives hold for both the analysis and interpretation of a work can be seen in two similar passages, one by Ravitch, the other found in Reason and Rhetoric. Each addresses the relation of liberal progressive technology. Ravitch writes:

> Feinberg does not explain how Dewey or Counts might have convinced the industrial-

> ists to diminish their commitment to technology...If Dewey and Counts and other progressives failed to question the rapid advance of technology and failed to understand how it would eventually affect American society, it may be that they were dazzled by technology's promise to improve the quality of life for the masses of people, to eliminate starvation, and to cure disease...Doubtless the modernization process would have gone forward even if Dewey and Counts had never lived...It is questionable whether a thoroughly radicalized, thoroughly Marxist Dewey and Counts would have had much impact at all on a society that was unreceptive to radical thought.[30]

The first of the points that Ravitch makes in this paragraph is a reflection of an almost identical point that I made in Reason and Rhetoric, although the subsequent development of this point is significantly different. In assessing the view of progress held by Beard and Robinson I wrote:

> While they clearly envisaged an eventual end to the traditional ills of man, such as hunger, disease, and inadequate shelter, they address the issue primarily as one of industrial growth and development not in terms of a standard of distribution.[31]

The difference here is simply that Ravitch's concern seems to be to address the personal reasons why mistakes were made (e.g., they were dazzled by the promise of technology, or they wanted to be effective) whereas I was mainly concerned to understand what the nature of those mistakes was (i.e., what the progressives failed to see while they were dazzled, or what concerns their desire for effectiveness brought them to minimize or overlook).

Neither Ravitch's concern or mine strikes me as an unreasonable research program, and some of the perspective Ravitch expresses was already incorporated into the larger thrust of Reason and Rhetoric. What is surprising is that Ravitch, in a way similar to her treatment of black "progress", is unable to report on the program in Reason and Rhetoric without significantly distorting it. This distortion suggests that there is really a much larger issue contained in this debate, one that speaks to the symbolic significance of Dewey.

III. Conclusion

It would be unfortunate if the evaluation of Dewey's system ultimately rested on the kind of oversights that are represented by Ravitch's treatment. One might argue a better case by suggesting that the problems that Dewey was attempting to address were, at least in some respects, unique to his own times, and that the uniqueness of such problems needs to be considered in appraising his work. The fact that our problems are somewhat different than those that Dewey faced neither gives us license to ignore the fact that Dewey was addressing problems at a different stage of development, nor does it allow us to neglect the inadequacies of the liberal ideal itself. Moreover, if it is the case that the criticism of liberal society that is offered in Reason and Rhetoric has a certain force which it might not have had during the time that Dewey was writing, it is important to remember that this is so at least in part because of events that, while available to us, were not available to Dewey or to his contemporaries. Dewey was not "privileged" to see the immoral slaughter of Vietnam nor was he witness to the level of police surveillance revealed by Watergate. These events, along with the spectre of nuclear destruction and depleted energy reserves, altered the perceptions of a generation and now place the whole idea of progress in question.

While the introduction to Reason and Rhetoric was framed with the above considerations in mind, it was largely neglected by Ravitch and others. To some extent this can be understood because many were reading it as a book on Dewey when in fact it was a book on liberal educational policy which simply acknowledged Dewey's important formative role. Yet much of the criticism of the book has been based on this reading, and it will be useful to conclude by trying to understand the impulse that lies behind it.

One criticism that has been made by a different critic is that in my treatment of Dewey's activity I did not take into account the flux of events that was propelling Dewey into action.[32] What I believe is being suggested here is the fact that the analysis of both a philosopher's system and his practical activity are sensitive tasks which need to be kept somewhat distinct from one another. At the very most a philosophical system can serve as a long-range guide for ordering our thoughts about social and political affairs, whereas the practical acts of everyday life need to contend with contingencies that no system, however comprehensive, is able to anticipate. Thus while a philosophical system is best judged in terms of traditional criteria of philosophical adequacy, such as consistency, coherence and comprehensiveness, a practical action must be judged in terms of what the possibilities were, given a specific set of events.

When this criticism is restated in this way it makes some sense to me and avoids the obvious problem with the earlier formation, i.e., that the "flux of events" can be used to justify just about any expedient act. What the criticism points to is the fact that a critical analysis of a tradition must be able to discriminate between progressive and retrogressive aspects, and therefore must be able to make its judgments in terms of both the objective conditions and the counter-possibilities that were available at the time that specific actions were taken. Yet there is another side to these remarks which also needs to be considered. To see this side, it will be useful to turn to another review of Reason and Rhetoric.

Wayne Urban criticizes me for treating Dewey's support of World War I while failing to mention Dewey's early opposition to the Second World War.[33] This criticism puzzled me for a long time not only because Dewey's opposition was very short lived, but also because, given the nature of that war, I saw little to criticize in the fact that Dewey eventually supported this war. Yet there is more to this event than the simple fact of Dewey's support for the war. For along with this support came a set of reasons which were supposed to help us understand the war. The most prominent of these was the new introduction to German Philosophy and Politics published in 1942 where Dewey attempted to establish a link between Hitler's policies and the German tradition of philosophy. Yet insofar as Dewey's reasons are inadequate (failing, for example, to examine the link between the depression and the war, or failing to see the relationship between expanding capital and military activity), and even if the inadequacies were to be understood in terms of overriding factors, they could be challenged independently of our approval or disapproval of his support for the war itself.

Dewey's support for the Second World War is a useful example to help us understand the kinds of questions that need to be taken into account in assessing liberal theory and practice. One may, for example, wish to argue that Dewey's alternatives were restricted during the Second World War, and that the most reasonable thing, that he could do was to support it in the way that he did. Whichever way the analysis goes, however, it will depend upon an evaluation of concrete events and specific alternatives. Yet as a philosopher and a social theorist, Dewey was not just an agent in the social world, he was also involved in reflection about the nature of the world. The product of this reflection is contained not only in his technical and theoretical formulations, but also in the traces of his agency that remain with us in the documents that explain and justify his practical acts. To the extent that these traces clarify the implications of the technical formulations they are useful for a fuller analysis of Dewey's ideas. Furthermore, because those ideas have had a formative influence on our own thoughts about fundamental educational values, then they are a useful place to join a critique of contemporary social and educational life. It is precisely the need for such a critique which Ravitch overlooks.

FOOTNOTES

1. Diane Ravitch, _The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools_, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1978, p. 105. The footnote in the original academy monograph referred to the wrong page in the Census Bureau report, but this was later corrected by Ravitch in the Basic Books publication. In this paper footnote citations refer to the Basic Books publication unless otherwise indicated.

2. _Ibid._, p. 112.

3. _Ibid._, p. 112.

4. See Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical View, 1970-1978. Series P-23, No. 80. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, (n.d.), p. 42, Table 26.

5. _Ibid._, p. 27.

6. Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, _The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States_, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 37, Table 19.

7. Reynold Farley, "Trends in Racial Inequalities: Have the Gains of the 1960's Disappeared in the 1970's?" *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 42, No. 3, April, 1977, p. 199. The comparable rate for whites during the same period was 90% in 1960, 85% in 1975. It is worth noting too that the percentage of female headed households has increased for Blacks from 22% in 1960 to 33% in 1972. See S. Levitan, W. Johnston and R. Taggart, *Still a Dream: The Changing Status of Blacks Since 1960*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 20. I am indebted to Eric Bredo for bringing Farley's essay to my attention.

8. Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974, p. 30.

9. *Ibid*., p. 25, Table 9.

10. Farley, p. 198, Table 2. The 1975 figure of $8,779 is still however, slightly below the 1972 figure of $8,831.

11. See Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974, p. 65, Table 39.

12. See *Ibid*., p. 126, Table 84.

13. *Ibid*., p. 123, Table 81.

14. Farley, p. 206. The complexity of this issue reveals an interesting problem about traditional social science quantitative research. Since the 1960's there seems to have been an almost consistent increase in the occupational prestige scores of both male and female non-whites at both the first and third quartiles of the population. (See Ibid., p. 197). Yet during the 1970's while this increase was generally continuing, dipping slightly for third quartile non-white males around 1975, unemployment was increasing from 4 to 13 percent among non-white men between 1969 and 1975. (Ibid., p. 193). Now one conclusion which could be drawn from these two sets of figures is that while the situation is improving for those who are able to obtain employment, it is getting increasingly more difficult for people to be employed. Hence the gap between the least well off and everyone else is increasing. While this conclusion seems to me to be the most reasonable one to draw, it does depend upon what certain categories are taken to mean when used to describe why people are unemployed. Another possible interpretation is offered by the author of the American Sociological Review article when he writes:

> Since 1967, the Bureau of Labor statistics has tabulated the activities of persons not on the labor force. They are classified as keeping a home, going to school, unable to

> work or not working for "other reasons." If the lack of economic opportunities accounts for the decreasing proportion of non-white men at work, we would anticipate that a growing proportion of non-white men would not be in the labor force because of "other reasons" but the data are not consistent with this speculation. In the 1970's there has not been a sharp increase in the proportion who are not in the labor force because of "other reasons." Rather there has been a modest rise in the proportion in this category, as well as increases in the proportion unable to work or going to school. (Ibid., p. 196).

However, from the information that is provided here it is really impossible to draw any conclusions. We do not know, for example, how the Bureau of Labor tabulates the activities. It makes a difference, for example, whether they use some independent data, or whether people are simply asked. If, for example, people are asked, then someone responding "unable to work" could clearly have in mind "unable to find a job." Since Farley wrote this, the unemployment rate for blacks hit a high of 14.5%, the highest rate since the end of World War II. (See *The New York Times*, Sunday, September 4, 1977, E5.)

15. Bureau of the Census/U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974, p. 52.

16. See Ravitch, p. 103.

17. See my *Reason and Rhetoric*, Ch 6 and also my "Essay Review of Dewey in China" *Philosophy East and West*. Winter, 1975.

18. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see my introduction to *Equally and Social Policy*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978. It should not be thought that large amounts of inequality are restricted to the United States. In discussing the question of equality of educational opportunity in Western Europe, for example, Henry Levin argues that there is little evidence that the gaps have decreased. Moreover, given certain structural considerations along with a reduction in economic growth, there is little reason to believe that these gaps will be reduced in the near future. See Henry M. Levin, "Educational Opportunity and Social Inequality in Western Europe," *Social Problems*, Vol. 24, No. 2, December, 1976. In the Basic Books publication, Ravitch deals briefly with the issue of equality and claims that more equality means more bureaucracy, less liberty, less efficiency and less initiative. She does not, however, provide any evidence to support these claims. Even more striking, however, is her assertion that "every transfer program is an effort to redress inequalities" (p. 98). She mentions welfare and public housing among other examples but fails to mention

government subsidies to upper middle class college students in public institutions, special loans to major corporations, e.g., Lockheed, or property tax write-offs to construction projects undertaken by big business. Yet as Noam Chomsky writes:

> There may be a residual sense to the notion that the state serves as an equalizer, in that without its intervention the destructive forces of capitalism would demolish social existence and the physical environment.

(See Noam Chomsky, "Language, Intelligence and Social Organization," in W. Feinberg, (ed.) Equality and Social Policy, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978.)

19. See Reason and Rhetoric, "Introduction".

20. Ravitch, p. 139. The appropriate page reference in the publication by the National Academy of Education is pp. 52-53.

21. See Ronald Goodenow, "The Paradox of Being Progressive," Change, April, 1976, p. 57, for a more favorable review which, in contrast to Ravitch, sees my failure to examine the class origins of the progressives to be a deficiency.

22. For some of my comments on this point see my "Revisionist Scholarship and the Problem of Historical Context," Teachers' College Record, Vol. 78, No. 3, Feb. 1977.

23. Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 110-111.

24. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, New York: Seabury Press, 1975, p. 17.

25. Ravitch quoting Feinberg quoting Dewey: Ravitch, p. 140.

26. Ravitch, p. 140.

27. John Dewey, "Conscience and Compulsion," The New Republic, July 14, 1917, No. 1719, p. 298.

28. John Dewey, "Conscription of Thought," The New Republic, September 1, 1917, No. 1719, p. 129, parenthesis added.

29. Ibid., p. 128.

30. Ravitch, p. 141. It should be mentioned that Ravitch just assumes American society has been unreceptive to radical thought without mentioning the state power that at various times has been used to suppress it. The Palmer raids, the McCarthy era, as well as more recently Jackson State and Kent State, would be

interesting studies for their influence on radical movements.

31. Reason and Rhetoric, p. 192.

32. See Walter Feinberg, "On Reading Dewey," History of Education Quarterly, Winter, 1975, pp. 395-415, for a more detailed response.

33. Wayne J. Urban, Review, Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, Nov. 1975, p. 555. Urban's main complaint is with my historical scholarship, but there are a number of times when he misses the drift of the argument and the point that is being made, as is the case with my treatment of Dewey and the First World War. However, there is one observation that he does make which suggests to me that I failed to provide a needed distinction in one of the chapters. Urban, while neglecting a number of my qualifications, gives a reasonably accurate exposition of a point made in one of the chapters. He writes:

> Child-centered reform, Feinberg argues, is emphasized when social tensions are domestic in origin, while subject-matter reform comes to the fore during periods of external threat. He cites the child-centered schooling of the 1920's and 1930's and the life adjustment movement of the 1940's as examples of the former, and refers to the

> social-efficiency movement during World War I and the Cold War emphasis on subject matter as instances of the latter. But he overlooks the fact that contrary to his theory, there was no impetus for subject-matter reform during World War II, a time of obvious external threat.

Urban's counter example is questionable here. Cremin, one of the leading historians of the progressive movement, for example, cites as typical of the attacks launched on progressive education shortly before the war two articles (both published in 1940) which criticized it for having no common body of knowledge or moral and intellectual discipline. (See Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957, New York: Vintage Books, 1961, pp. 325-326.) Nevertheless, while progressive education did undergo serious criticism during this time, Urban is correct; the question is not completely settled whether this criticism was calling for more rigorous teaching of academic subject matter or simply for more behavioral discipline regardless of the subject matter. It is best therefore to leave this an open question for historians to debate. The more general point of the chapter remains, however, that by and large schools have supported that social order, often serving to reinforce the power relationships that are found in the larger society. There is a problem with this chapter that I believe Urban is picking up in his criticism however. The problem relates to a distinction which I made, but failed to make completely. For in discussing pedagogical questions it is useful to make a tentative distinction between the type of curriculum that is being stressed at a particular time and the kind of method that is being used to convey this curriculum. In the book, I mentioned that a child-centered pedagogy, for example, could be attached to an academic curriculum, as I believe it was in many middle class schools in the 1930's, or it may be attached to a kind of life adjustment curriculum, as happened in many working class schools during the 1940's. I should have said the same thing about what I called the subject matter approach to education. That is, a method that emphasizes external discipline and control may be attached to an academic subject matter, but it may also be attached to another kind -- say a vocational one. When Urban suggests that there was no impetus for subject matter reform during the war, I suspect that what he means is that there was no impetus for more stress on academic programs (a question which, as I mentioned, is still an open one). What I think is less likely here is that there was not a greater call for programs that stressed the need for externally imposed discipline.

While Urban's critique is generally a balanced and reasonable one, there are still some problems that I want to mention. The first one may seem somewhat minor, but it provides a distorted exposition of the text. He writes as follows:

> Feinberg's purpose is to show that progressives could not achieve their liberating and democratizing goals because they subscribed to what he sees as the liberals' faith in technology. For instance, by trusting in the fairness of the IQ tests, progressives who supported equal educational opportunity legitimized a principle of unequal educational rewards. (Urban, p. 555).

Now the first part of this statement is an accurate reflection of what I was attempting to show, and Urban does not stretch this as some critics have done to the ridiculous point that I was arguing that progressives should have attempted to abolish technology *per se*. However, the second part of the passage entails a somewhat inaccurate portrayal both of progressives and of my treatment of them. There were a significant number of progressives who opposed the idea of IQ examinations. Walter Lippmann and John Dewey were two of them. In many respects their arguments were both strong and persuasive, and I think that I clearly reflected this in the book. Where they fell short, obviously so with

Lippmann and more subtly so with Dewey, was in their general acceptance of the contours of the existing or developing division of labor, and in the idea explicitly stated by Lippmann that such exams were not the best means for servicing this division. Returning to Urban's treatment of my examination of Dewey's activities during the First World War, he writes:

> Feinberg's liabilities as a historian also undermines his discussion of Dewey. First, he does not allow for change in Dewey's views over time. He cites Dewey's support of World War I as an example of the progressive tendency to allow political pragmatism to supercede the pacifism dictated by individual conscience, but he ignores Dewey's opposition to American involvement in World War II. (*Ibid*., p. 556).

The issue here is somewhat more complicated than the passage from Urban suggests. Yet to reveal these complications can help provide an understanding of how Urban is reading the book and how his reading of it differs from my intent in writing it. Urban is correct about two things. First, Dewey did, at least for a short period of time prior to the Second World War, oppose any involvement of the United States in it. (See for example John Dewey, "No Matter What Happens -- Stay Out!" *Common Sense*, March, 1939, VII, iii, II.) And second, Urban is correct in noting that I did not comment on this opposition in the book. What is in question therefore is the significance of this omission, and here Urban misses a number of important considerations. First, Dewey's opposition to the Second World War seems to have been short lived, and by 1942 the U. S. Army Air Force appears to have been dropping propaganda leaflets written by Dewey over China. (See "An Open Letter to the Chinese People," Washington: Office of War Information, 1942, as reported in Milton H. Thomas, John Dewey: A Centennial Bibliography, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 137). Ultimately Dewey supported the Second World War as well as the first one. Urban, however, overlooked this fact. A second reason for not mentioning Dewey's thoughts about the Second World War is that his writings on this subject are rather slim and do little to illuminate some of his fundamental concerns. Indeed, I found it strikingly odd that Urban mentions Dewey's opposition as if it were something which would cast the philosopher in a more favorable light. Nor do I think that his eventual support for the war should be thought to detract from an evaluation of his work. Given the differences in circumstances I am not quite as certain that this would hold true for Dewey's support of the First World War. However, this is an arguable position, and what Urban apparently misses is the fact that my examination of Dewey's activities during the First World War was designed not to show that he supported the war, but to try to clarify some of his broader principles by showing how they were articulated in terms that related to everyday practice. Thus, for example, my treatment of the Polish Study was intended primarily to clarify certain ambiguities in Dewey's more abstract notion of cultural pluralism, while the treatment of pacificists, which Urban mentions, was intended to show (albeit, the reference occurs in a brief footnote) how essentially moral concerns tended to be reduced to technical and engineering problems, and hence dismissed.

III. The Great School Warriors:

A Review of Diane Ravitch's *The Revisionists Revised**

by

Harvey Kantor

The last decade produced a major challenge to the traditional interpretation of America's educational past. Rejecting the standard portrait which linked the growth of public schooling with the evolution of American democracy, a group of educational historians, philosophers, and economists -- generally labeled revisionists -- argued that beneath the rhetoric of democracy and opportunity, elites and their allies (professional educators and middle class reformers) shaped educational institutions to advance their class interest and preserve the class structure of American society. In two path breaking books -- *The Irony of Early School Reform* and *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools* -- Michael Katz asserted that schools were racist, class-biased bureaucracies imposed on American society by ruling elites interested in preserving their social and economic dominance.[1] Clarence Karier,

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Paul Violas, Joel Spring and others extended this theme by arguing that the history of schooling in the twentieth century has reflected the agenda of corporate liberals interested in using schools to assure social stability and to fit people to the economic and social demands of a corporate society.[2] And, most recently, economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis used some of this evidence to develop neo-Marxist analysis which asserts that the expansion of public schooling has functioned to integrate workers into the capitalist division of labor and to reproduce the class structure from one generation to the next.[3]

The Revisionists Revised by Diane Ravitch is a biting, often polemical attack on this body of scholarship. Charging that radical scholars tell an overly pessimistic and often incorrect story, Ravitch seeks to re-assert the liberal belief in the democratic character of American schooling and to reclaim the educational past from radical critics. At her best she offers a penetrating critique of flaws in radical scholarship, but at her worst -- and the bad outweighs the good -- she is open to many of the same criticisms which she directs at her radical adversaries.

According to Ravitch, revisionist scholarship suffers from four major defects. First, she charges that revisionist work is overly reductionist and deterministic, for it draws conclusions about people and events on the basis of the assumed imperatives of social class. This assumption, she argues, is an insufficient explanation for action and is no substitute for rigorous historical analysis. Business people, educators, and reformers, she points out, were not often all of one mind about educational issues. In particular, progressive educational reformers such as John Dewey and Jane Adams need to be differentiated from business elites also involved in educational reform.

Second, Ravitch asserts that radical educational history is present-minded; that is, it seeks the roots of today's evils in events which occured over a century ago. Consequently, revisionist work confuses intentions with outcomes and ignores the fact that the consequences of a particular action cannot always be fully anticipated or controlled. Searching for the clue to educational history in the sinister motives of educators and elites, radical historians -- particularly Karier and Violas -- have spent a great deal of time examining reformers' rhetoric, but have generally failed to examine the "actual" effects of particular policies. Vocational education, she points out, is an issue about which far more is known about stated intentions than actual outcomes.

Third, she argues that revisionist scholars oversimplify the relationship between organizational structure -- i.e., bureaucracy -- and institutional purpose by reducing the complex working of the institutions to deterministic generalizations. Bureaucratic institutions, she argues, are not "bourgeois institutions" designed to repress working people as Michael Katz contends, but are responses to the complexities of urbanization, modernization, and population growth. Besides, she adds, bureaucratic organizations are not unique to capitalist societies but exist in socialist societies as well.

Finally, she argues that the portrait of elite domination of educational history distorts the complex, diverse reactions of working people, immigrants, and Blacks, many of whom resisted Americanization but struggled to provide additional educational resources for their children. Rather than treat working people as passive objects of elite manipulation, she suggests, we should recognize that immigrants, minorities, and others often hoped to enter the mainstream of American life and pursued education as the best way to fulfill those desires.

Much of this criticism rings true. At its worst, revisionist work tends toward reductionism, presentism, and an oversimplified determinism (as does the worst liberal scholarship). Her call for educational historians to acknowledge the complexity of historical causation, to consider the diverse interests and goals of reformers, to examine carefully the twisted course of historical events, and to pay more attention to outcomes than to the rhetoric of intentions should not be debated by any serious scholar. So, too, historical work in education needs to pay close attention to the complex often diverse attitudes of working people toward the institutional forces which impinged on their lives. Indeed, revisionist work in education has at times substituted a homogenized and abstract view of workers for a more complex portrait of the varied experiences and aspirations of immigrants, Blacks, and other minorities. As Herbert Gutman has pointed out, however, American workers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not view their changing circumstances in simple 'economic' terms. Rather, their behavior often reflected the interaction of their culture of origin, their class outlook, and the particular institution they encountered.[4]

If this were the full extent of Ravitch's critique, one would have little reason to quarrel with The Revisionists Revised. But this is not the entire scope of her attack. For, while offering these often astute judgements, she also seriously distorts much of radical scholarship (particularly the work of Bowles and Gintis), implies that revisionist scholars are not asking worthwhile questions, and, most importantly, relies on her own bland version of liberal ideology in place of any realistic historical analysis.

Part of her problem is that the revisionists, as she acknowledges, are a remarkably diverse group. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis are economists, Walter Feinberg is a philosopher, and the historians -- Katz, Karier, Violas, and Spring -- vary widely in their interests and modes of analysis. For example, where Katz focuses on the mid-nineteenth century, Karier and Spring focus on the first years of the twentieth; where Katz generally argues that ideology is merely a cloak for self-interest, Karier and Spring contend that ideology is central to an understanding of reformers' intentions. Moreover, where Karier and Violas share an interest in the motivation of historical actors, Bowles and Gintis are less interested in intent than in the outcome of educational decisions. What they share nonetheless, Ravitch argues, is an antagonism to liberal reform and a belief that education has perpetuated rather than alleviated economic inequality.

Yet, failure to appreciate these distinctions leads Ravitch to serious distortions, particularly with regard to Bowles and Gintis. For example, where she contends that radical scholars have embarked on a simple-minded search for evil intentions, Bowles and Gintis readily acknowledge the good intentions of progressive reformers such as Dewey and Addams. Indeed, they lament the fact that Dewey's educational aims were not realized. Moreover, Bowles and Gintis explicitly acknowledge the influence of pluralist politics on educational decisions. In a number of areas, they point out -- school board decisions, student's course selection, bond referenda -- pluralist forces shaped the course of daily events. What they do assert, however, which Ravitch utterly fails to comprehend, is that reformers and others (well-intentioned or otherwise) operated within a social structure defined by capitalist social relations and ideology. Consequently, they argue that while the day-to-day operations of schooling often reinforced an image of pluralist politics, the result of those decisions bolstered the capitalist class system. Indeed, they suggest, under ideal conditions of hegemony, elites do not need to participate in daily decision making, provided that educational decisions remain within boundaries acceptable to the basic structure of capitalist society.

Whether one agrees with this analysis or not, it certainly is a gross distortion to charge that Bowles and Gintis are searching for evil, sinister intentions, blaming progressive reformers for educational inequality, or presenting a simple, reductionist argument for the expansion of schooling. In fact, Ravitch so misunderstands their thesis that her general criticism of their work is basically that things are not much better in the socialist countries of eastern Europe. Yet even here she errs, for Bowles and Gintis do not look to eastern Europe for model societies, but explicitly point out that "the state socialist countries of Eastern Europe were never democratic" and that ruling elites in those societies "have always maintained their power through top-down control of production, a centralized party structure, and the military."[5]

More serious than these distortions is Ravitch's implication that revisionist scholars are not asking worthwhile questions. For instance, she implies that the relationship between bureaucracy and class is spurious. Bureaucracy, she argues, is an inevitable result of modernization, not a form of class rule. Yet, aside from the fact that she mis-reads Michael Katz (who argues that structure and purpose interacted, not that structure is reducible to class), a number of other scholars including Marvin Lazerson, Carl Kaestle, and David Tyack (who also pursue revisionist themes, though quoted by Ravitch in defense of her assertions) also suggest that bureaucracy and class purpose were closely related. Examining the growth of bureaucracy in New York City in the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, Kaestle points out that while bureaucratic structures grew piecemeal in response to the challenge of administering ever greater numbers of schools and students, they also reinforced the aims of elites interested in using schools to preserve their moral and cultural hegemony in a diverse city.[6] Likewise, David Tyack has pointed out that while bureaucratization was partly a response to the complexities of urbanization and population growth, bureaucratic organization was not simply the result of a preordained imperative. Rather, the drive to bureaucratize urban schools, which flowered after 1890 in cities across the nation, was part of an effort by elites and educational professionals to turn political questions into administrative issues by removing decision making from the public arena to the hallways and offices of bureaucratic organizations where educational experts could operate free from the pressures of public opinion.[7]

Ravitch also dismisses questions which revisionists have raised regarding the nature of Progressive ideology. Revisionists, she argues (particularly Karier, Violas, and Feinberg), have selectively quoted Dewey, Addams, and other progressive reformers, painting a dark picture which overlooks their good intentions and fails to appreciate the complexity and diversity of their thought. Yet, a number of other social historians including Robert Wiebe, James Weinstein, and Christopher Lasch have also pointed out that progressive philosophy placed an emphasis on social order, harmony, and control, as well as on individuality, independence and spontaneity.[8] Moreover, as John Higham has commented, progressives of all stripes -- social efficiency types, business progressives, welfare reformers, and socialists, too -- fell victim to the optimistic belief that social problems were susceptible to technical rather than political solutions.[9] One need not assert bad intentions -- as Karier and Violas sometimes seem to do -- to point to these flaws in progressive thought. Neither, however, are good intentions -- as Ravitch asserts -- reason to dimiss consideration of the conformist, coercive aspects of progressive reform. Rather than argue about motives and intentions, one needs to examine how an actor's historical context defined his/her horizons, not retreating from judgment but distinguishing carefully between one's own value judgments and the actor's world view.

Why does Ravitch fail to acknowledge the historical viability of these issues? Underlying her lack of concern for these questions is a belief that inequality was (and is) not as pronounced as the revisionists maintain, except for native Americans and Blacks, and that, in any case, achieving a more equal society requires additional bureaucracy which, in her view, is even more objectionable. In support of her latter argument, she simply refers to the example of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe in place of any substantive analysis of American society. To support her former contention, she reviews a number of historical and sociological studies of occupational mobility in the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In brief, she concludes that these studies indicate that: a) there was substantial upward mobility in the United States in the late nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, b) there continues to be substantial occupational mobility in the mid-twentieth century, and c) in the twentieth century, educational attainment has had (and continues to have) an independent effect, apart from social class background, on occupational status.

A review of these diverse studies is not possible here, for a complete evaluation would extend for many pages. But since Ravitch builds much of her argument on their findings, a few brief considerations are in order.[10] First, those studies that find a great deal of occupational mobility for poor and working class people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also indicate that elites always retained a distinct occupational advantage. Second, while most historical studies indicate that occupational mobility was not an impossibility for those at the bottom of the economic ladder, they generally conclude that while there was a great amount of mobility (that is, perhaps upwards of one third of blue collar workers in some communities experienced some occupational mobility), this was over a relatively short distance (that is, a notch or two) on the occupational ladder. Rags to respectability perhaps, rags to riches unlikely. Third, the criterion for mobility in most of these studies is movement from blue to white collar occupations. Yet this is not a very reliable indicator of mobility of class position. Not only, for example, was mid-nineteenth century society characterized by vast disparities of wealth within occupations, as Michael Katz has pointed out, but after 1870 agricultural employment declined and the number of white collar jobs increased rapidly. Thus, movement from blue to white collar work is not a very helpful measure of upward mobility or of one's relative position within the emerging class structure of late nineteenth and early twentieth century American society. Indeed, as E. P. Thompson, Herbert Gutman and others have argued, occupational categories alone (or income categories for that matter) are inadequate indicators of class, for such classifications reduce class to unidimensional sociological variables and overlook the fact that classes have a culture and a history of their own which can only be understood within the context of the class relations of a given society.[11]

These mobility studies, then, do not prove Ravitch's contention that class has been an unimportant barrier to mobility and that class background has been relatively unimportant in determining one's occupational prospects. Even more important, while these studies provide valuable information about the occupational structure of nineteenth and twentieth century cities, they cannot substitute for analysis of the structure and distribution of economic and political power in American society. Indeed, it is at least plausible to suggest, as David Tyack has noted, that the modest advancement of all is quite compatible with elite dominance. In fact, such advancement may act to de-fuse unrest by convincing many of the open nature of the economic system and the benevolence of ruling elites.[12]

Whatever the case in the second half of the nineteeth and early decades of the twentieth centuries, however, Ravitch asserts that American society in the twentieth century has grown and is growing more and more equal and that the expansion of education -- independent of the effects of social class -- is a major reason for this. As a result of the Great Society and other liberal reforms, she contends economic inequality has been substantially reduced, if not through direct income then through transfer payments. Yet a number of studies of the distribution of income in the United States -- not to mention the ownership of stocks, bonds, and property -- indicate that with only minor fluctuations income distribution has been persistently unequal since 1910 -- the top twenty percent receiving over forty percent of total income, the bottom percent receiving less than 10 percent.[13] And, while food stamps, welfare payments, medicare, and other social programs certainly ameliorate the effects of dire poverty, they hardly equalize the quality of life, distribution of power and status, or relative freedom for groups at the bottom of American society.

Moreover, the fact that education has an independent effect on occupational status apart from social class background is not surprising, for in a society which guards access to high status jobs through educational requirements, rich and poor alike must attain the required credentials in order to qualify for entry to the most prestigious occupations. Thus, for example a poor child with a lot of education probably will have better occupational opportunities than a middle class child with low levels of education. (Class is not the only consideration, of course; the effect of education on occupation also varies with race and sex.) The real question, then, becomes who gets how much and what type of education and why. And, though educational inequality is not nearly as pronounced as economic inequality studies such as Jencks', whom she refers to in support of her argument regarding the independent effect of education on occupational achievement, suggest that social class plays an important role in determining the level of educational attainment.[14]

To be sure, one must admire Ravitch's reassertion that education makes a difference to one's life chances. In the pessimistic climate of the 1970's it is easy to conclude that education is irrelevant to one's economic prospects. Surely, the United States does need to put more resources into the education of its youth, particularly the education of poor and minority youth. Moreover, as Ravitch points out, revisionist analysis which argues that schools simply reproduce the class structure does take the ground out from under those who advocate for increased resources for schools. Yet, such an argument is no reason to ignore the vital historical questions asked by revisionists, for it merely substitutes a liberal presentism for a radical one.

Ravitch, in the end, is a captive of her own liberal ideology. While she chides revisionists for attributing actions and events to the sinister intentions of liberals, she herself takes their stated intentions as a sufficient explanation of historical events and is too often content to substitute liberal ideology for historical analysis. Thus, she exalts the liberal tradition of compromise and accomodation as the essence of a democratic community but ignores the social and economic structure within which this process occurs as well as the abundant evidence that whatever gains poor and working people have achieved are the result of conflict and struggle not simply the good will of liberal politicians. As a result, she seems to equate capitalism with democracy. Yet, as Charles Lindblom has recently reminded us, although historically linked, capitalism in the twentieth century has become the antithesis of democracy, for through an unprecedented concentration of power, capitalist enterprise has been able to set the boundaries of acceptable political debate and, most importantly, to remove the most basic questions of daily life -- how and where one works, what investments will be made, what types of technology will be developed, how the environment will be altered -- from public scrutiny, discussion, and democratic control.[15] De-mystifying this relationship, then, is a central task for all those interested in a more equal and democratic society, but Ravitch's book only contributes to the confusion.

The Revisionists Revised will be welcomed by those made uncomfortable by the issues raised by revisionist scholars as well as by those searching for a lively, political debate. But those people looking for a book which will enrich their understanding of the role of education in American history will be disappointed. For, despite some astute observations, the book is often unfair, at times simply incorrect in its presentation of radical views, and most importantly, I think, can easily be used as a sophisticated rationalization for the inequality which has characterized the history of education as well as other spheres of life in capitalist America.

FOOTNOTES

1. Michael B. Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform, Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), and *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1971).

2. Clarence Karier, *Shaping the American Educational State: 1900 to the Present* (N.Y.: Free Press, 1975), Joel Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (Boston: Beacon, 1973), and Clarence Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, *Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing, 1973). Also, see Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., eds., *Work, Technology, and Education, Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976).

3. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America, Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (N.Y.: (Basic Books, 1976).

4. Herbert G. Gutman, *Work, Culture and*

Society in Industrializing America (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), esp. chp. 1.

5. Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*, p. 81.

6. Carl F. Kaestle, *The Evolution of an Urban School System, New York City, 1750-1850* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), esp. chps. 4-6.

7. David B. Tyack, *The One Best System, A History of American Urban Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), part IV.

8. Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1967), esp. chps. 5-6, James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918* (Boston: Beacon, 1968), and Christopher Lasch, *The New Radicalism in America 1889-1963, The Intellectual as a Social Type* (N.Y.: Vintage, 1965), esp. chp. 5.

9. John Higham, "Hanging Together: Divergent Unities in American History," *The Journal of American History* LXI (June, 1974): 5-27.

10. Among the works Ravitch refers to are: Herbert G. Gutman, "The Reality of the Rags to Riches 'Myth': The Case of the Paterson, New Jersey, Locomotive, Iron and Machinery Manufac-

turers, 1830-1880." in Stephan Thernstrom and Richard Sennett, eds., *Nineteenth Century Cities: Essays in the New Urban History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 98124, Clyde Griffen, "Workers Divided: The Effect of Craft and Ethnic Differences in Poughkeepsie, New York, 1850-1880," in Thernstrom and Sennett, eds., *Nineteenth Century Cities*, pp. 49-97, and Paul B. Worthman, "Working Class Mobility in Birmingham, Alabama 1880-1914," in Tamara K. Hareven, ed., *Anonymous Americans, Explorations in Nineteenth Century Social History* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.) Mostly, however, she relies on, Stephan Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880-1970* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).

11. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), and Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society*, esp. chps. 1-2. Also see, Alan Dawley, *Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), and James A. Henretta, "The Study of Social Mobility: Ideological Assumptions and Conceptual Bias," *Labor History* 18 (Spring 1977): 165-178.

12. David B. Tyack, "School and Society in St. Louis," *History of Education Quarterly* 16 (Summer 1976): 199.

13. Robert Lampman, *The Share of Top Wealth Holders in National Wealth, 1922-1956* (Princeton University Press, 1962): Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America: An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution* (New York: Praeger, 1962): G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America*? (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967): Frank Ackerman et. al., "The Extent of Income Inequality in the United States," in Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf, eds., *The Capitalist System* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 207-217; Christopher Jencks et. al., *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 209-213; and, Lester C. Thurow, "Education and Economic Inequality," *The Public Interest* 28 (Summer 1972): 66-81. Two periods of increasing income equality in the twentieth century were the Depression and World War II. Depression and war, however, are not policies which recommend themselves.

14. Jencks et. al., *Inequality*, chp. 6. Also see~~,~~ Ivar Berg, *Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and, for an excellent review of recent research on education and inequality, Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, "Educational Research: A Review and an Interpretation," in Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, eds., *Power and Ideology*

in *Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 1-85.

15. Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics* *and* *Markets*: *The* *Worlds* *Political-Economic* *Systems* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977).

IV. An Apology for American Educational History*

by

Michael Katz

In The Revisionists Revised, Diane Ravitch argues that through incapacity or political motivation the "revisionist" historians have deployed incomplete evidence, bad logic, and poor theory to present a simple-minded, conspiracy-ridden, and thoroughly negative portrait of America's educational past.[1] Written in the service of un-American political ideals, their work not only has distorted the past but has exacerbated the problems of low morale and declining standards in American education. Ravitch would like to substitute a story of progress, a sustained attempt to realize democratic-liberal aspirations in a pluralistic society. Despite unfortunate lapses, including slavery and McCarthyism, the fundamental openness of society and the steady improvement in the lot of minorities remain indisputable hallmarks of America's past, evidence of the fundamental soundness of American institutions. Progress can be continued through a steady application of the democratic-liberal tradition of reform -- in particular of representative rather than participatory democracy.

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Ravitch concentrates her attention on the work of Clarence Karier, Joel Spring, Samuel Bowles and Hebert Gintis, Walter Feinberg, and myself, although she criticizes a number of other writers as well. She begins with an overview of the main issues in the debate, and in the next few chapters attempts to summarize critically the revisionist position. The substantive core of her argument is a discussion of the relation between education and social progress. The book concludes with a chapter whose point is apparent in its title, "A Summing Up: Limitations of the Ideological Approach."

Ravitch notwithstanding, historical scholarship during the last decade has exposed the myths obscuring the origins of public schooling. Public education neither emerged in a blaze of egalitarian and humanitarian zeal nor did it alter patterns of inequality. Rather, the development of public education cannot be understood apart fron social relations between classes, anxieties about disorder, attempts to shore up a social structure under stress, and the invention of modern forms of bureaucracy. Diane Ravitch's book does not offer an effective challenge to this perspective. Nonetheless, her book requires a lengthy review because it is representative of the current backlash against dissenting scholarship and social reform. The position outlined in her book should concern those interested in the degree of equity and social justice in American life.

The Revisionists Revised has received a great deal of attention and favorable comment. Too frequently reviewers have accepted the book's description of "revisionist" scholarship without further scrutiny. Its message is clearly one that many have wanted to hear: radical scholarship has apparently touched exposed nerves. It has called into question the traditional justifications of major social institutions; undercut comfortable notions of the role of disinterested benevolence and humanitarianism in the history of American reform; challenged the design and results of the social programs of the 1960's; and taken a hard, critical look at the vast, self-protective educational establishment. At the same time, the mood of the country has shifted in a more conservative direction, with budget-cutting as the most popular electoral slogan (1978), and a general backlash against radical ideas evident in many quarters. Still, the economy stagnates, inflation increases, and the condition of the cities deteriorates. In these circumstances, myths about the credibility of social institutions and the reality of social progress serve to protect professionals and to bridge the distance between mood and actuality. This is why the times are right for the message offered by Diane Ravitch.

The history of Ravitch's book shows that it is not simply a laudable and straightforward attempt to contribute to the lively debate that American education needs at all times" (p.xi). In 1975 the National Academy of Education under a grant from the Ford Foundation invited Ravitch to review the literature on the history of American education. The review which resulted has been expanded into the book under consideration here. Copies of the review were sent to the publishers of the historians attacked, to deans of education, and to some professors of education, not all historians. I received copies from my publishers, none directly fron the Academy. So did most (though not all) of those attacked.

This incident raises troubling questions. Why was Ravitch, rather than one of the more obviously established scholars in the field, selected to write the review in the first place? Second, how was the mailing list for distribution chosen? Why did it go to publishers, deans and influential professors and not to the authors attacked?

I have attempted to answer these questions about the sponsorship and distribution of Ravitch's review by the National Academy of Education. However, I have received only vague and unhelpful answers from the then president, Patrick Suppes. It remains unclear whether the Academy wished to obtain a general review of the literature in the history of American education or an attack upon the "revisionists."[2]

If the connection between Ravitch and the National Academy has aroused the suspicions of those taken to task by Ravitch, they should be pardoned. For -- whatever the motivation behind the incident -- a deliberate and well-financed attempt to discredit radical scholarship could not have been initiated more effectively.

Ravitch wishes to do more than discredit revisionist historians. In attempting to substitute a different version of the American past, she has become one of the most articulate exponents of what can be called the apologist case for American education, past and present. This review is not the place to systematically present a dissenting view.[3] Rather I wish to concentrate on Ravitch's tactics and on exposing the theoretical weakness at the heart of the apologist version of American history. Although my rebuttal emphasizes some of Ravitch's charges against me and not other historians, her treatment of my work is an example of the way she treats the work of other scholars she attacks in this volume.[4]

Diane Ravitch prefaces her discussion of revisionist historians by noting the curious lack of response to their writings.

> In my own field of educational history, radical historians have encountered very little opposition; even books which, in my view, flagrantly violated the rules of evidence and logic went unchallenged. Scholars who disagreed profoundly chose to look the other way rather than engage in controversy with the radical historians. One prominent historian wrote, in response to an early version of this book, that he agreed with what I had written but had been afraid to state the same things himself; another historian wrote that he now realized that his error in the 1960's was in keeping silent for fear of being shouted down. (p.xi)

Two observations undercut her statement. In fact, each of the works Ravitch attacks has been criticized in reviews and at professional meetings. My first book, The Irony of Early School Reform, for example, received not only praise but sharp criticism during the initial round of reviews, and revisionist scholarship has been enmeshed in controversy for the last decade.[5]

Second, Ravitch's statement implies that the revisionists formed a powerful group, strong enough to silence criticism within the field. However, at the time Irony appeared, I was a twenty-nine-year-old assistant professor; Joel Spring published his first book before he had tenure; and Samuel Bowles suffered professionally for the political stance of his research. The most senior historian among those attacked by Ravitch is Clarence Karier at the University of Illinois. The fact remains that not one major piece of radical educational history has been published by a tenured member of the faculty at Havard, Chicago, Stanford, or Columbia, the centers of power and prestige among schools of education. Ravitch intimates the existence of a conspiracy of radical historians to silence criticism. It should be obvious that the facts could hardly support such a charge.

Ravitch attempts to construct a group she can term radical revisionists. Although she begins by noting that each historian within the group offers a different interpretation, she generally ignores this caveat and creates the impression of an intellectually and politically unified group. In truth, however, sharp differences of method, interpretation, and politics separate the historians Ravitch attacks, although each in his own way offers a critical version of the past. What Ravitch scarcely mentions is that these historians have been often sharply critical of each other.

Ravitch falsely homogenizes the historians she criticizes into a set of straw men not only by ignoring the differences and controversies between them but also by distorting their viewpoints and omitting important aspects of their arguments. For instance, she criticizes my analysis in The Irony of Early School Reform of the vote to abolish Beverly High School in 1860 by arguing that I made a simple situation far too complex. She attempts to show that the occupational figures I gave are ambiguous and that the opponents of the school lived far away and had no school-age children: in other words, that the opposition lacked structural roots or a class basis as I contended.

Now, I stated quite clearly that distance from the school and the age of children played important parts in the vote. I also showed that clear differences in wealth, as measured by property value, separated supporters and opponents; that all of the laborers, clearly the lowest occupational group on any social or economic ranking, voted against the high school; and that within both central and peripheral districts, occupation and wealth influenced the way people voted. Ravitch does not cite any of the latter three pieces of evidence, and does not even mention that I considered wealth or had the sense to control for location. She attempts to convey an impression that I was simpleminded, building a case to suit my ideological fancy rather than one based on evidence.[6]

Elsewhere, Ravitch contends that my analysis of bureaucracy is deficient because it merely stresses the relation between organizational structure and class and does not consider the role of objective conditions such as population pressure or administrative chaos (p. 50). That statement neglects one-third of Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, the book under attack, which painstakingly describes the development of bureaucracy in one urban school system, an account which stresses both objective conditions and processes. That section of the book is a condensation of a two-part essay which appeared in the History of Education Quarterly, and was an extremely detailed account of the origins of educational bureaucracy. Ravitch does not mention that account, in either its shorter or longer form, despite its centrality to her thesis and her critique.[7]

Not only does Ravitch omit inconvenient aspects of the work she criticize', she also neglects the revisionist's attempts to grapple with critics, to refine interpretations, or to utilize new historiographical techniques for which she praises others. Her criticism does not mention my attempt to answer other critics in the epilogue to the expanded edition of _Class Bureaucracy, and Schools_; my effort to synthesize recent scholarship in " The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment," or my work on family and social structure in _The People of Hamilton_. This study contains as detailed an empirical investigation of social mobility as any she uses to support her thesis about the openness of American society.[8]

Ravitch states (p. 117) that I argue "that the irony of mid-nineteenth-century school reform is that it was not the product of working-class demands, but rather that it was imposed." That, to set the record straight, is not the irony. Irony means unintended outcome, and the principal one in my book is the discrepancy between the intention and results of educational innovation, a point made clearly in the text. Elsewhere (p. 122), Ravitch states that I imply "that tax funds should be spent only on services used by each segment of the community in proportion to its numbers," a point I never made or implied. On page 125, she asserts that I assume "the goals of educational radicals and working-class parents are the same." In fact, I make exactly the opposite point and discuss the dilemma that arises from the contradiction between the two.

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis's work also suffers from Ravitch's omissions. She does not mention that a substantial portion of their book, Schooling in Capitalist America, rests upon a sophisticated multivariate analysis whose nature and conclusions undercut her criticisms.[9] Ravitch presents Bowles and Gintis' thesis as simply one more discovery of the relation between family background and educational achievement (p. 149). She does not mention that their case is arresting and compelling because it demonstrates that, with controls for socioeconomic background, IQ has relatively little independent effect upon income inequality. In other words, by its own standards the meritocracy is a failure. To dismiss Bowles and Gintis' careful and complex analysis of the relations between measured IQ, socioeconomic background, and education, and their tightly argued account of the contradictions between socialization and schooling as "nothing more than speculation masquerading as sociology" (pp. 150-151) is to caricature an important piece of serious, imaginative scholarship.

Ravitch not only omits, she also distorts and invents. Consider the following sentence:

"A decent respect for the complexity of causation will make the historian reluctant to claim that the activites of an institution in the mid-twentieth century were directly determined by the ideas of a man who was influential in 1850" (p. 46). That of course is true, but none of the historians she attacks has argued to the contrary. Nor is there any basis whatsoever for this assertion: "The radical historian describes the terrible way things turned out and asserts that it must have been intended by policymakers" (p. 44). Similarly, she writes, with reference to the diversity of American minorities, "It is historically unjustified to assert that all have been crushed by their education or by the public schools into a homogeneous, deracinated mass" (p. 58). Certainly, but none of the historians she attacks has said that, and she provides no evidence for her point, nor could she. Or "as they (radical revisionists) contend, only those from high-status families do well in school, so the injustice of the social order is reproduced and perpetuated through the myth and mechanism of the public school" (p. 73). Again, none of the historians in question have said any such things.

It is curious that a book which attacks a group of authors for their ideological distortions should bear such a tenuous relation to what they actually have written. Indeed, Ravitch's tactics are precisely those of which she accuses the radical revisionists: omission, distortion, the creation of straw men, ideological bias, and unjust and unwarranted impeachment of motive. Consider for a moment the question of motives. Although she deprecates what she unjustly takes to be an attack on the motives of educational reformers, Ravitch assaults the motives of the revisionists. Referring to Bowles and Gintis, she states "one might wish that the authors showed some slight appreciation for the democratic-liberal values that preserve their freedom to publish a call to revolution against democratic liberalism" (p. 154). However, a central premise of Bowles and Gintis's work is that a contradiction exists between the democratic character of the political process and the hierarchical organization of economic life. Contrary to what Ravitch would have readers believe, they define socialism "as an extension of democracy from the narrowly political to the economic realm" (p. 14). Her remark is a slur against two scholars whose commitment to academic freedom, democracy, and intellectual dialogue has pervaded their published work and their lives.

The direct questioning of Clarence Karier's integrity also must be noted. In The Shaping of the American Educational State, Clarence Karier reproduced Walter Lippman's criticism of intelligence testing which first appeared in the New Republic shortly before that journal published articles on the same topic by John Dewey.[10] Karier did not reprint Dewey's contribution. Although it is rare to encounter an anthology designed as a text that reprints every article relevant to a topic, Ravitch nonetheless asserts: "The only conceivable reason for leaving them out is that they constitute a sharp refutation of many of the allegations Karier has made against Dewey. . . . To have included Dewey's penetrating critique of testing would have compelled Karier to deal with complexity, for he would have found himself agreeing with one of his chief targets." (p. 136).

One might reach exactly the same conclusion about Ravitch because when she agrees with a point made by the revisionist historians, she often presents it without acknowledgement, as her own. For example, at the close of her book Ravitch cautions against unrealistically expecting schools to solve social and economic problems which "might be more directly and fruitfully attacked in noneducational ways" (p. 173). An excellent point, which many of those she criticizes have been making in print for a decade, and which is included in my work which Ravitch has attacked.[11]

Simplistic reductionist assumptions exemplify Ravitch's discussion of social theory. Much of her apologist case for American social institutions is cast in windy terms and resembles nothing so much as a ninth-grade civics textbook. Consider, for example, the following paragraph:

> The focus of democratic thought in the United States has traditionally been a commitment to the democratic political process, a belief in the doctrine of majority rule and minority rights. Compromise and conciliation are vital elements in the democratic process....The process works slowly and unevenly, and it occasionally errs; sometimes the majority is wrong, and sometimes the necessity for conciliation defers needed social change. The major political parties support the process, regardless of who wins elections or legislative votes, because it guarantees their own ability to win some future vote, and with it, the cooperation of the loser. (p. 34)

Harmless enough, if vacuous. Less benign is her sharp distinction between representative and participatory democracy, seeing only the former as in the American liberal tradition. Advocating participatory democracy "puts the educational radical at odds with the mainstream of liberalism" (p. 126). Ravitch's animosity towards decentralization and the dispersal of power underlies not only her critique of the revisionists but is also the hidden agenda of The Great School Wars, which is a thinly veiled attack upon decentralization efforts in the New York City schools from the early nineteenth century until the present.[12]

Ravitch is entitled to her point of view, but two observations must be made. First, hers is a strange position for one whose heroes and heroines include John Dewey and Jane Addams, both of whom attempted to demonstrate the centrality of process to democracy. It was, after all, Jane Addams' famous observation "unless all men and all classes contribute to a good, we cannot even be sure that it is worth having" -- that most simply and eloquently states the assumption on which efforts to make democracy more participatory have rested. Ravitch cannot have it both ways.[13]

Second, Ravitch fails to acknowledge that a bias shapes her history as surely as it affects the interpretations she criticizes and, indeed, all written history. She locates the positions she contests as outside the American tradition and hence, by implication, alien and dangerous. That is neither liberal nor scholarly; it is a smear tactic.

The apologist case reflects a tenuous grasp of social theory as well as a skewed definition of the American democratic tradition, especially in Ravitch's discussions of class, mobility and bureaucracy. She does not define class explicitly, nor even show that she is aware that more than one definition exists. Nonetheless, she asserts that class analysis is largely inappropriate to American history (pp. 43-44), citing evidence that most Americans regard themselves as middle class to support her position.

The type of analysis to which she objects allegedly rests on three assumptions: "first, that the United States is composed of distinct and fairly rigid classes; second, that people identify themselves as members of these distinct classes; and third, that people invariably recognize and act consistently with respect to their economic self-interest" (p. 43). That list is a caricature of class analysis and a travesty of revisionist historical arguments. In radical history, serious class analysis rejects purely subjective definitions or arbitrary divisions of people according to quantitative criteria such as wealth or prestige scores. Rather, it attempts to view class as a relation, instead of as bumps in a system of stratification or as the artifact of an opinion poll. Class involves social relations broader than simple economic self-interest, and none of the historians Ravitch attacks has argued that people always act consistently. Ravitch does not understand class as a concept. She distorts the arguments of those she attacks and fails to marshal effective counter-evidence. She does not even bother to define the concept which she assaults.

Nor does she define bureaucracy, although she discusses it extensively. Her point appears to be that, although bureaucracy may be unpleasant, nonetheless it is inevitable and not, as I wrote, a "crystallization of bourgeois social values."[14] In support of her point, Ravitch notes that bureaucracy "is a characteristic organizational form in socialist and communist nations" (pp. 49-50). Contrary to what Ravitch maintains, everybody who has written on the subject points out that bureaucracy was a complex response to problems of social development, but that it was a response that embodied particular values and priorities. Each element of bureaucratic innovation was contested, sometimes fiercely, by sane, rational people. As Anthony Giddens points out, although Marx and Weber deffered about the inevitability of bureaucracy, they agreed that it embodied the values of industrial capitalism.[15]

Moreover, Ravitch criticizes Bowles and Gintis for failing to account for bureaucracy in socialist or communist countries. Actually, they face the issue directly and effectively in a way that affirms their commitment to democratic values. They write:

> Why, then, has a democratic organization of work emerged in the existing socialist

> countries? If not a proof that technology requires hierarchical authority, does this fact not at least suggest the inevitable tendency for bureaucracies to come to control people's lives in modern society? We believe not. First, numerous plants in China, Cuba and Chile (during the Allende period) exhibited a substantial degree of worker control of production with positive results. Second, the state socialist countries of Eastern Europe were never democratic. Rather, the ruling elites have always maintained their power through top-down control of production, a centralized party structure, and the military. It is, therefore, not surprising that they have instituted a hierarchy in the workplace, a characteristic of corporate capitalist production.[16]

Ravitch's analysis of social mobility is no more accurate than her interpretation of class or bureaucracy. Her assertion that revisionists claim that "only those from high status families do well in school" (p. 73), is a preposterous fabrication. The same can be said of the unfounded claim that revisionists assert the "irrelevance of schooling" to social mobility (p. 74). Nor should one accept Ravitch's contention that "widespread" upward mobility would destroy the radical case (pp. 74-75).

Insofar as a consistent position can be found among the revisionists, it would be that schooling serves the well-to-do better than the poor and, by and large, helps to reproduce rather than alter the class structure. That argument does not deny that substantial amounts of individual mobility always have taken place. But two points must be made concerning this argument. First, social mobility has been largely structural. An expanding economy produced more white-collar, technical professional, and managerial positions than could be filled by the children of people already occupying similar occupations. Second, rates of occupational attainment have differed sharply by class. Different proportions of children from different social classes have attained high-ranking occupations. Working-class children always have done less well.[17]

Ravitch contends that the high rates of mobility which exist have been fostered by education. To support her point she uses Blau and Duncan's findings about occupational mobility to suggest that education matters more than social origins. Their data, however, show that although education plays a critical role in occupational attainment, social origins strongly influence the amount and nature of the education that young people receive. Working-class children are much less likely to receive the type of education that leads to the most desirable jobs.[18] Thus, she ignores both the structural basis of mobility -- the number of openings -- and the question of proportions -- not the number but the share of children from various social backgrounds who reach different occupational levels.

In a chapter titled "Education Still Matters," Ravitch argues that the gap between white and black income has been narrowing; that the general situation of blacks has been improving; and that education has played a key role in this process.

> Just as dropping out was once an economically rational decision, getting more education is now as rational for blacks as it has been for whites....It is indisputable that full equality has not been achieved, but equally indisputable in the light of the evidence is the conclusion that a democratic society can bring about effective social change, if there are both the leadership and the political commitment to do so. (pp. 112-115)

These assertions conclude a chapter which omits any mention of unemployment, inflation, racial tension, trends in residential segregation, and the debased value of higher degrees on a tight job market. I am writing this in Philadelphia in August 1978, where unemployment for young black men hovers around 50 percent; racial segregation in housing has actually been increasing; jobs are leaving the city; and racial tensions are higher, most commentators maintain, than they have been for years.

One need not look beyond the source Ravitch herself used to show that her image of black progress has no substantial foundation, for she has made a selective use of a U. S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Census report. That report shows that between 1970 and 1974 an increase in the ratio of black-to-white family income occurred only among husband-wife families headed by a person under the age of 35. Among all families with husband and wife present, the ratio declined. Moreover, the proportion of families with both husband and wife present declined among Blacks and remained stable among whites. Partly as a result of the increase in female-headed households, the proportion of married black women in the labor force increased. Thus overall, between 1970 and 1974 the income of black families decreased relative to that of whites from .61 to .58. According to the report:

> Between 1970 and 1974, the proportion of black families with wives in the paid labor force declined from 36 to 33 percent: whereas the proportion of their white counterparts increased 34 to 37 percent.

> Changes in the proportion of all families with working wives are a result of changes in first, the proportion of all families which are husband-wife families and, second, the proportion of husband-wife families with working wives....Black husbandwife families as a percent of all families have declined; virtually no changes have been observed for their white counterparts during the 1970 to 1974 (income years).... The husband-wife families generally have median incomes which are higher than those of other types of families, primarily because they are more likely to have two earners....Between 1970 and 1974, the decline in the proportion of black husband-wife families has reduced the proportion of all black families with wives in the paid labor force. This pattern combined with changes which have occurred among white families has produced a downward effect upon the overall income of black to white families in the '70's.[19]

Ravitch does not cite the evidence in the same pamphlet that between 1967 and 1973 black family income decreased relative to white family income. Nor does she note that black unemployment is usually about twice as high as white; that black infant mortality in 1973 was only slightly lower than the white rate was in 1950; or that black males in every age category from one year through age twenty-five could expect to live longer in 1959-61 than they could in 1973.[20] The situation did not change materially between 1974 and 1976 according to a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights.[21]

Between 1960 and 1976 black college attendance increased. The proportion of black males aged twenty-five to twenty-nine who completed college rose from 4 percent to 11 percent, while the white male college attendance rate increased from 20 percent to 34 percent. The ratio of black to white thus rose from .20 to .32. However, most black males who had attended college were unable to find work to match the r qualifications. The proportion in jobs that typically require less education than they had acquired was 58.8 percent in 1960 and 55.0 percent in 1976. Similarly, the proportion of black male high school graduates with jobs typically requiring no high school diploma shifted only from 70.2 percent to 67.2 in 1976.[22] Despite the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty, despite more years of education, black men have been unable to increase their chances for jobs for which they are qualified, and unemployment among them has worsened.

Ravitch's complacent view of America's past, present, and future, a story marred by unfortunate "lapses from the standard" (p. 11), leaves her unable to deal effectively with the origins of problems even she admits exist. Her list of the problems in American education includes: "a decline in education standards, as evidenced by policies of automatic promotion in elementary and secondary schools, and at the post-secondary level, by the acceptance of grade inflation, diploma mills, and term-paper factories" (p. 171). Ravitch's only explanation of these problems is startlingly simplistic: "These changes did not come about solely because of the way history has been written in recent years, but the repeated assertions by historians and social scientists that schooling was of little or no intrinsic value has had its impact on policymakers" (p. 171). Although she does not state here what that impact has been, she perhaps has in mind what she asserted earlier, "to sap the political will that is necessary to effect change" (p. _15).

Ravitch has made an extraordinary claim. It assumes, first, that the average policymaker has been influenced by revisionist historians, a claim that is impossible to believe, and for which no evidence of any sort is offered. How many policymakers read history and how many are willing to entertain seriously a radical critique? Unless my own experience has been unusual, Ravitch's statement is absurd. More than that, Ravitch once again distorts the arguments she criticizes. "Revisionists" have never said that schooling has little or no intrinsic value.

Their point, rather, has been that schooling has by and large helped to maintain and reproduce existing patterns of social structure and that education reforms have not altered this state of affairs.

Even more seriously, Ravitch's assertion is scapegoating. By placing the responsibility for the problems of American education upon a group of historians while neglecting unemployment, inflation, racism, and the increasingly tenuous connection between education and work, Ravitch displaces the blame from where it should rest. The problem, she implies, does not lie in the distribution of power and resources, but rather lies with those carping critics who sow disaffection and erode the will to action. If Ravitch successfully were to silence or discredit the revisionists, would any of the great problems of American society or education improve?

Were Ravitch successful, it is she who would subvert school reform. The apathy and hostility, even violence, encountered daily in schools, public anger and disillusionment with public education, educators' sense of impotence and rage -- none of these can be explained by the apologist case. By offering a realistic explanation of the situation, the revisionists do more than the apologists to aid students and teachers to survive their daily lives with their sanity and self-esteem intact. All that Ravitch and the apologists can offer is to attempt to kill the messenger who brings bad news and to spin illusions of social progress.

It is important to understand why the apologist case surfaced in the late 1970's and why it has been welcomed in many quarters. During the last decade one key message of social science research has been that educational innovation and reform have failed. The War on Poverty and its related educational spinoffs have not attained their goals. As so often in American history, education was deployed as the primary weapon to fight poverty, crime, and social disorder, and, as before, schools have been unable to alleviate problems which have structural origins in the distribution of power and resources. Reform usually has rested on environmental assumptions that are inherently optimistic: altered environments can change character and behavior. As reforms have failed, hereditary theories have surfaced: problems of crime, poverty, and ignorance are not environmental but genetic. This familiar pattern in American history recurred during the 1960's and 1970's as the environmental theories underlying the optimism of the War on Poverty gave way to the hereditarian arguments of Jensen and Herrnstein.[23] Those who would resist genetic arguments have two alternatives. One is to recognize the structural origins of social problems and the inherently ineffectual nature of the reforms that have been attempted. The other is to argue the case for social progress, regardless of what the evidence shows. The latter is what Ravitch has done; it is what makes the apologist case so appealing.

Ravitch subtitled her last chapter "Limitations of the Ideological Approach." Characteristically, she does not define ideology. Presumably it is bad, an attempt to put scholarship to the service of political goals whatever the evidence might show. Her assertion that the books she attacks, and not her own, are ideological is disingenuous at best. It is, in the last analysis, dangerous as well, and this is why such a slight, polemical volume deserves a lengthy review in a major journal.

I find Ravitch's book dangerous for three reasons. First, her book will be used, as it already has been, as ammunition by those who wish to assert the apologist case for American social institutions and to dampen the prospects for structural reform. Second, given her powerful sponsorship by the National Academy of Education, her work will receive broader attention than the ordinary polemic. Third, although Ravitch expresses a hope that her book will contribute to lively debate, the more likely consequence is a reduction in fruitful dialogue. Were her case that "revisionists" are simple-minded, dishonest ideologues responsible for a large share of our educational problems to be accepted, less "revisionist" work would be published. On a subtler level, once it is believed that critical history will meet with official disfavor, young scholars facing a tight job market will be reluctant to deviate far from center. Indeed, evidence exists that this has already begun to happen, not, of course, as a consequence of Ravitch, but as part of the turn to the right that has created a climate receptive to her message. The times are right for scapegoats. That is why Ravitch's credibility is an important issue.[24]

FOOTNOTES

1 Ravitch's book is an expansion of her article *The Revisionists Revised: Studies in the Historiography of American Education*, Proceedings of the National Academy of Education, 4 (1977), 1-84.

2 I have repeatedly asked the former President of the Academy, Patrick Suppes, for details and have received only vague and unhelpful replies. My own correspondence is available upon request.

3 Michael B. Katz, "The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment," *History of Education Quarterly*, 16 (1976), 381-407, and "Origins of the Institutional State," *Marxist Perspectives*, 4 (1978), 6-22.

4 For example, Walter Feinberg has attempted to correct Ravitch's distortion of his work in his essay in this collection, "Dewey as a Cultural Symbol: Some Reflections on *Reason and Rhetoric* and Its Critics."

5 Michael B. Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

6 Katz, *Irony*, pp. 20-21; pp. 272-279.

7 Michael B. Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 56-104; "The Emergence of Bureaucracy in Urban Education: The Boston Case, 1850-1884," Parts I and II, *History of Education Quarterly*, 8 (1968), 155-188, 319-357.

8 Expanded edition, pp. 147-194; Michael B. Katz, *The People of Hamilton, Canada West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth Century City* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

9 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), esp. pp. 102-148 and pp. 201-223.

10 Clarence Karier, *The Shaping of the American Educational State* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

11 For example, Katz, *Irony*, pp. 217-218; *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools*, pp. 141-142; "Origins," p. 403.

12 Diane Ravitch, *The Great School Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

13 Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902; republished Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 220.

14 Michael Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy and Schools*, p. xxi.

15. Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 232-238.

16 Bowles and Gintis, p. 81.

17 For an example of the way structural factors influence mobility rates, see Richard M. Bernard and John B. Sharpless, "Analyzing Structural Influences on Social History Data," *Historical Methods*, 2, No. 3 (1978), 112-131.

18 Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 402-403 and pp. 405-406.

19 Department of Commerce and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of Census, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States*, 1974, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, Series P-23, No. 54, July 1975, pp. 30, 37.

20 Bureau of the Census, Social and Economic Status, pp. 123, 126.

21 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Social Indicators of Equality for Minorities and Women: A Report (Washington: GPO, 1978).

22 Social Indicators, pp. 14, 18, 20.

23 Katz, Irony, p. 111.

24 See, for instance, the totally uncritical review in the Wall Street Journal, or the long review by Peter Clecak, The Chronical (of Higher Education) Review, 16 Oct. 1978, pp. 14-15. Clecak accepts as accurate all Ravitch's substantial criticism of the revisionists. His review is accompanied by an interview with Ravitch. The effect is to buttress her image as a fair, objective commentator. Reviewers should compare the accuracy of a criticism against the texts it attacks. The point, though, is that these reviews, like Ravitch's books, are an attempt to discredit radical scholarship masked by an assertion of objectivity and fairness.

V. On the Revision of the Revisionists

by

Paul C. Violas

Diane Ravitch's review of revisionism in educational history first appeared in the 1977 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Education*[1] and a year later was published under the same title, *The Revisionists Revised*, by Basic Books.[2] Both publications received considerable attention; the former, in part, because of the prestige of the Academy while the latter revised and expanded text reached a larger audience. Some in the liberal educational establishment believed this work had documented with finality the intellectual bankruptcy of a bothersome corpus of historical studies. Many of the authors indicted by Ravitch were indignant. Most of the latter felt she had indeed "revised" the revisionists -- in some instances to the point where they disclaimed the interpretations attributed to them by Ravitch. Some were also surprised at the tone of her attack. I am grateful that the Academy has now offered some of the authors reviewed an opportunity to respond in the same forum that the original attack appeared two years ago.

The section of The Revisionists Revised which addresses my work is devoted exclusively to my essay on Jane Addams.[3] Ravitch begins with the charge that my essay is "an egregious example of tailoring quotes to fit the writer's ideology....The words he quotes are hers, but in repeated instances, the context and meaning have been altered to match his point, not hers."[4] She then provides several illustrations of what purport to be abuses of the original context of Addams' words or distortions of Addams' meaning.

Ravitch's overarching objection to my interpretation of Addams' work seems to be, "His selections from her works are meant to demonstrate Violas' belief that Addams sacrificed individualism for the sake of a unified organic community."[5] In this statement Ravitch comes reasonably close to an understanding of the thesis of the essay, although she avoids the page and half of modifiers I provided to indicate that Addams rejected the nineteenth century or Classical Liberal conception of individualism in favor of a collective association which would yield a new social ideal and a new ideal community.[6] It is interesting that Ravitch avoids confronting the documentation provided to support this general thesis. Rather she concentrates her efforts on my analysis of the ramifications of this effort by Addams to construct a new social ideal and ideal community based on collective association instead of rugged individualism. Thus, we must turn to these illustrations to examine the validity of Ravitch's charges.

She begins with the assertion that I claimed Addams commitment to a new ideal community "brought her to reject the ties of family, social class, ethnicity, and nationality."[7] Further she attributes to me the suggestion that Addams urged "the atomization of the individual and the destruction of the family."[8] If I had made the claims and suggestions which Ravitch attributes to me, then not only would my scholarship be as derelict as she implies but I would have proposed an interpretation so silly as to hardly require serious criticism.

The "if," however, is the issue. Let us consult the text which reads, "She rejected the family as a primary object of loyalty. Filial loyalty was too narrow and selfish....Family claims on its individual's loyalty would have to be significantly altered in order to develop the ideal community. For similar reasons, Miss Addams rejected social class, ethnic groups, geographic areas, and even the nation state as the source of individual identification and validation."[9] I submit that Ravitch has misconstrued my statements. There is a significant difference between her words "rejected the family" or "urged the destruction of the family" and my own argument that Addams "rejected the family as the primary object of loyalty." To say that Addams rejected the family as the primary object of loyalty is not to say, as Ravitch implies I did, that Addams rejected completely the ties of family. Rather, the point is to acknowledge that Addams recognized the legitimacy of family claims, but she was convinced that such claims, as I wrote, "would have to be significantly altered in order to develop the ideal community." Ravitch's parody of my claims implies that Addams found no use for these institutions or groupings and further leads to the notion that she urged the atomization of the individual. That, however, is Ravitch's interpretation of my essay and not my interpretation of Jane Addams. Indeed, the entire tenor and thrust of my analysis argued that Addams worked for a redirection, not destruction, of traditional loyalties toward ever more encompassing social units. Atomization of the individual was certainly not part of Addams' agenda and not implied in my analysis of her efforts.

Ravitch returns to my analysis of Addams' position on filial loyalty a second time and in this instance it is not my text but Addams' text which she confounds. She tries to suggest that my analysis is based on correctly worded quotes which, however, were tailored or taken out of context to alter Addams' meanings to suit my ideological position. Ravitch's argument here requires some extended treatment for it graphically displays her refusal to follow a complex argument over the course of an entire chapter in a primary source. It is best to allow her own words to outline the problem:

> He says, for instance, that "She rejected the family as a primary object of loyalty. Filial loyalty was too narrow and selfish: 'Our democracy is making in-roads upon the family, the oldest of human institutions, and a claim is being advanced which in a sense is larger than the family claim.'" In its context, the meaning of her sentence is unrelated to Violas' point. Addams, in Democracy and Social Ethics, was writing specifically about the dilemma of the educated woman in 1902, torn between those who tell her that her only role is to raise a family and her own desire to serve in some social role outside the family.[10]

Readers familiar with Addams' text will recognize a modicum of truth in Ravitch's argument, i.e., the paragraph from which I took the quote is primarily devoted to the problem of the woman's dilemma regarding her traditional family obligations and her newly evolving opportunities to contribute to a wider social sphere. Now, even if that was the entirety of the chapter entitled "Filial Relations" such a context would hardly render the meaning of Addams' sentence "unrelated to Violas' point." My point was that

Addams argued that the family claims were often too narrow to ethically claim primary loyalty especially when outside claims called for ministering to broader needs. Addams' sentences which follow the one I quoted read, "The claim of the state in time of war has long been recognized, so that in its name the family has given up sons and husbands and even fathers of little children, if we can once see the claims of society in any such light, if its misery and need can be made clear and urged as an explicit claim, as the state urges its claims in time of danger, then for the first time the daughter who desires to minister to that need will be recognized as acting conscientiously."[11] Clearly, Addams' argument in behalf of the "educated woman" was based on her view that such loyalty to a larger social unit had been legitimately and long recognized for "sons and husbands and even fathers of little children." She merely sought to extend to educated women what she viewed as legitimate and good for men. Thus, since Addams used the legitimate claims of the larger community on men as an analogy for extending it to the educated woman, it is entirely unreasonable and wrong for Ravitch to insist that this part of Addams' text is "unrelated to Violas' point." Moreover, had Ravitch attended to Addams' entire chapter she surely would have recognized this.

Much of Addams' chapter is devoted to the woman's problem of breaking out of traditionally defined wife-mother, family roles. This problem, however, is merely an illustration of Addams' larger point that a multitude of traditional relationships must be transformed to facilitate the birth of her new social ideal. Addams explicitly states this thesis early in the chapter:

> In considering the changes which our increasing democracy is constantly making upon various relationships, it is impossible to ignore the filial relation. This chapter deals with the relation between parents and their grown-up daughters, as affording an explicit illustration of the perplexity and maladjustment brought about by the various attempts of young women to secure a more active share in community life.[12]

Ravitch apparently chose to ignore the first sentence of the above quote and concentrate her emphasis on the second. Such exclusive emphasis, however, seems to alter Addams' intent and meaning. Clearly Addams was asserting that among those various relationships being changed, traditional family relations should be readjusted in light of the demand for a more inclusive social obligation. In those instances where family claims conflict with the claims of a more encompassing social ideal it was clear to Addams which claim should take precedent:

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> The collision of interests, each of which has a real moral basis and a right to its own place in life, is bound to be more or less tragic. It is the struggle between two claims, the destruction of either of which would bring ruin to ethical life. Curiously enough, it is almost exactly this contradiction which is the tragedy set forth by the Greek dramatist, who asserted that the gods who watch over the sanctity of the family bond must yield to the claims of the gods of the state. The failure to recognize the social claim as legitimate causes the trouble; the suspicion constantly remains that woman's public efforts are merely selfish and captious, and are not directed to the general good.[13]

If any suspicion remains regarding Addams' intentions for reconstruction of filial loyalty let us return again to her words:

> There came periods of reconstruction, during which the task is laid upon a passing generation, to enlarge the function and carry forward the ideal of a long-established institution....The family, like every other element of human life is susceptible of progress, and from epoch to epoch its tendencies and aspirations are enlarged, although its duties can never be abrogated and its obligations can never be

> cancelled....The family in its various members together must recognize and acknowledge the validity of the social obligation.[14]

And surely, as the final sentences above indicate, Addams did not speak exclusively to the problem of the woman viz. filial loyalty; and if one continues to believe that even this is speculation, on the page following the above passages, she provides the example of St. Francis Assisi in similar conflict with his father:

> Such glimpses remind us of that tragedy enacted centuries ago in Assisi when the eager young noble cast his very clothing at his father's feet, dramatically renouncing his filial allegiance, and formally subjecting the narrow family claim to the wider and more universal duty. All conflict of tragedy ensued which might have been averted, had the father recognized the higher claim, and had he been willing to subordinate and adjust his own claim to it.[15]

My point was that although Addams' ideal community was not clearly defined in her writings, it "was quite similar to the Social Gospel concept of the Brotherhood of Man." And for this new ideal community she "rejected the family as the primary object of loyalty. Filial loyalty was too narrow and selfish," thus "family claims on its individual's loyalty would have to be significantly altered in order to develop the ideal community." I concluded that Addams believed "men must devote themselves to the largest possible social unit and develop a sense of 'cosmic patriotism'." As supporting evidence for this point I quoted Addams' statement: "Our democracy is making in-roads upon the family, the oldest of human institutions, and a claim is being advanced which in a certain sense is larger than the family claim."[16] It should be relatively easy for the reader to judge which critic has abused the context of Addams' words.

There is one factual point in Ravitch's review which is correct. As she finds, footnote no. 22 in my essay incorrectly refers the reader to page 141 of Addams' The Spirit of Youth in The City Streets.[17] The correct pagination should be 141-147. Even here, however, Ravitch draws an incorrect inference from my error. What I was trying to indicate with this reference was that there were certain aspects of immigrant cultures which required some modification if the immigrant's ethnic loyalty was not to conflict with the larger social loyalty she desired. Ravitch argues that I sought to use this citation to support a contention that Addams wished to strip the immigrants of their cultural identity. Of course, citation no. 22

would not support such a conclusion. Although there is evidence in reference nos. 29, 30, and 31 to support that inference, the question of whether or to what degree Addams desired to "strip" immigrants of their cultural identity is complex and not nearly as clear cut as I had thought when the essay was written.[18] There is clear evidence in the above noted citations that, in these instances, she was arguing that immigrants were excellent building blocks for the new society because of the relative ease with which they could be brought to the simplest common elements of humanity. Nevertheless, it is equally clear from the larger corpus of her work that Jane Addams was not a simple anglo-conformity Americanizer, that she did value certain aspects of immigrant culture, especially when those aspects were congruent with the values she saw necessary for the new social idea. My present view on this question emphasizes this later emphasis in Addams' thought.[19]

Much less complex is Addams' position regarding workers and industrial conflict. The issue becomes somewhat murky in Ravitch's review. After analyzing Addams' discussion of her Hull House exhibit depicting the historical evolution of spinning wheels in which she argued that the worker should understand that industrial evolution was orderly and peaceful throughout history, I argued that Addams was so concerned to develop a social ideal free of conflict that even living in the midst of the Haymarket riots she "proposed to teach the worker that even when his situation was desperate, industrial conflict was not necessary."[20] Ravitch's response to the term conflict is vitriolic, "This is an extreme distortion of both what she wrote and what she meant. Addams expressed the wish that strikes could proceed without violence because she believed that violence turns public opinion against the workers.... Clearly, it was not industrial conflict she opposed, but violence....While her pacifism may have been naive, it was sincere and not just a tactic to disarm the proletariat."[21]

There are several issues embedded in Ravitch's charge which deserve to be unpacked and individually examined. First, Ravitch's pronouncement of Addams' naive pacifism should not be allowed to stand unchallenged. This is a tactic all too often used by those who think they are defending the good reputation of early Progressive leaders. When a problematic aspect of a Progressive's thought surfaces it is dismissed with the notation that it resulted from naivety, lack of understanding, or some other judgment which portrays the Progressive as less adept than she or he otherwise might have been judged. With this line of defense one can well imagine these historical actors asking to be left to their "enemies" and saved from their "friends." In fairness to the dead, historians should take their ideas and proposals seriously. Jane Addams' pacifism was not naive, rather it was a significant aspect of her social philosophy and a cornerstone of her new social ideal. Collective association required peace, order and absence of conflict.

Secondly, Ravitch's disclaimer that Addams' pacifism was not just a tactic to disarm the proletariat is interesting but diversionary. She apparently believes that my essay posed Addams as a disingenuous friend of the workers and a proponent of the interests of capital. If so, then she has confused my analysis. Explicit in the entire essay is the understanding that Addams' work contains no deliberately hidden meanings: Addams, like most of the early Progressives, was proud of her efforts and made every effort to explain them fully and forthrightly. Moreover, there is no hint that she wished to favor capital over labor. Her sincerity was unquestioned. She sincerely wished to avoid conflict.

The third and most important issue raised by Ravitch's charge relates to Addams' position on industrial conflict. Ravitch attempts to distinguish between conflict and violence. This distinction seems odd when it is remembered that I used the term "conflict" to distinguish a condition which was not peaceful and orderly. Most usual connotations of these words would indicate that this usage was not outlandish. Ravitch, however, insists on the distinction because Addams was hostile to violent strikes. Somehow, according to Ravitch, the fact that Addams rejected violent strikes renders my judgment that she urged against conflict an "extreme distortion" of Addams' words and meanings. She seems to imply that what Addams really meant was that industrial conflict and strikes were acceptable to the new social ideal except in those cases where violence occurred. One can make such a distinction only at the risk of constructing an abstraction innocent of American labor history. It is the case that during the time Addams' wrote her most significant work "orderly" industrial conflict and "peaceful" strikes were indeed a rarity. Industrial conflict and strikes were nearly synonymous with violence. One generally accepted history of industrial relations during the Progressive era characterizes the mood thusly.

> A dominant motif emerged from the numerous and apparent diverse strikes investigated by the Commission. In conflict after conflict, either one or both sides struck a posture of unyielding obduracy which produced open violence. Regardless of cause, geographic location, type of industry, or ethnic grouping, turbulence in industrial relations flared all over the United States. On labor's side, native Americans

> as well as immigrants plunged into the battle. Many management leaders of old American stock willingly employed the tactics of war. Industrialization had outdistanced American social attitudes and institutions. In many cases this led to a collapse of civil authority, to near-anarchy, and to military rule.[22]

Ravitch's charge seems little more than a bit of linguistic hairsplitting which can be sustained only by ignoring the known history of Addams' time.

Ravitch concludes her critique of my work with the objection that, "Perhaps Violas' most outrageous misrepresentation is his suggestion that Addams presaged fascism."[23] Once again, however, Ravitch misconstrues what I wrote. I did not say that Addams' calls for mass demonstrations, utilization of national holidays, street processions, martial music and the mass expression of emotion through symbols to mobilize collective spirit and action either "presaged fascism" or was an "expression of incipient totalitarianism" as Ravitch suggests. I simply said that such expressions "reverberates through the charred corridors of the twentieth century with deafening resonance."[24] If Diana Ravitch is deaf to that reasonance then one can only suggest that she examine the mass gatherings at Neuremburg in the thirties, the utilization of emotional expression of symbols by Josef Geobbles, the May Day Celebrations in the USSR and Havana, The Red Guard outbursts in Peking, or the quasi-religious utilization of mass gatherings at professional football games by American warplanners during the late 1960's and early 1970's. It is indeed unfortunate that her historic memory is so short or perhaps selectively sanitized. It is difficult to believe that any fair minded scholar could read pages 95-100 in Addams' The Spirit of Youth in the City Streets and fail to hear the resonance.[25]

Several factors seem to emerge from the above examinations of the charges leveled by Diane Ravitch. First, they are at best problematic. Most seem based on Ravitch's misconstruing either the author's analysis or the primary sources and her willingness to overlook the known historical facts of the era under investigation. Second, the tone of Ravitch's charges seems directed more to an attack on the personal integrity and scholarly abilities of the authors she indites rather than to the advancement of an intellectual dialogue. Moreover, this tone is all too prevading in her review. More than simply strident and polemic, it is often vicious and demeaning. Through both publications one finds phrases like "slipshod research," "outrageous fabrication," "extreme distortion," and implied as well as explicit suggestions that an author has deliberately distorted meanings by abusing the contextual character of selected quotes. Such charges are not normally part of a scholarly dialogue, even when they could be substantiated.

When such charges are leveled in publications as prestigious as the Proceedings of the National Academy of Education the editors usually exercise the responsibility to verify their validity and, at the very least, offer those attacked the invitation to respond. Moreover, one can only speculate on the career damage inflicted on those attacked in this manner. It should be remembered that in today's hectic academic world, Deans and other university administrators who have considerable impact in areas of hiring, promotion and salary increments often do not have the time to follow scholarly research in all areas. They frequently rely on prestige indicators such as the National Academy of Education. When a respected scholarly organization like the Academy supports a research project and subsequently publishes the results in its Proceedings without comment and without speedy response, it is likely to have an effect. One is left to ponder why these scholarly courteousies were not observed in this case. While I am grateful for the present invitation, why did two years elapse before it was extended? And why did the invitation state that it was "following up on an invitation to 'rebut' proferred by the NAEd's then-president, Pat

Suppes?" The invitation I received on March 27, 1979 was the only invitation I have received from the Academy. One also wonders why all of the authors indicted by Ravitch were not extended an invitation at this time. Perhaps these questions can be explained as a clerical error or the notorious inefficiency of the U. S. mail. One would certainly hope this is the correct explanation.

FOOTNOTES

1 Diane Ravitch, "The Revisionists Revised," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Education*, Vol. 4, 1977, pp. 1-84.

2 Diane Ravitch, *The Revisionists Revised* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

3 Paul C. Violas, "Jane Addams and the New Liberalism," In Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, *Roots of Crisis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973) pp. 66-84.

4 Ravitch, *The Revisionists Revised*, p. 131. Subsequent references to Ravitch will be from this book as it probably represents her more refined position.

5 *Ibid*.

6 Violas, "Jane Addams" pp. 70-71.

7 Ravitch, p. 131.

8 Ravitch, p. 132.

9 Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 72.

10 Ravitch, pp. 131-132.

11 Jane Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1964; orig. 1902) pp. 77-78.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 80.

16 Violas, "Jane Addams" pp. 71-72.

17 Ravitch, p. 132.

18 Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 73.

19 See e.g.: Paul C. Violas, *The Training of the Urban Working Class* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1978) pp. 42, 46, 52-53, 87-88.

20 Violas, "Jane Addams" pp. 77-78.

21 Ravitch, pp. 133-134.

22 Graham Adams, Jr., *Age of Industrial Violence 1910-1915*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) p. 228.

23 Ravitch, p. 134.

24 Violas, "Jane Addams" p. 81.

25 Jane Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Ill. Press, 1972; orig. 1909).

BOOK REVIEW*

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An Overview of Evaluation

Encyclopedia of Educational Evaluation, by Scarvia Anderson, Samuel Ball, Richard T. Murphy, & Associates. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1976. xxiii + 515 pp. $17.95.

How should one go about evaluating an encyclopedic work on evaluation? After all, a book review is itself an evaluation, and presum-

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ably educational so it should either exemplify principles to be found in an encyclopedia, or serve as a counter-example to them, or as a demonstration of lack of comprehensive coverage. So one might do the review in the usual way one does a book review, as well as one can, and then check the encyclopedia to see if what one has just done is described there. If it _is_, one might receive hints as to how to improve the book review; if it is _not_, one would have either a counter-example or a demonstration of limitations on comprehensiveness. But this encyclopedia turns out not to have any reference in its topics or index to reviews, book reviews, or indeed books. Before breaking into tears, however, the old-fashioned reader should check under "materials evaluation" (4 pp.) and "product evaluation" (2 references). The "book" has become a "material product"; but, alas, not _much_ new besides a new name appears to have emerged.

Still, there is _something_ there -- an emphasis on the need to field-test books, and do serious cost analysis on them. One might infer that book reviews should be reviews of field-test results and of cost analysis data. But just how does one design the field-test? That is not discussed, and is far from obvious. Nevertheless, in the spirit of a new discipline, we shall attempt to make this review more of a "product evaluation" than is usual.

If the review should benefit from the book reviewed, so too should the book itself. Does the encyclopedia take its own advice, i.e. was it developed in such a way as to meet the standards that it lays down for a high score by an educational product? Looking at the introduction, however, we find no reference to any field tests of this product. And as far as cost is concerned, we find that the Office of Naval Research (ONR) provided all development funds, which of course makes the price excessive. So the book is not exactly a paradigm of its suggested practices.

At the metalevel, one might ask whether this review has been field-tested and costed. The answer is also negative, but then the little fleas that bite the big fleas are a bit less expensive to feed and perhaps one shouldn't expect so much of them. The vast resources of the Navy were not available -- nor even the fairly vast resources of ETS. The book is in fact an ETS tour de force, written almost entirely by the staff there. It must certainly be a help in working up contracts to be able to make a presentation to the client of the only encyclopedia in the discipline of educational evaluation and say -- As you can see, we wrote the book. But the claim is a little risky and it might have been better to make the more modest claim -- We wrote a book. And not, as we have already seen, a book that practices all that it preaches. Of course, that doesn't mean there aren't many good things in it, and it's appropriate to say at the outset of this review that this book is indeed a very valuable compendium of practice and principle, and fare more useful than any other single reference in the field.

The discussion of whether it meets its own standards is not just nit-picking. It is a matter of the greatest importance whether texts and references on educational evaluation show that what they say applies to themselves, because it gives us a chance to see whether the authors have realized exactly what kind of subject evaluation is. The failure of this particular work to even think of applying to itself the standards of field-testing and cost analysis that it lays down as the appropriate standards for educational materials is not just quaint, it is typical of the model of evaluation that underlies the book as a whole. Notice that we are not here talking about the failure of the book to evaluate itself. Of course, evaluators should be expected to be evaluating themselves; but they should also be expecting to be extremely skeptical about the objectivity of such evaluations, and they might well argue against putting them in print. Let the "external evaluators" (reviewers) do that job, they might say. And so we shall. But it is another matter to fail to follow the practices that one defines as correct. This is just like a book on typography failing to observe the typographical principle that the type depth on facing pages should not differ in number of lines. It's true that field testing an encyclopedia is a pretty serious kind of effort, but when ONR is paying the bill it might well be argued that this presents an unusual opportunity to do something according to the rules. In particular, one would hope to find that internal inconsistencies (of claims and vocabulary) were picked up in this way, something that it's hard to avoid in a multi-author work. As we'll see, that is not avoided.

Education is taxonomically an applied social science, to the extent that it's a science at all; and it is indeed a science because science is defined by methods used and the goals toward which those methods are bent, not by the existence of large bodies of precise quantitative results expressed in relatively technical lanaguage and formal theories. But education, like the social sciences on which it has too long depended for methodological exemplars, has been very lax about any recognition of its self-referent nature. Just as the social sciences talked a great deal about the validity and reliability of instruments (including judges), but never applied those standards to the procedures whereby they distributed research funding to themselves (panels of judges), so education has talked at great length about the validity, and reliability of educational tests and measurements, but almost never applied these standards to the testing and measuring process used on educational institutions or practitioners, either in the form of the accreditation process or in the examination and certification (or tenuring) of faculty members. It's encouraging that the work under review here (which we'll abbreviate as E3) does discuss accreditation (pages 4-7), which is more than one can say of the fourth (current) edition of The Encyclopedia of Educational Research. However, it is tragic that the discussion of accreditation nowhere makes the point that accreditation practices violate the simplest requirement on test validity i.e. that they should directly check or indirectly document a connection with criterion behavior. That the accreditation of educational institutions should never look at whether the educational institutions taught anybody anything worthwhile is one of the great scandals of education as a practice and as a discipline. As a scandal of practice it is not unusual in the professions, corresponding quite closely to the remarkable failure of e.g. the American Medical Association to censure or disbar those of its practitioners that have flagrantly violated its professed standards. But the failure of education as a discipline to recognize the intellectual lacuna between its espoused standards and its actual practices is not only a different scandal but a worse one because it takes consideraly less effort to see a problem than to fix it in practice.

In E3, if we work our way through the *index references* *to* -- rather than *the article on* -- accreditation, we finally do find occasional passing references to the connection between competency-based, performance-based, and criterion-referenced approaches to teacher certification. However, it's Sam Ball who is picking up these problems, and Richard Murphy who didn't see them in the accreditation article, so we are running into one of the consistency problems with the book. And even Sam Ball only touches on these points, never states them clearly, and doesn't mention any of the half dozen other problems with accreditation (e.g. untested reliability, censorship of results, selection of biased judges, inconsistent official standards, no cost and comparative data, biased data collection process). So there is a major problem with E3 that one might describe as characteristic of many emerging disciplines, a blithe lack of self-consciousness that leads to a lack of intellectual coherence and comprehensiveness.

Now, ignoring the self-reference approach, there is a rather different way to go in doing this review. If one happens to believe in a certain general model of evaluation, as a competent reviewer would be likely to do, one might approach the task of reviewing an evaluation encyclopedia as an opportunity to apply that model, even if the result is not a typical book review. The particular "model" (using that term in the current sloppy way to refer to any favorite account of the real or the ideal) which I espouse involves one component that presented special difficulty for the present task. This ("checklist") model lays great emphasis on the importance of judiciously selected comparisons between what is being evaluated and other similar entities; but since this happens to be the first attempt at an alphabetically organized evaluation encyclopedia (by contrast with a collection of articles), there is an obvious problem about where to find the competitors. Although there are some quasi-competitors that can be created by making up a list of selections from available texts, and a two-volume anthology aimed at social service program evaluation, these hardly seemed sufficiently specific competition for a real encyclopedia. There seemed to be no alternative to the somewhat onerous task of creating a competitor, and then running some field tests between the two. Pause for a few years, and apologies for the delay with this review.

It seemed important not to look at the entries in E3 before making up the first entry list for an alternative reference work, since one might learn something interesting about the general orientation of E3 by comparing independently developed entry lists. (And one could still review both lists in order to come up with a "best shot" list.) It also seemed important to try for something *much* less expensive even if somewhat less comprehensive, because the most powerful competition for expensive products is usually from inexpensive ones where the cost difference offsets some loss of coverage.

So, a month or two after accepting this review I wrote (with help from Jane Roth) and published a little booklet called *Evaluation Thesaurus (ET)*, (Edgepress. $2.50, now out-of-print, second edition in press), doing the "needs assessment" for entries directly on students and practitioners and without study of E3. The idea was less to provide a text than a map of the territory. The results of "field-testing" by several hundred users, many of whom also owned E3 and were asked to compare, were interesting in that they produced relatively few suggestions for additional entries in ET, despite the considerable mismatch between the two tables of contents and the large number of culpable omissions. This raises serious questions about how to design the field-test. It makes clear that relatively casual field-testing is not a good basis on which to build the development or evaluation of good materials. (By "relatively casual" I mean field-testing in which the users are a) well qualified in the field, and b) strongly encouraged to identify omissions (errors, etc.) and provided with rewards for so doing.) What kind of field-testing should one use in materials development? We turn to E3 for an answer, but we find no listing for "field testing" in the index although the term in fact occurs in the article on materials evaluation. Elsewhere in that article one encounters the cognomen "verification procedures" for essentially the same process; but the index yields no other elaboration under this heading. Well, given the failure of "casual field-testing", in this case, and the absence of enlighenment from E3, it is perhaps worth mentioning that an occasionally more useful procedure would involve task analysis of field workers to see exactly what terms they a) use b) need to look up or ask about. This would be an observation-intensive effort, but would provide us with a rather solid basis for talking about what an encyclopedia needs to contain; of course, the observations or workers (and their supervisors) would have to be combined with a critical appraisal of their reports and prsentations. The absence of any kind of discussion of the pragmatics of field-testing, or even what it means (which ET covers under the heading of "learner verification", Komoski's term which certainly deserves an entry since it is incorporated in state law here and there) points to a general shortcoming of the encyclopedia with respect to evaluation-specific practice. While E3 is quite good on the tests and measurement activities that come into evaluation practice, these are not evaluation-specific. Learner verification is much more evaluation-specific, indeed it is essentially one validity check on an evaluative conclusion. Well, it was only the publisher's brochure that said that E3 would provide you with "everything you need to know about educational evaluation"; the authors make no such claim, and it should be clear by now that it would be very implausible for anybody to make any such claim. E3 or ET will serve significantly different needs, and that's no basis for severe criticism in itself. It's the specific omissions and their number that will matter.

So it is worth exploring the extent of this difference somwhat further; we will uncover some examples that clarify the kind of difference in orientation at which we have already hinted, and we will also uncover -- I believe -- some examples of failure by both reference books to cover the essential minimum. In considering the nature and adequacy of coverage of E3, therefore, it may be of interest to list the non-overlapping entries. First, the items unique to E3: the ones asterisked are those which seem clearly to earn their place, and represent culpable omissions from ET. The others have a place somewhere; the ones that refer to education sub-areas (e.g. compensatory education) should be in an encyclopedia (and not in a thesaurus), the ones that refer to testing etc.

may be regarded as options, whose presence has to be justified against the competing claims of the absentees which we'll list in a moment.

*Accountability
Achievement Test Construction
*Assessment
Attenuation
Attitudes
Baseline Measures
Case-Study Method
*Certification
Change Measurement
Cognitive Variables
Commonality Analysis
Compensatory Education
Component Variables
Composite Variables
Confidentiality of Data
*Content Analysis
Correlation
Cross-Sectional Study
Culture-Fair Test
Curriculum Evaluation
Data Preparation
Data Sources
Decision-Making Typology
Design of Evaluation
Equivalent Scores
Evaluation History
*Evaluator Role
Expectancy Tables
Experimental Design
Factor Analysis
Field Operations
*"Hard" and "Soft" -- Shibboleths in Evaluation
Hypothesis Testing
*Independence
Institutional Evaluation
Intelligence Measurement
Interest Measurement
Interviews
Ipsative Measures
Item Sampling
Johnson-Neyman Technique
Longitudinal Study
Lord's Paradox
*Materials Evaluation
Medical Model of Evaluation
Motivation
Multivariate Analysis

Nonparametric Statistics
Observation Techniques
Path Analysis
Planning and Priorities
*Politics of Evaluation
Posttest
Practical Effect
Pretest
Projective Tests
*Quality Control
Questionnaires
*Ratings
*Replication
Response Sets
Sampling
Scales
Scientific Inquiry and Evaluation
Score Types
*Simulation
Site Selection
Situational Tests
Social Indicators
Socioeconomic Status (SES)
*Staff Evaluation
Statistical Analysis
Statistical Inference
Statistics
Survey Methods
Taxonomies of Objectives
Test Anxiety
*Tests
Test Selection
Test Wiseness
Time-Series Analysis
Training Evaluation
Training of Evaluators
Trait-Treatment Interaction
*Transactional Evaluation
*Values Measurement

(Total: 86, 17 asterisked)

It's clear that a number of these, besides those asterisked, should certainly be in any comprehensive reference work and I'll add them to the second edition of ET. Right now, I place them in evidence as grounds for the claim that I did not cheat, or at least, not very well. Now let's look at the list of items unique to ET in the same sense that not only are they not article headings but also that they are missing from the index, whereas they are in ET. I've asterisked the ones I think should be in E3, given its general thrust: I think only a very few of these asterisks are idiosyncratic.

*Achievement vs. Aptitude
*Actors
*Advocate Teams Approach
*Artifact
*Audience (in Stake's sense)
Balance of Power
Basic Checklist
Bi-Modal Distribution
*Budget
*Central Tendency
*Checklist Approach
*CIPP
*Client
CMI
*Consumer
*Conflict of Interest
*Connoisseur Model
Consonance/Dissonance
Consumer-Based
*Contract Types
*Correction for Guessing
*Cost-Free Evaluation
*Cost Plus
*Credibility
Critical Competitors
*Critical Incident Technique
Decile
Descriptive Statistics
*Diffusion
*Dispersion
Dissonance
*Domain Referenced Testing
Dumping
*Educational Significance
Enjoyment

Environmental Impact Report
Evaluand
Evaluee
*Explanation (vs. Evaluation)
Experimental Group
*External (Evaluator)
External Validity
*Fault Tree Analysis or Cause Tree Analysis
Field Initiated
*Field Trial (or Test)
Flow Chart
Frames
Fugitive Document
Funding
Hierarchical System
Hypercognitive
*Illuminative Evaluation
*Impacted Population
*Indicator
Inferential Statistics
*Internal (Evaluator)
Internal Validity
*Interrupted Time Series
*Learner Verification
*Level of Effort
Locus of Control
Man Years
*Market
*Meta Evaluation
Mission Budgeting
*Modus Operandi Method
*Monitoring
Multiple Tier
Normal Distribution
*Opportunity Costs
Pad
*Pareto Optimal
(not in index, but in text)
Parkinson's Law
Percentile
Perfectionism
Person Years
Perspectival Evaluation
Point of Entry
Population
Press Releases
Programmed Text
Pseudo-Positive Effect
R & D
*R D D & E
Random
Rationalization
*Relativism/Subjectivism
*Research

Rorschach Effect
Scope of Work
Semi-Interquartile Range
Sole Source
*Stratification
Strengths Assessment
Supercognitive
*Synthesis
TA (technical assistance)
*Teaching to the Test
Technology Assessment
Terror
Testing to the Teaching
Therapeutic Role of the Evaluator
Time Management
Triangulation
Two Tier System
Why Deny
Wired

(Total: 108, 47 asterisked)

The topics common to both sources, with asterisks for the most important evaluation-specific items, are:

*Accreditation
*Adversary Model of Evaluation
*Affective Variables
*Audit of Evaluation
*Bias in Testing
*Causation
Ceiling Effect
Cognitive Styles
Cohort
Competency-Based Education/Training
Computer-Assisted Instruction
Control Group
*Cost Considerations
*Criterion-Referenced Measurements
*Delphi Technique
*Discrepancy Evaluation
Evaluation Results

*Evaluation Concepts
Ex Post Facto Design
Experimental Design
Fade-Out/Fading
Follow-up
*Formative Evaluation
*Goal-Free Evaluation
*Goals and Objectives
Grade-Equivalent Scores
*Grades/Grading
*Halo Effect
*Hawthorne Effect
Interaction
*Job Analysis
*John Henry Effect
Mastery Learning
Matched Sampling
Mean, Median, Mode
*Model
*Needs Assessment
Norms
Performance Contracting
Placebo
*Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)
*Progress Evaluation
Product
*Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT)
Pyschomotor Variables
*Quasi-Experimental Design
*Ranking
Raw Scores
*Reactive Effects of Program and Evaluation
Regression
*Reliability
*Request for Proposal (RFP)
*Secondary Evaluation
*Side Effects
Standard Deviation
*Standardized Tests
*Standards
*Statistical Significance
*Systems Analysis
*True Experiment
Treatment Measurement
*Unobtrusive Measures
*Validity
Variables
Variance

(Total: 68, 39 asterisked)

Then there's the most interesting list of all -- the terms we all forgot like "implementation" (not in the index of E3, though there's a casual reference in the text, p. 381) and "ethical evaluation", evaluability, apportionment, and so on (additional suggestions are welcomed.) Hard to add up that list!

In addition, ET has a glossary of acronyms referring to organizations (e.g. ETS) and processes (e.g. PPBS) that are likely to be obscure to readers of evaluation literature. ET being only a thesaurus, it does not list topics or problems in evaluation which would require a long article to cover; it's just a concept map. (There's an exception or two, like Needs Assessment which seemed to need it.)

It's obvious that E3 is more of a basic text in "tests and measurements," statistics and experimental design, than ET; and ET is more of a glossary than E3. The E3 index does not usually identify the page where a term is defined, so it can be a very slow process to find a definition from it. And the book's designer made the egregious blunder of putting the page numbers on the spine end of the header line both recto and verso, making it difficult to see them when blipping through the book hunting a particular page. ET is about 10% of the length of E3 and about 10% of the price (excluding postage etc.). It probably cost the taxpayers between

1% and .1% as much. None of these facts or estimates has very obvious evaluative implications. They simply contribute to a general perspective from which some conclusions will follow with respect to some questions of interest.

At this point it should be noted that E3 has a subtitle, not that it's on the cover or jacket; "Concepts & Techniques for Evaluating Education and Training Programs". Since such programs involve educational products and personnel and plans and proposals, not much is excluded from the scope of E3. But as you look at the exclusive-entry lists above, you will probably notice that ET is -- perhaps surprisingly -- more thorough on the contract/proposal side than E3, despite ETS' major role as an evaluation contractor. One might argue either way on this. For inclusion of such material, one might argue that it is historically a product of Federal and State contracts and any particular evaluator must know that scene. But one might also argue that history and context should not be confused with the discipline itself. Resolution of the issue depends on a decision about what the needs are and hence where the maximum utility value for such a book lies. E3 is aimed more at amateurs in evaluation that ET is -- and that's something to understand in weighing its nature and worth. It has a very useful front-matter table called "classification of the articles" (e.g. Evaluation Models, Social Context of Evaluation) which serves as a guide to the jungle for a novice or student. And when one studies that classification, a general feature of E3 stands out very clearly. Most of it is about educational measurement, not about evaluation. And that, I think, is a basic flaw in the work, though not by any means a fatal one. It's hardly surprising that ETS should have this emphasis in their encyclopedia, given the nature of their organization. Nor is it entirely misleading with respect to the modal practice of evaluation today; for it is still generally thought of as an area for the application of "T&M" or more generally as an area for the traditional social science techniques.

But this is nonetheless a truly fundamental misconception of evaluation, and one that is no longer excusable. Evaluation -- in the sense relevant to this book -- is the systematic and objective determination of the worth, merit or value of something (in this case, something of interest to education). It is not essentially -- though it is often -- judgmental, contrary to the claim on page 136. It is not restricted to program evaluation, contrary to the assumption throughout the book -- and explicit in the article on Evaluation Concepts. It does not exclude ethics (i.e. ethical evaluation), though that term and its cognates are totally absent from E3. Such an exclusion is a typical result of trying to get to evaluation from a background of value-free social science methodology. You can't get here from there. How can you evaluate educational programs without looking at personnel policies, and how to evaluate personnel policies without considering whether they are just? Even in the standard context of federal and state programs, affirmative action must be considered, not just for its legal but also for its moral application; the same applies to any program relating to segregation; or mainstreaming; or student disciplinary procedures; or student grading & testing. (It is not irrelevant to this point that the language of E3 is totally and unnecessarily sexist.)

Even if one is unwilling to accept the idea that there can be any such thing as objective ethical evaluation -- and, tragically, that would be the reaction of nearly everyone trained in social science disciplines in this country -- one can hardly excuse the huge gap in E3 that should have been filled by serious consideration of the other aspects of personnel evaluation. It's amusing that the term "teacher ratings" occurs in the index, but only to mean "ratings by teachers." However, the index is at fault. There is a sentence or two on teacher evaluation on page 381 in an article on staff evaluation. But it's just a mention of some data-types that are often collected, without even a comment on their limited validity, available instruments, etc. There's nothing at all on administrator evaluation (except for the advice that one should check on administrators' effectiveness in implementing whatever program is being evaluated.) And, although most of the book is about evaluating student performance, there's essentially nothing on evaluating students, a very different matter but the key one with respect to admissions, employment etc. (Nothing at all in the index, but a mention on p. 188). This is surprising (though traditional) since the whole social psychology literature on person perception is so obviously relevant. The only recognition of even one part of that fact is in the article on the halo effect. Similarly, the evaluation of evaluators, contractors, panels, plans and proposals is omitted but surely of continual and great importance in the evaluation of educational programs.

The question is, of course, not how can you do everything in 500 or so pages, but what needs to be done most in an encyclopedia. This encyclopedia does a good deal, but much of what it does is not specific to educational evaluation and it leaves out a great deal that is specific and important.

The conceptual foundations of the E3 approach have other flaws. "The primary purpose of evaluating an education or training program is to provide information for decisions about the program" (p. 136). This was of course the key thesis and error of the mighty famous PDK study (Stufflebeam et al.) and completely omits what is quite often the "primary purpose" of an evaluation, namely retrospective accountability; the investigation of a past program for malfeasance, malpractice, exemplary methodology or simple historical merit, from none of which will come any decisions about the program (unless judgments are defined as decisions which makes the quoted remark wholly trivial.)

The E3 article on accountability is somewhat unclear, but the author certainly fails to realize that it contradicts the definition of the senior author just quoted. Making decisions about "the program" is not the same as making decisions about future, other, past, or similar programs, about the government in power at the time, about the public attitude towards drugs or the handicapped etc. But all of these are legitimate aims of evaluation studies of one kind or another, and not (I feel) to be dismissed as secondary aims of evaluation.

As might be expected, in a work with a strong empiricist orientation, the problem of conceptualizing attitudes -- because they include and are sometimes defined as values gets the authors into some difficulties. The problem for empiricists in general is that they want (a) to avoid defining attitudes as internal states (because they favor behaviorism); (b) to deny that attitudes have cognitive content (because if they did, they could be right or wrong which would mean science could determine their validity which would require abandoning the valuefree doctrine.) However, both positions are contrary to common sense since (a) values/attitudes are internal states (sets) that cause behavior, not the behavior itself, (b) some values/attitudes are simply incorrect e.g. a dean valuing an assessment of teaching done by a classroom visitor over the assessment of the same teacher done by students in that class is in general wrong. The phrases "bad attitude" or "wrong attitude" are thus not logical blunders, though often carelessly applied. But E3 defines attitude as a response while also saying it's internal and not directly observable (pages 32-33); and defines it as either positive or negative, which takes attitudes out of the 'right-or-wrong' category and is also clearly false of "neutral attitudes", "wait-and-see attitudes", "cautious attitudes" and indeed the "scientific attitude."

The discussion of measurement approaches to attitudes is inevitably muddled; many of the items are simply factual not attitudinal ("My teacher is often too busy when I need help" (p.36)) and the inevitable question is why these are different from cognitive test items, apart from the logically irrelevant facts that they are not about the usual curriculum content areas, and that there is (presumably) no single correct answer for all teacher-student pairs. In the case of many so-called attitude scales, the items may indeed *have* a single *correct* answer, though the proposed answers are quite *controversial* e.g. "Teachers and students should jointly reach consensus on a code of conduct" (p. 36). At a given school and grade level, the correct answer may be, yes. Does one want to talk about *attitudes* towards what may be matters of fact? That sits quite well for me, but is not typical of behaviorists; and the behaviorist-empiricist side of the admittedly schizophrenic author of the Attitudes entry surfaces repeatedly. For instance, in the example of a Semantic Differential instrument whose stem reads: "...Put a check on the (scale) that indicates how you feel about that country...there are no right or wrong answers...", the particular example given belies this stem; the respondent is asked to locate Australia on the small to large spectrum. Anyone who located Australia -- a continent -- at the small end of the spectrum would be simply wrong. What does this do to the author's definition, which requires that an attitude "possess evaluative properties"? Is one *evaluating* Australia in asserting that it's a large country? Not if there's to be any difference at all between evaluation and "mere" description. Not if the author's explication of evaluation as involving a positive or negative element is to be salvaged; there's nothing intrinsically positive or negative about a judgment of size. The definition clearly doesn't cover the example of attitude measures given.

Since the same author (Sam Ball) wrote the Affective Variables entry, let's look at that related notion. It opens with the sentence: "Variables that refer to feelings or emotions are categorized as affective and are differentiated from Cognitive Variables (Knowing and Thinking) and Psychomotor Variables (movement)" (p. 23).

Later in that paragraph he says that attitudes have both affective and cognitive components. But that view is inconsistent with the definition of attitude in the Attitude entry, whose only possibly cognitive component is the evaluative one, defined as requiring either a positive or a negative element, i.e. on the model of a valence. But, as we have seen, not only is that false of many real attitudes and -- for different reasons -- of whatever is measured by the instruments given as examples in the Attitudes article, it is also false of cognitive statements in general and evaluative statements in particular. (One can say "There is no doubt Wagner is a great composer..." and go on to say "but he bores the hell out of me" or "and I guess he's my favorite" or "-- I just don't respond to him at all": there's no logical connection between the evaluation and the attitude.

These points are not just nits to pick about E3: they are deep difficulties with the whole taxonomy on which most psychological measurement -- and hence the testing component of evaluation -- rests. If the affective/cognitive distinction won't work or is very different from its usual portrayal, most explanations and theories about e.g. learning behavior are being incorrectly tested and may be radically incoherent.

Pursuing this general concern further, we soon find specific reasons for worry. "...what the student typically feels about himself" is given as an example of an affective variable; and as behavior (p. 23). But feelings aren't behavior, they are -- we would normally say, and as the same author said about attitudes -- inner states that produce it. The next remark is that "...with affective variables, there is little emphasis on the "correctness" of one response... with items assessing cognitive variables, there is usually a correct response." At least the claim is slightly qualified. But the example given refutes the point; someone who selects "Never or almost never" as a response to "I cry when I feel very happy" may be giving a precisely correct factual response. Not to put too fine a point on it, the author -- like most writers on this point -- simply fails to distinguish between the fact that there are many feelings which cannot be said to be right or wrong, whereas most beliefs can be so classified; and the fact that these feelings can sometimes be inferred from responses to items which can be said to be right or wrong, just as beliefs can. In short, a confusion of the logic with the science. Something we might call the homeopathic fallacy is involved in the view that only non-cognitive measures can be used to test for non-cognitive states; and hence in the view that "there's no correct answer" to the items in an affective instrument.

It is certainly true that there are validity and reliability problems with most affective measures, as stressed on p. 24. They can be significantly reduced, however, if one first clarifies the concepts themselves.

Given that E3 has now been out for some time, one might reasonably raise the question whether it has been significantly dated by recent developments in the evaluation field. That field is now so large and active that a single reviewer -- or at least this one -- cannot give a comprehensive answer. I will mention four areas that I happen to have seen develop, but I would add that none of them is viewed as so important by so many people as to have guaranteed their inclusion in E3 even if it had been written yesterday. But I think that mentioning them is an important part of understanding the scope and limitations of E3 in 1980.

The first is the Evaluation Standards project, funded by NSF and Lilly and directed by Dan Stufflebeam of the Evaluation Center at Western Michigan; this is about due for release of a final report and provides a very useful first cut at a set of comprehensible and reasonable standards for an evaluation, coming from a committee representing many professional associations with both client and performer interests in evaluation. In the Evaluation Concepts article, a simpler checklist of merits/requirements in an evaluation is listed. The Standards enhance this considerably.

The second is the apportionment issue, which involves attacking a real-life problem for decision-makers -- that of apportioning resources across competing programs (or staff) -- for which the usual evaluative conclusions about the candidates (i.e. judgments of their relative or absolute worth or merit) are not enough to imply a solution. Some steps toward a general treatment are now available in the 1978-79 issues of Evaluation News.

The third topic concerns some refinements of the formative/summative classification of evaluations or evaluator roles, to which several valuable articles are devoted in E3. These refinements include three suggestions. First, it seems useful to recognize that the formative evaluator has a useful role to play even before the project begins, e.g. in discussing evaluability, getting baseline data, evaluating program plans, hiring staff, and planning program evaluation. It may be useful to call this pre-formative evaluation or just add it to the duties of the formative evaluator. Logically speaking, it is just formative evaluation of the plans for the project; but we can call it pre-formative evaluation of the project. Second, it seems important to distinguish between two types of evaluation report, whether formative or summative; but the distinction is especially important for formative. This distinction is distantly related to the distinction in E3 between what Sam Messick calls the engineering and the medical models of evaluation (p. 245), but those names are very inappropriate and there are other problems with that distinction, as we'll see in a moment.

Suppose that we are trying to evaluate something -- it might be a program, a product, a performance, or a person; let's call whatever it is the evaluand. The evaluation which we finally submit may be reported in two ways -- holistically or analytically. Student compositions, for example (and it's the example from which we borrow the terminology, with thanks to another ETS staffer, Paul Diederich), can be very effectively evaluated holistically i.e. by having the judges form an overall impression of quality, without allocating points for grammar, spelling, structure, ideas etc. The analytical approach, in control, would give the sub-scores on these dimensions of the performance, then weight and sum them for an overall score/grade. In program evaluation, evaluators (though not all administrators) usually do at least some analysis, frequently in terms of the performance of various components of, or contributors to, or aspects of the program. It increases the credibility and potential utility of the evaluation. But remember that -- as we have learned in the composition and clinical areas -- it may decrease the validity.

Now we must make a distinction between three kinds of analytical evaluation; dimensional analysis, causal analysis, and remedial analysis, although what we do may in practice not fall neatly into one of those categories. In dimensional analysis, we look at various dimensions or components of the evaluand's performance which together "add up to" the overall evaluation. And this leads to a certain kind of explanation of that overall evaluation -- but not a causal explanation. For example, we may evaluate color TV sets by rating them on color convergence, color fringing, color rendering etc. and hence we may explain why a particular brand ranked rather low by saying that, while it did well on absence of snow with weak signals, the basic cyan was rendered too yellow." Or "Jones won the decathalon because his track performances more than compensated for his relatively weak showing in the field events." Or "this school of education did badly because the curriculum is so out-of-date, though the facilities are excellent." From a dimensional analytic evaluation, one can always generate a kind of recipe for improvement -- but it will often be a very unhelpful one e.g. "Improve the quality of your ideas before doing your next essay."

Now there's also -- sometimes -- the possibility of providing a causal explanation of the overall performance. The TV set may perform poorly because it's using low-grade capacitors, or because of faulty feedback circuit design. Contrary to common supposition, that kind of explanation also may or may not lead to useful recommendations for improvement. If the cause of educational failure is brain damage or a small budget, no remediation may be (currently) possible. Causal analysis is not evaluation, it is explanation, though of course it is in this case explanation of an evaluation. Dimensional analysis is also not evaluation -- it is "factor analysis"; yet it, too, is a kind of dimensional explanation of an evaluation. But there's an important difference: dimensional analysis always refers to micro-evaluations (evaluations of performance along various dimensions, or of the performance of various components), whereas causal analysis often does not; it may refer to "deeper" causes, i.e. states, events, processes and properties which physically caused the overall performance, whatever the merit of that happens to be. The line isn't sharp because sometimes the "physical", or psychological, cause of trouble (or success) may happen to be one of the dimensions for the dimensional analysis; e.g. poor morale may both causally and formally explain why a program performed poorly. But program evaluators ideally shouldn't be using morale as a dimension of performance (though they often do) so it shouldn't show up in a formal explanation. It's a cause of bad performance, not in itself a bad performance since (a) it's an inner state, not a performance (b) it's not a pay-off dimension but a process dimension.

Of special interest in formative evaluation are factors which are (a) controllable and (b) directly linked to improvement in such a way that manipulating them in stateable ways produces gains without offsetting side-effects due to causal interactions. This subset may be identifiable from a complete causal account; or it may be determined without a complete causal account; or it may involve factors not mentioned in that account. It's a popular myth amongst educational researchers that we need the theory to get the remedies, whereas in fact we do not -- or aspirin wouldn't work -- and we may do better (in terms of social payoff, as opposed to intellectual pay-off) to hunt fixes without theory. In fact, we often find remedies which are not part of a causal account at all e.g. folk medicine, one-way collection of bridge tolls. The point is not that a causal account can't handle these phenomena; it is that a causal account neither suggests them nor is needed in order to get them. But, however we get them -- from a scientific theory, from superstitions, from luck or from systematic trial and error, these yield remedial analyses, by contrast with dimensional and causal analyses. And that is what we would like to be able to provide in formative evaluation. But we often cannot provide it. It does not follow that we cannot do formative evaluation. Even holistic mid-point evaluation -- and certainly dimensional analysis -- will be helpful because it will indicate the need for improvement, or the lack of it. Calling out scores after each shot, to someone on the pistol range, even if it gives them no remedies, does give them crucial evaluative feedback to guide their experimentation. So the classic identification of summative with holistic and formative with remedial is a serious oversimplification and not just semantically unfortunate; it handicaps the planning (and relating) of research and evaluation. The error is compounded by the assumption that remedial is a type of causal analysis.

A word must be added about the extreme importance of component analysis, where this is possible. It is an exceptionally powerful hybrid of dimensional, causal, and remedial and can only be illustrated here. Consider the evaluation of college teachers by students taking their courses. One can in this case break out the teaching task into components; the catalog description, the text, the class notes, the tests, the grades, the advising, the class discussions, the sections, the labs, etc. The sum of the performances on these things -- perhaps with differential weighting -- is the performance on the course as a whole, which is the requirement for dimensional analysis. But it's also true that these are separate activities and hence causal factors in the overall performance. Finally, in the event of poor overall performance, component analysis will suggest non-trivial remedies. There are minor complications -- e.g. the organization of a course is not a component yet is a crucial factor; but they can be handled. Notice however that nothing fancy in the line of a "theory of teaching/learning" is involved; components are the simplest kind of causes. I developed a School Evaluation Profile for the San Francisco Schools Commission which does component analysis for the school site. The usual approaches to both tasks e.g. factor analysis are dimensional-analytic and hence much less easily tied to remediation.

The basic points here are that (a) one does not have to go through any kind of micro-account (dimensional analysis or causal analysis or remedial analysis) in order to reach a macro-evaluation. The latter may be achieved holistically -- sometimes with higher reliability. (b) Explaining and understanding why the evaluand performed at a certain evaluative level can be done in two quite different ways (dimensional and causal). (c) Neither way automatically generates useful recommendations. (d) Dimensional analysis always generates some recommendations for improvement -- though they may not be useful -- while causal analysis may not even do that. (e) Bare holistic evaluations can be extremely useful for the improvement process (just as causal analyses may not be useful). (f) If you don't have a sound macro-evaluation you can't tell whether you need a causal account or what to do with it if you had it.

Given this set of relationships it's time we went beyond pious remarks about the desirability of getting a complete causal account (e.g. p. 246) to the realization that such an account may be (a) unnecessary for or unlikely to produce significant improvement (b) impossible to get within our lifetime (c) ridiculously expensive. The decision whether formative or summative evaluation should be holistic or analytic, and if analytic, dimensional or causal or remedial, must be seen as a cost vs. possible-payoff decision, remembering that even a complete micro-causal account may not yield any constructive suggestions at all, supposing that we can get it. Research is good stuff, but it often takes a good deal of research to come up even with a holistic evaluation and if we carelessly suppose that we must have more than that to be formatively useful, we may steal funds from the macro-evaluation (which we wrongly identify as the summative evaluation) to do the micros, with the result that the macro is invalid and the micro therefore useless, even if we get it.

A fairly typical example of confusion about these points is on p. 408, in the article on Summative Evaluation: "The /summative evaluation7 study should also be sufficiently sophisticated to allow the evaluator to point to the program features that seemed to influence success or failure. That is, good summative evaluation may well have formative implications". I would comment as follows. (a) The study should only be analytic in any sense if it can afford it without loss of adequate validity (b) If analytic, dimensional and not causal analysis is the most feasible way to go (c) If dimensional analysis is done, it will explain -- but only in one sense -- what "seemed to influence success or failure" from which we may learn a good deal, some of which might have "formative implications" for this project (d) The most important formative implications may require remedial analysis, which may increase the costs 1000 percent (e) The second sentence in the quote does not follow from the first; "Formative implications" exist even if a purely holistic study is done -- they are not the same as micro-level analyses.

It is hard for the traditional explanation-oriented researcher to understand that just as there is a respectable task of mere description and one of mere classification -- not just preliminaries to theory -- so there is mere (holistic) evaluation. Here's a quote from the Evaluation Concepts article: "It is difficult to conceive of a useful model for evaluation of education/teaching programs that is not multivariate in nature. Human behavior, including that exhibited in such programs, is complex and multiply determined" (p. 137). But it doesn't matter how complex it is unless you're hunting causal explanations; for holistic or even remedial evaluation, a single scale or factor is all you need. Models for evaluation are not models for complete causal accounts. And even if it were true that "evaluation results should be useful for program-important decisions, not just for decisions about continuation or termination" (p. 136), which it is not, this would not require causal analysis, since both dimensional analysis and remedial analysis can do that task. (In fact, so can holistic.)

Looking for generalizable causal explanations is what E3 calls evaluative research (p. 138), distinguishing this from Suchman's use which meant simply scientific rather than casual evaluation. One can make a case for either use; but the E3 use (alone) relegates dimensional and holistic investigations to the category of non-research, which seems prejudicial.

The preceding remarks are an attempt to give a positive alternative to much that is covered in the entries on Formative Evaluation, Summative Evaluation, Medical Model, Planning Priorities, Evaluation Concepts, and Evaluation Roles, as well as to update it.

The third aspect of formative/summative that has been developed slightly since E3 came out concerns the reactive function of evaluation. One might say that formative evaluation has two functions, one of which is independent of content. The mere fact that evaluation is being done will often have some effects on program operation. These effects may be good or bad. Hence in planning the use of formative evaluation a manager or monitor must try to make some allowance for the impact of the process quite apart from the impact of the content e.g.

any recommendations. This is no news to managers but reference to the distinction is missing from most texts' treatment of formative evaluation. E3 has a very good short article (Reactive Effects of Program and Evaluation) which sees the problem of Hawthorne-type effects and possible solutions like unobtrusive measures. What it does not do is go beyond these measurement-validity worries to the metaevaluation level, i.e. it does not recognize that part of the argument for doing evaluations is that -- valid or invalid -- they may be properly planned to have good effects. Cashing in on this phenomenon is pretty close to putting the original Hawthorne effect to work; it's totally different conceptually from cashing in on the effects of novelty, which is here said (p. 318) to be Martin Trow's way to use Hawthorne. And different again from the effects of knowing that somebody cares about you (the pop interpretation of the Hawthorne results) or from the effects of special status, e.g. from knowing that you are taking part in the first field test of an important new training program. The E3 article on the Hawthorne effect erroneously conflates the novelty effect and the Hawthorne effect (p. 197).

There remains in most of these articles one other confusion, namely the supposition that the formative evaluator is -- or is satisfactorily -- internal, whereas the summative evaluator is (best) external (pp. 175, 177, 406-7). But the arguments for an external formative evaluator are just as solid as for an external summative; objectivity and credibility are likely to be higher because of freshness of vision, the absence of social bonds and (possibly) greater familiarity with competitive evaluands. Since there are also very good arguments for having an internal evaluator on the staff (better understanding of the project, better chance for implementation, cost-savings etc.), the solution has to be a hybrid; the use of occasional visitors to provide the fresh eye and at least a part-time or consulting staff appointment for someone to provide continuing evaluative support internally (the auditor role excellently described and justified on pp. 40-41, but forgotten elsewhere.) Trying to combine these jobs in one individual produces sloppy formative evaluation and poor products.

The preceding discussions concern, generally speaking, the nature of evaluative inquiry and the role of the evaluator as well as specific topics like formative evaluation. We will now take up each of these general issues briefly, referring especially to the articles "Scientific Inquiry and Evaluation", and "Evaluator Role."

The essay on scientific inquiry and evaluation is a short treatment of various topics in the philosophy of science and is probably the weakest in the book. Few sentences avoid errors, including for example the assertion that a categorical generalization is a hypothesis and an explanation (p. 348); the assertion that the higher-level laws in a theory always refer to unobservables (ibid.); the confusion of verification with confirmation (p. 350); the assertion that "we cannot assign a probability other than 0 or 1 to a universal proposition" (p. 352). But this is not the main turf of E3 -- we can forgive it while we read on, fascinatedly wondering how this neo-positivist philosophy of science is going to cope with the concept of evaluation which was anathema to the neo-positivists. Aha! The awful word finally emerges in the penultimate sentence. "Evaluation is seen as one kind of procedure for formulating and testing hypotheses (not restricted to statistical hypothesis testing). It can be an important step in the process of theory verification" (p. 353). Good grief! One can only say that if that were taken as the defining account of evaluation, the whole book would only be about 20 pages long. Evaluation is the process (and the products of the process) of determining the merit or worth or value of various entities, and very very occasionally those entities are hypotheses or theories. One might as well say that mathematics "is seen as one kind of procedure for playing blackjack".

Here we see the failure of the conceptual foundations of E3 at its atypical worst. The fact is that scientific inquiry is partly intrinsically evaluative and almost always aimed at evaluative goals -- to produce good hypotheses, papers, explanations and theories; to identify and use good data, designs, instruments, procedures; to make good measurements and inferences and judgments. Distinguishing the good from the bad in these areas is what scientific training is all about i.e. learning how to evaluate. This is not learning to count or to recognize or to describe or to observe. Evaluation is not mere discrimination; it is discriminating discrimination, and E3 needs -- if the reader will pardon the expression -- a good article on evaluation and the rest of science.

The Evaluator Role article is also rather important -- for what it does not do. What it does, and does better than anything else to that time (and I think since) is identify the following roles for the evaluator: as judge, juror, defendant, attorney, expert witness, detective, social worker, court reporter. The article is by Anderson and Ball jointly and is witty and illuminating.

What's missing? Within the limits of the court analogy, the evaluator as police officer (the program monitor); as the jailor (constraining freedom within the confines of a preordinate design); as criminal (thief, con artist, slanderer etc.); or innocent bystander (scapegoat). But other major roles are missing too, most notably: the evaluator as teacher, administrator, painter, poet, consumer and therapist. Of these perhaps the teaching role is the most common and the most important. Just as training scientists should be largely a matter of training them in certain kinds of evaluation, so it should be with all other professions. And since this is far from being the case, it turns out that much of what one does in the field is teaching teachers how to grade papers, teaching students how to grade teachers, administrators how to grade each other, agency or foundation or district staff how to evaluate programs and so on and on. All of which they should already know; do need to know and do benefit from knowing. Evaluators are introducing a new discipline that is the emerging scientific methodology of a universal practice, and so of course we have a great deal of explaining and teaching to do.

One of the great merits of E3 is that it avoids the usual absurdity of equating evaluation with goal attainment. It's an absurdity because it assumes that side effects are always negligible, which is known to be false, and that goals are known goods, which is doubly false since they are rarely known at all and frequently not good; and for several reasons. The first point, about side effects, is covered in the article on Goal-Free Evaluation; the latter point, about the assumed merit of goals, is not. The biasing effect on the evaluator of knowing the goals is covered; the colossal difficulty of determining the "real" goals of a program is not. Nor is the problem of deciding what to say about a program which overreaches or shortfalls its goals. Since a program can be terrible even though it overreaches and excellent even though it shortfalls, about all you can say in such cases -- and that only if you are lucky -- is something about the merit of the goals rather than the program, i.e. something about what it meant to do rather than what it did i.e. something irrelevant.

The other major methodological advantage of a goal-free (component in an) evaluation design, besides contamination-reduction, is that it's the only systematic approach to identifying side-effects, as far as I know. (Incidentally, E3 never seems to talk about side-effects in the sense of impacts on non-target populations, as opposed to unintended effects on the target population; but these "leakage" "spillover" or "ripple" effects are often very important). The Side Effects article says that the two big questions on the subject are Which to look at and Who to select them; but I think How is harder, and having someone working goal-free is the best way I know (the whole design and staff does not have to be goal-free, of course). This failure to see the essential weaknesses in the goal-based approach does cause trouble here and there e.g. in the summative Evaluation article where we are advised to focus on the "unintended goals of the program"!!

Perhaps it's appropriate to conclude by talking about the evaluation of evaluations or evaluators. Here the terminology has (it seems to me) been refined so that where E3 usually calls this secondary evaluation, one would now want to distinguish between (a) secondary evaluation meaning reanalysis of data gathered in primary evaluation; (b) replication or extension which would involve gathering at least some new data; (c) metaevaluation which involves application of the full evaluation process to another evaluation (d) review simple critique of an evaluation as a technical report, in the usual ("social science") way; (e) audit (well covered E3): usually a concurrent review, though it should be a concurrent metaevaluation. The distinction between metaevaluation and the rest is important. Metaevaluation involves looking at -- for example -- the side effects and cost of and the alternatives to the primary evaluation; reviewing does not, nor does secondary evaluation.

Here we have tried to do a little more than an ordinary review, even if not a full-scale evaluation (or metaevaluation if one conceptualized E3 as a set of evaluations of the literature). The effort to try the product-evaluation route when dealing with an educational product, does lead one to look harder at empirical issues like reliability and "critical competitors". In that spirit, we ran up the Evaluation Thesaurus and in that spirit I "subcontracted" Marty Nemko to do an independent (10 page) review of E3 -- with an effort to focus on the qualitative material -- which I have just read. I now summarize or mention some of his comments that are different from mine, but which I endorse. There were no areas of serious disagreement; there were significant overlaps.

He identified as positive factors (in addition to the ones I have previously mentioned) the substantial cross-referencing to other articles; the brief bibliographies at the end of most; the general readability and conciseness. Criticisms included; the one-sided treatment of some topics e.g. the very favorable treatment of factor analysis, the very negative treatment of non-parametric statistics; the occasional excursions into excess jargon e.g. "activity vectors" and "n-dimensional commodity space" in the cost analysis article; the essential vacuity of the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" needs of assessment in the article on that topic, given that judgment enters both about equally; and the suggestion that J. R. Popham's Educational Evaluation is a serious critical competitor. He was most worried about the variable level of difficulty of the articles, but I see this as essential in encyclopedias.

The other critical competitor that deserves at least a passing remark is the two-volume Handbook of Evaluation Research (Sage, 1975), edited by Struening and Guttentag. It is in fact a huge (1400 pages) compendium of articles of extremely variable utility which are very loosely organized, not cross-referenced, inconsistent with respect to basic definitions, lacking in plausible conceptual foundations. The key article on "The Logic of Evaluation" is about statistical influence and reflecting the mid-70's effort by social scientists to "treat" evaluation research as (a) exclusively (disembodied) program evaluation (i.e. not one reference to personnel of staff evaluation); (b) just some more applied social science. There are good articles (Levin, Sjoberg, Weiss, Campbell, for example) but the effort is more a monument to a phase in the history of the social sciences' blundering back to the world of value than a key reference.

So; E3 is still the best of its kind, still one of a kind, still very useful. It has gone into several printings by now and it deserved to do so. Though it has limitations as a picture of the state-of-the-art, and imperfections of other kinds (such as some internal inconsistencies), it's a fine achievement and a considerable stimulus even or perhaps especially when one disagrees with it.

BOOK REVIEWS*

Evaluating Compensatory Education

Reports from the National Institute of Education on the Compensatory Education Study (6 volumes). Washington, D.C.: The National Institute of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1977.

I. Compensatory Education Services. xxii + 100 pp.

II. Title I Funds Allocation: The Current Formula. xxii + 138 pp.

III. Using Achievement Test Scores to Allocate Title I Funds. xxiii + 68 pp.

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IV. *Demonstration Studies of Funds Allocation Within Districts*. xx + 63 pp.

V. *The Effects of Services on Student Development*. xvi + 68pp.

VI. *Administration of Compensatory Education*. xvii + 87 pp.

VII. *Compensatory Education Study: A Final Report from the National Institute of Education*. xiii + 190 pp.

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Compensatory education has been the largest and most controversial area of federal involvement in education since its beginning nearly two decades ago. The evaluation of compensatory education has been no less controversial. Both touch deep-seated value and interest conflicts in society.

In 1974, the Congress instructed the National Institute of Education (NIE) to conduct a study of compensatory education, especially those programs funded by Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which has provided over $2 billion annually for educational programs for low-achieving students in school districts with low-income families. The NIE mandate grew out of Congress's frustration with past evaluation efforts.

**Ernest House wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments provided by Gene Glass, Paul Hill, Douglas Weir, Gordon Hoke, and staff from the Illinois Board of Education -- Tom Kerins, Connie Wise, Rose Maye, and Jack Fyans.

By 1974, the evaluation of compensatory education in general and Title I in particular had indeed been inadequate. After several years of federal programs, and several hundred millions of dollars spent on the evaluations, Congress had little information on which to base decisions. As a member of the staff of the House Education and Labor Committee put it: "Incredibly enough, both the sponsors and opponents of that provision found that almost no data existed on how much money from the Title I allocation was then being spent on basic skills" (Cross, 1979, p. 16).

The reasons for this inadequacy are found in the history of the Title I evaluation and in the Illinois Board of Education -- Tom Kerins, Connie Wise, Rose Maye, and Jack Fyans. the type of evaluation that has been attempted for the past decade. Put simply, federal officials in the Office of Education have attempted to evaluate these programs by an inappropriate approach to evaluation and when the approach fails, they modify the evaluation slightly and attempt the same approach again, and it fails again. This has occurred repeatedly over the past fifteen years (McLaughlin, 1975). The result has been either no information at all or evaluation data that are severely citicized as invalid by evaluation experts. Controversy succeeds controversy.

Frustrated by this problem as early as 1974, Congress tried two solutions. One was to write into the Title I legislation itself a requirment that the Office of Education develop "models of evaluation" and that local school districts evaluate their programs using these models. As in many cases where Congress tries to legislate the detailed conduct of technical activities, the legislation led to questionable results.

The Office of Education developed three models of evaluation which emulated the unsuccessful approach to evaluation that the Office had been using. Although the legislation was enacted in 1974, there is still little usable information on which to base decisions. In addition, the evaluation models themselves are under attack by evaluation and measurement experts, as well as by the state evaluators whom the models are supposed to help (Linn, 1979; Jaeger, 1979; Wiley, 1979). The state evaluation directors have strongly protested the imposition of these particular models, yet the work goes forward. In 1979, use of the three models was mandated for all Title I programs.

The other Congressional solution to the problem was to instruct the National Institute of Education, an agency separate from the Office of Education, to conduct a study of compensatory education, especially the Title I programs. It is my happy duty to report that the federal government has redeemed its honor and its competence in this study. It has conducted an evaluation that was helpful to the Congress, that was valid, that was worthy of the name.

The former staff member of the House Education and Labor Committee commented:

> More recently the attention of Congress with respect to the reenactment of Title I has been focused to a remarkably large degree by information generated by the study done by the National Institute of Education. . .The NIE study has been remarkable in terms of the quality and quantity of information that it has produced . . . One of the more specific products to emerge from that study was a substantial revision and reorganization of the Title I statute. . .At this point one could say that the NIE study has been the single most productive piece of evaluation work ever undertaken on a federal education program. It may well be one of the most productive evaluation works of any executive branch agency. (Cross, 1979, pp. 20-25.)

This burst of enthusiasm is understandable after so many years of failure. The intention of this review is to analyze the NIE study, to judge its worth, and to assess its strengths and weaknesses. I shall try to show why it is a good study and to outline the critical decisions made by the evaluators and officials that kept it from going astray. I suggest in some places how it might have been made even better than it was.

Judging Evaluations

What is it that makes an evaluation good or bad, valid or invalid? Suppose the evaluator and the decision maker are the same person, as when a person is deciding to purchase a car. What is the minimum standard for the evaluation? In this case one would say that the evaluation must be true. If the evaluation were not true, even though conducted by an individual for himself or herself, one would say the evaluation was invalid. There are many different ways in which individuals determine truth, and, indeed, these different methods distinguish evaluation approaches. But, whatever the method, an untrue evaluation would be considered invalid by everyone. It would make little sense to say, "This is a valid evaluation, but it happens to be untrue." (Validity I take in the sense of being worthy of recognition.)

Now consider the case when the evaluator and decision maker are separate persons. Perhaps the decision maker consults Consumer Reports to make a decision. It is not enough that the evaluation be true; it must also be credible to the decision maker. An incredible evaluation is likewise invalid, i.e., not worthy of recognition. Again, there are different ways in which credibility is assessed. Again, it would not make much sense to say, "This is a valid evaluation but it is not credible."

Finally, consider a third case. In this case, the evaluator is not evaluating something for an individual's private use, but is evaluating a public program, a social program. In this case the evaluation must not only be true and credible, it must be normatively correct. This is the most stringent demand of all, for one has passed from the private into the public realm, and there are obligations to the public at large and not simply to private individuals. This is the area of least agreement. I will not make an extended argument here but will simply contend that an evaluation of a public program must be democratic, fair, and impartial. If it is undemocratic or unfair, it is invalid. It makes little sense to say of an evaluation of a public program that it is valid but that it is unjust, unfair, or partial. (For development of these ideas, see House, 1980.)

Why this is so is because of the role of evaluation in our social decision procedures, in determining who gets what. To be valid a private evaluation must be true, an interpersonal evaluation must be true and credible, and a public evaluation must be true, credible, and right, i.e., democratic, fair, impartial, and so on. The burden of those who presume to evaluate social programs in the public interest is not a light one -- nor should it be. It seems only fair and just that evaluators should meet standards that they expect of others. I shall attempt to show in this review that the NIE study meets these standards of validity.

In fact, I would contend that the success, acceptance, and utility of the study is significantly dependent on its meeting these validity claims. In the words of a Congressional staffer:

> . . . Congress is generally not concerned with the technicalities in the development of evaluations. What the Congress wants is information on which to base policy and political judgments about programs. The primary concern of Congress is that the information that is produced can withstand a professional critique and that the data will produce findings that are at least somewhat conclusive. (Cross, 1979, p. 19.)

Although part of the judgment as to whether the evaluation is good depends on whether it can be used by its intended audience (in this case, the Congress), utility of the information alone is not a sufficient criterion to determine the validity of the evaluation. Congress may make good use of information which is false. Or an evaluation that is good for Congress may not be good for the country as a whole. The Congressional interest may not be identical with the public interest. An evaluation could be good for Congress's own purposes and interest but invalid in that it did not serve the public interest. Thus utility for an intended audience, while important, is an insufficient criterion when evaluating public programs, even when the audience is the government.

From the quote above, it would appear that Congress wants relevant information and also information the truth and credibility of which are assured by professional consensus. Another criterion -- that of conclusiveness -- I will not address other than to say that government officials often expect a conclusiveness that is beyond the power of formal evaluation or social science to deliver. (For a discussion, see Lindblom and Cohen, 1979). Congress is actually looking for practical information that can be used to improve programs. The NIE study, while inconclusive in many ways, was able to provide such practical information and hence satisfied the Congress. More elusive are enduring generalizations about social programs and social phenomena. Pursuit of these has led to inconclusive evaluations and to Congressional frustrations.

In summary, the conclusion of my review is that the NIE compensatory education study is valid because it meets the standards for the evaluation of a public program, and it is a good evaluation because it was used by and satisfied its intended audience, the Congress. Its value to Congress was partially dependent on its validity. It would have been a valid evaluation even if, through some strange circumstance, Congress had never seen it or used it, in which case it would have been of no value to them.

The Charge

Section 821 of the Education Amendments of 1974 instructed the NIE to undertake a "thorough evaluation and study" of compensatory education programs. Such study had to include the following:

1. An examination of purposes and effectiveness of these programs;

2. An analysis of means to identify children who have the greatest need for such programs;

3. An analysis of the effectiveness of

methods and procedures for meeting the educational needs of children, including the use of individualized plans and teacher training programs;

4. An exploration of alternative methods of distributing funds in an equitable and efficient manner that ensures the funds reach the areas of greatest need;

5. Establishment of not more than 20 experimental programs to carry out the above purposes.

In addition to allowing four years for completion, the law instructed NIE not to report the results to any other group, e.g. the President or the Commissioner of Education, before it reported to the Congress. Specific Congressional concerns in passage of the act were the effects of altering the definition of poverty, of using test scores to distribute funds, of requiring individualized plans for all students in Title I programs, and of requiring school districts to spend 85% of their Title I grants on basic skills instruction.

From these concerens NIE designed a wide focus study, one purpose of which was to assess the past effectiveness of the program and the other to examine specific alternative procedures. So the study was both an evaluation and a policy study. The wide focus was the most critical decision -- and a wise one. Past evaluations had foundered by using standardized achievement scores as the exclusive indicators of program outcomes. In both correlational and experimental designs, the Title I programs repeatedly failed to show large increases on standardized tests. Measurement and evaluation experts criticized the narrow focus of the outcomes, the experimental designs, the instruments employed, and the statistical techniques, thus throwing the evaluations into question.

By contrast the NIE officials concluded that compensatory education had a number of important goals, most of which were not captured by outcomes on standardized achievement tests, which were themselves considered by many to be invalid measures. Although there were many motives for originating compensatory education programs, such as eliminating poverty, the specific purposes clearly discernible in the status and Congressional statements were to provide financial assistance to districts with low income children, to fund special services for low-achieving children in the poorest schools, and to contribute to the overall development of students. Members of Congress themselves differed on the priority of the three fundamental purposes. There was no reason to assume (as past evaluators had done) that the programs existed solely to enhance academic achievement as measured by tests.

Furthermore, federal involvement operated through state and local agencies which had their own goals. The evaluation had to consider implementation as a factor. This insight into compensatory education programs, particularly Title I programs, as having multiple and possibly conflicting goals and as being implemented by other agencies with their own structure and purposes, is what distinguishes the success of this evaluation from past failures. It is essentially a political insight, and it is significant that the director of the study (Paul Hill)[1] had a background in political science rather than economics, engineering, accounting, psychology, or even sociology. The temptation in all these disciplines would be to secure overly reductionist outcome measures. (Of course, political science is also reductionist in its focus on power and authority.)

The NIE strategy was designed to produce a "complete understanding" of how Title I operated by focusing on funds allocation, service delivery, student development, and program administration, and by employing criteria derived from the fundamental purposes. The study did not provide a complete understanding, but it did provide information that Congress could and would use to judge and improve Title I. The initial definition of the problem derived from the Congressional charge was critical to the success of the study. Other, less fortunate, interpretations were possible. Although most evaluation discussions focus on technicalities of design and statistics, it is in the initial conceptualizing of the problem that the essential features are determined, usually beyond remedy.

Needs

A reading of the original Congressional mandate reveals how easily the NIE study could have gone astray. The mandate is implicitly written from the "needs assessment" paradigm: determine the purpose of the programs, analyze means of identifying children in need of such programs, and analyze the effectiveness of methods for meeting the needs. Needs is a complex and unquestioned concept, and when used as in "children's needs," a clear moral mandate. The existence of a need is used to justify acting in a certain fashion. Most often, need is used to indicate the discrepancy between some target state and the actual state of affairs. (See Scriven and Roth, 1977, and Roth, 1977, for a half-dozen different ways in which needs are defined.)

It is clear enough that children need vitamin C or so many calories a day, but the further one moves away from biology, the less certain the concept of need becomes. For example, the child needs a strong self-concept (mental health), but people disagree immediately as to what this entails. Typically, needs assessments in compensatory education programs are conceived as the need to reach the average level of educational achievement, as operationally defined by a standardized achievement test.

Such a construal of needs could have resulted in another evaluation such as occurred in the past. The study might have been designed as a large-scale field experiment to see whether Title I programs improved children's test scores or brought them up to grade level on standardized tests. An experimental design would be necessary for determining whether the expected gain was attributable to the programs and not to other causes. Yet there are many reasons why children do not perform at grade level on tests, including family background, past history of disadvantagement, and even the nature of the tests themselves. This type of evaluation makes the federal program solely responsible for elevating test scores when there are many causes of low test scores. The programs are likely to look like failures. They are, after all, only supplements to the children's education.

Thus the net effect might be to make the programs and those who run them appear incompetent. President Nixon justified no increase in funding for compensatory programs because he said educators did not know what worked, a direct reference to past evaluations. Often the children themselves were blamed for the failure. Some researchers have concluded that certain children are intrinsically incompetent because compensatory programs have not succeeded, according to this type of evaluation.

In this case the Congressional mandate instructed the researchers to examine the purposes of the programs and to analyze the means for identifying the children who have the greatest need for the program. The researchers defined the set of fundamental purposes as providing financial assistance, funding special services for low-achieving students in poor schools, and contributing to the cognitive, emotional, social, or physical development of these students. Needs were not reduced to test score performance, although there was a testing component to the study. The financial assistance to poor students and the provision of special services were conceived as positive outcomes. In other words, the needs were for more money for the education of poor students and for special funding for them, as well as a need to enhance their overall development.

Other possible purposes for the programs would have been to eliminate poverty and to re-distribute wealth. An egalitarian (and I am one) might hope for the programs to reduce poverty among the students. But, again, since poverty has many causes, many of which are external to the school's influence, expecting the schools to alleviate poverty puts an extraordinarily heavy burden on the programs and one the programs probably cannot carry. It would be interesting to know the degree to which the programs alleviated poverty, although how this might have been determined in a four-year evaluation of public school children is not at all clear. What the study did do is examine the immediate redistributive effects of the programs.

One of the internal conflicts in compensatory programs is that they are supposed to compensate for both poverty and educational disadvantagement. These two goals do not always coincide, and many decisions in the study reflect a weighing of the two, and a trade-off of one against the other. This balancing of criteria applies to the evaluation of any complex social program.

In summary, what one takes as the purposes of the programs will very much influence what one takes as the children's needs and will alter the shape and results of the evaluation. Children's needs could be construed variously as the need not to be poor, to receive extra educational help, or to perform at grade level on a test.

(There are hidden, and perhaps implausible, presumptions that the higher test score will lead to better things in life later on.) In this study I believe that the researchers have defined the problem in such a way that the results were useful.

Funds Allocation

One of the three fundamental purposes of compensatory education, as defined by the NIE Study, was to provide financial assistance to schools in relation to their numbers of low-income children. The NIE evaluators conducted an in-depth analysis of the distribution of the Title I funds. Did the funds go to districts and schools with poor children? The persistent pursuit of this question, I think, makes the NIE study democratic.

Democracy means that everyone's interests are considered, and in some cases justice is defined as attention to the interests of those who are most disadvantaged. In this case the primary interests are those of the children who are poor. Whether they, in fact, received the funds that were directed to them was a critical question. If it is an obvious one, it should be noted that up to the time of the NIE study, little information existed as to the destinations of the funds. One may also wonder whether the

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funds do any good. First, though, they must arrive.

A just compensatory education program, justice being democratically conceived, will deliver the funds to the disadvantaged effectively, and a just evaluation will investigate whether the program does so. Poverty programs that help the upper classes more than the lower are all too common. Perhaps the greatest strength of the NIE study was its concern about these issues.

Who gets the money? This question is not as easily answered as one might think. According to the NIE study, the funding pattern of Title I is complex. By law, school districts are supposed to receive 40 percent of their average expense for each child between the ages of 5 and 17 identified as eligible.[2] In fact, districts receive only about 17 percent. Federal rhetoric is stronger than federal action.

The complexities of governmental jurisdictions complicate the allocation process. There are three steps. First the federal government distributes monies based on county census data. The states in turn distribute to school districts within counties, and the separate districts distribute to individual school within their jurisdictions. Eligible children are identified as those below the poverty level, those from families receiving dependent children aid, and those supported by public funds in foster homes and institutions. Poverty level is defined by the Orshansky index, which estimates the cost of food for an adequate diet, then multiplies by three, one-third being the proportion of food costs in the average budget.

The distribution effects of the Title I funding formula were that counties with the most eligible children were indeed receiving the most money. There is a clause in the formula that bases funding partially on average costs of educating so that central cities and suburbs in the Northeast were receiving the most dollars per eligible child while rural Southern counties received fewest dollars per child. This adjustment seems reasonable since educational costs do differ, and there is no cost of living adjustment built into the poverty definitions.

The redistribution effects of Title I can be seen by the fact that when all school children are included (as opposed to those eligible) the central cities receive $43 per child, the suburbs $20 per child, and the nonmetropolitan areas $40 per child. In other words, the suburbs receive less because they have fewer eligible children. Similarly, the Southeast region is the most favored region of the country, according to the study. As to race, although most elibible children are white, only 15 percent of the white children are from low-income families, compared to 42 percent of black children and 28 percent of Spanish-surnamed children. Overall, half the funds that would have gone to suburbs on the basis of total school population go to central cities and nonmetropolitan areas. Central cities also gain 10 percent more from the cost component than they would by strict child count. There is a limit put on the cost factor that stipulates that no state may receive less than 80 percent or more than 120 percent of the national average per pupil expenditures. This cost limitation favors the South and penalizes the Northeast.

The other factor that influences the amount of funding is the number of children in families receiving state aid and the number in institutions and foster homes. Most of these children are in the five large industrial states. This factor results in a transfer from nonmetropolitan areas to cities. The South is the big regional loser and the Northeast the big gainer. Thus, different factors in the overall formula have quite different effects.

Allocation to counties is only the first step. The states must allocate funds to districts within counties. Most states follow procedures dependent on the federal formula. However, five states allocate funds entirely on the basis of dependent children. This results in shifting an extra 10 to 16 percent of the funds to cities which contain high percentages of minorities. These allocations are based on data that are several years old. None of the allocation procedures yield totally consistent or current information.

Within a school district, funds must be allocated to schools in which there are high concentrations of children from low-income families. There are a number of ways by which districts allocate funds to schools, and districts are given great latitude in which procedures they may follow. Eligibility can vary considerably, depending on which indicator of low income is used at the school level. Districts can increase the number of eligible students by using different measures for different schools. The NIE researchers seem to disapprove of this inconsistency, but I think it merely emphasizes that measures on which any funding is based are at best only partial indicators of what they supposedly represent. Obviously, consistency achieved by using only one measure of low income will be purchased by excluding some children identified by the other measures. In fact, I would encourage the use of multiple measures for each school.

Once schools are identified, almost all of them receive services. In half the districts the amount of funding is determined in proportion to the number of low achievers, not on the basis of low income. In many districts the basis for allocation decisions is not clear. Educational "need" is cited by some.

The idea of serving both children from low-income families and low achievers is built into the program itself. Funds awarded to a school because it is in a low-income area may go to helping low achievers in the school who are not from low-income families. Personally, I see no reason for limiting the services to low achievers. It seems to me that a gifted youngster who is from a low-income family deserves extra help, too. So certainly should low achievers, whatever their income level. It would make more sense to target the funds to all children in low-income schools, since all the children in that school have a disadvantage, whatever their achievement. One could have separate programs for low achievers. The current system penalizes some poor children. There is no reason to believe that poverty has not stunted their life chances, even though they score above some arbitrarily defined test level.

Various suggestions have been made for changing the definitions of poverty. Most would result in significant changes in allocation. Census surveys tend to underestimate poverty, and more recent surveys have indicated that the South has relatively less poverty and the Northeast relatively more than before. The groups studying this issue have reached no recommendations. The measurement of poverty itself (like all measurement) presents complex problems.

Title I funds are supposed to supplement rather than supplant local funding. In other words local districts are not supposed to replace their spending with federal funds. By comparing spending patterns in similar districts with and without Title I funds, the investigators estimated that a Title I dollar increases local spending by 72 cents. This compares favorably with 41 cents on the dollar for other federal programs, 25-40 cents for revenue-sharing funds, and 13 cents for state aid. In other words, Title I funding is comparatively quite effective in raising spending on education, rather than merely providing tax relief.

Other NIE analyses assessed the redistributive effects, the degree to which Title I provided more money to low-income districts. Title I was markedly more redistributive than other state and federal programs. It allocated 5-1/2 times as much aid per pupil to districts with the highest poverty rates (grouped by quarters) than to those with the lowest. The ratio for other federal programs was 3-1/2. Title I may be the most redistributive federal program. Title I funding has a correlation of -0.76 with county per capita income. By contrast, state aid programs were not very redistributive, showing a ratio of only 1.2 within-state.

On the other hand, Title I does not equalize expenditures. Low-spending districts are not necessarily the low-income districts. Equalization programs provide more money to low-spending districts. The cost factor in the Title I funding formula gives more money to high expenditure districts. Title I has a modest equalizing ratio of 1.6 of aid per pupil of the lowest to the highest quarter. A strong equalizing formula would likely decrease the redistribution effects. All in all, Title I is strongly redistributive in effect, aiding those districts not favored by state and local revenues. In terms of social justice, the Title I programs are commendable, and the NIE study is to be commended for investigating these issues.

Allocation by Testing[3]

A particular stimulus for the NIE study within Congress was that Representative Albert Quie (R-Minn) was interested in using test scores rather than poverty indices to allocate funds. Some people have argued that achievement is the "ultimate aim" of compensatory education and that test scores are a better basis for distribution. Others have argued that a fundamental purpose is to channel funds to the poor rather than to low achievers.

NIE was instructed to investigate this issue and carried out a series of substudies that were particularly well conceived. The investigators reasoned that such a testing system should be technically accurate and not susceptible to manipulation. They recognized that any setting of a minimum skill level is arbitrary and that there are no technical procedures for translating standards into test items. Furthermore, the test cut-off levels have strong effects on the distribution of funds.

The investigators concluded that tests would have to be administered at least every 4 years since test scores fluctuate considerably. To prevent various forms of cheating, the tests would have to be administered by trained proctors under strictly monitored conditions. No current testing system is adequate to distribute funds among states, and few state testing programs are adequate to allocate among districts within states. The National Assessment of Education Progress was designed to produce national rather than state-by-state estimates and does not test in all states. Current testing programs are adequate to the task of allocating to schools within most districts.

Hence, allocating Title I funds by test scores would require the establishment of a new

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testing program. Assuming that the testing was limited to reading, to 9-year olds, and to 10 percent precision, a 3-year testing program would cost $7 million for one set of results. For each grade level added, costs would increase by 20 percent and by 50 percent for each additional school subject. A testing program of 5 percent precision would cost $16.5 million, according to the NIE study. (The sampling error of the census data on which the poverty indices are based is very small.) To produce estimates for each school district in the country would cost $53 million. I would not argue with those figures other than to say they are conservative estimates made several years ago before the huge increase in travel costs. Half the total costs are in the data collection and would be substantially higher today. In any case, the maintenance of such a testing program would be costly.

Assuming a cut-off at the fifteenth percentile, a figure which would yield the same number of students as current Title I funding procedures, NIE investigated the effects of switching from current allocation procedures to test score allocations. Twenty-three states would have increases or decreases of eligible students in excess of 15 percent. Many of the changes would be quite dramatic. Generally, nonmetropolitan areas would lose, and central cities with high black populations would gain. The higher the cut-off score, the more the suburbs would gain.

If the cut-off were raised above 15 percent, the distribution of eligible children would resemble the distribution of the general child population. There would be no significant changes from region to region.

Distribution of funds within states would require uniform regulations for all states, since state testing programs differ significantly, and it would necessitate major changes in those state programs, according to the NIE study. My own judgment is that the rules and regulations would be far more cumbersome and directive than expected.

To determine what effect such an allocation might have within school districts, 13 school districts were given dispensation to allocate funds internally by test score. The overall effect was that they served more schools and students than before but did so less intensively. They concentrated less on poor children and on minorities. The teaching time and strategies were the same. As the number of students served by the programs increased, students were included from higher income areas. On average, there was a 71 percent increase in the number of students and only a 44 percent increase in the number of teachers. Students spent less time in special instruction. The average time loss for each student was 14 percent, due to a 13 percent reduction in the staff/student ratio. The study of those demonstration districts lasted two years. NIE investigators concluded that one might reasonably expect the intensity of instruction to decrease still further since many of the activities were supported with extra funds not available over a longer period of time.

Although NIE took no stand on using test scores to allocate funds, I find their studies a strong negative assessment of such a prospect. To allocate so would require the establishment of another large and expensive national testing program. It would require uniform regulations and substantial changes in current state testing programs, plus a bureaucracy to enforce such changes. Even then the data would be based on only a thin slice of achievement, perhaps one subject at one grade level. Funds would be shifted to students from higher income families and away from the poor. The higher the cut off level moved -- certainly a strong pressure -- the more the funds would resemble general aid.

Within school districts such an allocation would also shift services to the wealthier student and would result in less intensive services for the poor. All things considered, there are remarkably few reasons for using test scores to allocate funds. Compensatory education would cease to be a program for helping the poor. There may be good reason to have programs for low achievers regardless of income, such as for handicapped students, but there is no reason to purchase these at the expense of the poor children.

For the most part, I think these studies (policy studies rather than evaluations) examining the effects of a shift to test score allocation, are quite well done. They explore the relevant issues in a clever way. Policy issues are elusive since they anticipate future effects. These studies are conclusive, convincing, and succinct. Ordinarily, when one does a feasibility study for employing a new method, the study is highly likely to favor the new method.[4] That was not the case here. The investigators displayed an evenhandedness in dealing with a critical and politically sensitive issue.

Administration[5]

Another often neglected aspect of a program being evaluated is its administration. The administration of a program cannot only account for its efficiency, but can affect its justice and fairness. The cornerstone of justice, after all, is consistency in application of principles and rules. One cannot have a just program where regulations are wrongly or inconsistently administered.

The NIE study provided for a thorough examination of the Title I legal framework and its administration. At the federal level there are two types of requirement, those for funds allocation and those for program development. NIE contracted with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to do a survey of the legal requirements. The criteria for this assessment of the legal framework were whether the regulations were necessary to accomplish the program purposes, whether the regulations were internally consistent and consistent with the statutes, whether they were clear and comprehensible, and whether they were unduly restrictive of local district flexibility -- an excellent set of criteria.

The funds allocation requirements included seven rules, such as targeting of schools, eligibility of students, and funds being used to supplement instead of supplant. The investigators concluded that funds allocation requirements were necessary because of strong pressure on states and local districts to use the funds in other, noncategorical ways. I would agree with this judgment. Without strong stipulations the funds would almost certainly be used for general aid rather than to help the poor.

The program development requirements were a different matter. They included needs assessments, objectives, evaluation, and parent involvement. While these things may be desirable, they are certainly not necessary to accomplish the purposes of the program, according to the study. In fact, one may meet these program development requirements and still have a low quality program. There is little evidence that any of the designated requirements will actually result in a better program. I would judge that some work against it. There is an unfortunate tendency on the part of the government to specify not only that something be done, such as providing programs for poor children, but also to tell people exactly how to do it. As often as not, the advice is misguided and ill-conceived.

There is another difference too between the funds allocation and program development requirements. With funds allocation there are strong incentives on the part of the state and local agencies to use the funds in other ways than those intended. Hence, the restrictions make some sense. However, there are no incentives to deliver inferior quality programs. The program development requirements are based on the supposition that the federal government knows something that the local agencies don't. Although some of the requirements are good ones, prescribing the contents of local programs is a case of over-regulation.

As to consistency and clarity, the NIE investigators found the regulations generally consistent, although the role of the parent advisory councils and that of the local and state governments in monitoring could be made more specific. On the other hand, the operational standards were judged not to be clear. Clarity was defined operationally as a Title I administrator's being able to comprehend the full range of acceptable practices from the regulations. State administrators had to invest an inordinate amount of time to understand, especially regarding the requirements of needs assessment, evaluation, and parent involvement.

This lack of clarity resulted in overly restrictive interpretations by the states. Because of fear of violating the requirements, some states wrongly concluded that they had to have pull-out procedures or that they could not approve the hiring of nurses, for example. The lack of clarity in regulations actually led to less flexibility for local districts and to promulgation of inferior programs, a point to be made later about pull-out procedures.

At the federal level itself, the investigators found that monitoring and enforcement regulations of the supplement requirement were neither clear nor consistent. Two different groups inside the Office of Education charged with the monitoring of the supplanting regulations were in conflict over the proper criteria for supplanting violations. As a consequence, the monitoring of this important regulation had ceased. States did not know whether or not they were in violation. One can see that this kind of information is valuable for an evaluation to uncover because something can be done about it immediately.

Overall, the federal management of Title I absorbed $5 million and employed 100 people. The states spent $20 million for management and the 14,000 local districts, $120 million. The state agencies received one percent of the state funds for administration, and the local districts spent about four percent of their funds for management. These are not bad figures for such a large program. State staffs averaged 18 full-time people, although this varied considerably form 3 to 101 persons. Generally, the states with poor management performance, as judged by such things as audit exceptions, had small staffs. The successful state managements spent much time with the staff of local programs.

NIE was also instructed to investigate the state compensatory education programs other than Title I to see if there were other models of good practice the federal government might adopt. This investigation seemed rather cursory to me. Fourteen state compensatory programs provided a sum of money equivalent to 20 percent of the Title I funds, but 68 percent of this was in New York and California. According to the study, the services provided by these state programs were very similar to those of Title I. Even the administration of these programs was conducted from Title I offices. In the opinions of the state directors of these programs, Title I was essential to the success of the state programs. Few states would have established their own programs without the federal example, and few state agencies could resist pressures to discontinue. Ironically, some of the strongest fiscal pressures on the compensatory programs (which ruled out increased funding) were federal incentives and requirements for handicapped children.

Some effort, though not a lot, was put into studying the administration of local programs. At the district level, planning was done in a few meetings in the spring. Few teachers or principals attended these meetings, and teachers did not feel constrained by plans developed there. Presumably, these activities were to meet the program development requirements. Plans did not relate to the classroom level. Apparently the real decisions were made at the school level meetings, which involved the participating principals and about 90 percent of the teachers. In these meetings instructional techniques were discussed. But information on this process is sparse and fragmentary.

The elevations required of the programs

were not disseminated below the district level, and when they were, teachers felt the standardized test scores provided little information of relevance to the classroom. Fully 95 percent of the evaluations relied on such tests, and, in fact, the use of such tests is now mandated by the Office of Education. Evaluation of compensatory programs continues to be frequently dysfunctional. It is unfortunate that useful evaluations cannot be done. Again, the regulations specify not only that an evaluation be done, but how it should be done, usually counter to professional advice.

Another program development requirement and problem area was the Parent Advisory Council. The regulations provided that the majority of the members must be parents of participating children and be selected by parents from that area. The idea was to give poor parents some say in the education of their children. This was easier said than done. Most councils met less than once a month, and they were purely advisory 90 percent of the time. In half of them, the principals dominated the choices to be made, according to the study. In spite of this, 71 percent of the members reported being satisfied with their role. Some did perceive some unfairness. Again, the NIE account is thin.

Overall, the evaluation of the management of the compensatory program is quite strong, well-considered, and unusual in its focus, especially the part dealing with federal regulations. This should be an important component of similar evaluations. By addressing the concerns of those who must live by these regulations, it substantially increased the utility and justice of the study. The major weakness was a lack of similar thoroughness at the state and local levels.

Compensatory Education Services

The NIE study was actually a series of separate studies, more than 35 altogether, which were organized and published in 7 separate volumes. Each substudy addressed a separate set of questions. The logic of this design is another reason for the success of the overall study. An alternative way of proceeding might have been to design a massive experiment, the results of which would have left unanswered most key questions. In other words, a whole set of relevant questions was explored by the NIE study, thus sustaining and eliminating various hypotheses about compensatory programs. Social issues can rarely be resolved by a single massive experiment. There are too many separate issues to address by a single approach.

The first volume of the NIE study focused on a description of the compensatory programs, especially Title I. This was necessary because no current information representative of the nation existed on the selection of students, the educational services, or the costs. The multi-tiered reporting system in which local districts reported to the states and the states reported to the federal government had resulted in outdated and generally unreliable and noncomparable data. The NIE survey was based on a nationally representative sample of 100 school districts. Since unreliability was a feature of past studies, interviews were conducted not only with the district directors of the programs, but also with principals, teachers, and parents within each district. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to two and a half hours. Previous studies had relied on self-report, mailed questionnaires, usually to district administrators.

The advisability of such expensive, laborious, face-to-face interviewing may be illustrated by the following anecdote. Between 1967 and 1971, I directed a large-scale evaluation of the Illinois Gifted Program, a categorical program that was funded similarly to Title I. In the initial data collection, questionnaires were mailed to all 1,100 Illinois school districts; a respectable return was received. The questionnaire asked for detailed descriptions of programs for the gifted supported by state funds. We analyzed and sent the results to the State Department of Education and the State Legislature -- we were obliged to provide a report the first year.

In the third year of the evaluation, we examined the financial claims of the school districts and found that 340 districts were receiving state funds. From these we selected a 10 percent random sample stratified by type and size of school district, and sent teams of people trained with special interview schedules, observation protocols, and psychometric instruments into each district. Generally, there was little resemblance between the original questionnaire description of the local program and what our data-collection teams found.

A few administrators admitted forthrightly that their gifted program was a fabrication which existed only on paper. In other cases, the respondents had answered sincerely, but in fact had little idea of what their programs consisted. Only when we interviewed the teachers did we discover what was happening. In even more cases, people were misled by our questionnaire. For example, when they marked "individualized instruction" as a type of program, they often meant something quite different from what we had supposed by the label. We fooled ourselves by our terminology. All of this misinformation was discovered only when interviewing several people and observing the classes within the districts.

Reliable information is often bought only at high cost. In most cases mailed questionnaires are inadequate as information sources. The chances for intentional and unintentional misinforming are too great. Fortunately, in-depth data collection was what the NIE survey undertook, which makes this part of the study seem accurate and credible. They also conducted case studies in 18 of the districts (as did we) to determine how district auxiliary services were provided. The only fault I can find with this part of the study is that they apparently did not visit classes.

Although federal money was awarded to school districts on the basis of income level of the children's parents, children became eligible for Title I services at the school level by being identified as having an educational need. They were chosen by low test scores and teacher judgment. Of those eligible, 66 percent received special educational services.

The provision of special services was directly proportional to the amount of special funding available to the district. The more money available, the more students served. There was no significant variation in student participation rates in districts of different sizes, different regions, or different socio-economic characteristics. Children in non-public schools received fewer services. Of the students served, 59 percent were white (compared to 75 percent total enrollment), 34 percent were black (compared to 19 percent of total enrollment), and 10 percent were Spanish-surnamed (compared to 5 percent of total enrollment). Contrary to popular conception, Title I is not solely, exclusively, or even primarily for ethnic minorities. It is for the poor.

Services Rendered[6]

What kinds of services were being offered to children identified as needy? Describing educational programs is difficult because there are so many factors that may be significant and contribute to or detract from program quality. An experienced educator ordinarily has little difficulty recognizing a good or a poor class, but measuring characteristics that are indicative of high quality by standard measurement procedures is a problem.

The difficulty is that one might expect a small-size class to be a better one, all other things being equal. But other things are not usually equal, so a small class with a bad teacher will result in poor quality education. There are so many relevant factors, and they interact so strongly with one another that some researchers have despaired of being able to predict precisely the pattern of factors that will result in quality education (Cronbach, 1975). One strategy is to forego description of the program and simply measure the outcomes. But the outcome measures themselves, such as standardized achievement tests, are often oblique or even invalid measures of educational quality. This has been the past path to failure.

What the NIE evaluators did was to identify program characteristics that educational research has suggested are associated with high quality. This is not what I would have done, but it is not a bad strategy and is certainly preferable to attempting to rely exclusively on outcome measures. Alternatives might have been to conduct in-depth case studies or to assemble a larger number of descriptive and evaluative observations, both of which would provide a denser, thicker description of the programs. (See House, Steele, and Kerins, 1971). The NIE strategy was a good one, however.

The factors selected for the study were time spent on instruction, class size, teacher qualifications, and the extent of individualization. The NIE survey revealed that three-quarters of the Title I funding went directly to instructional programs. Ninety-five percent of the school districts offered remedial reading or language arts programs. Half had only remedial reading or language arts, while 44 percent had a math program. Almost all were elementary school programs.

The average Title I student received 3 hours and 47 minutes of special instruction a week if the program was reading, 4 hours a week if language arts, and 3 hours a week if math. From 1/4 to 1/5 of the students' time was spent in compensatory instruction. Title I programs were deliberately supplemental and in addition to regular instruction. The average class size was 9 in remedial reading and 12 in language arts and math, compared to 27 in regular classes.

As to individualization of instruction, as defined by the NIE survey, 38 percent of the teachers reported using instructional objectives, 77 percent said they used tests, and 70 percent reported teaching to small groups or individuals. Individualization, one might add, could have been defined in several different ways.

Teachers were selected primarily because of academic training or experience in compensatory education. The average total teaching experience of compensatory teachers was similar to the national average. The most highly valued training, as reported by district personnel, was in measurement and evaluation, new techniques, new materials, and characteristics of the disadvantaged. Two-thirds of the teachers had received special training, the average being 25 hours. Most districts provided some in-service training for teachers, usually consisting of consultants, staff meetings, and workshops. Only a small portion of the Title I budget (0.5 percent) was spent on in-service training, the average district expenditure being $600.

Most compensatory services were offered as "pull-out" programs, that is, students were removed from the regular classes and put into special ones for their compensatory instruction. About 25 percent of the students were in special classes for the entire day, a feature more prevalent in districts with many eligible students. The school districts' Title I applications for funds had low utility for predicting district practices. Most of the instructional expenses consisted of teacher salaries, and the number of teachers seemed to determine the number of students served and the total time spent in reading.

In reading programs relatively more teacher aides were employed; in language arts programs, there were more teachers with bachelors degrees, and more with masters in reading and math. Pull-out programs used more aides and teachers with masters degrees. In programs with more instructional time, there were more aides and less well-educated and less well-paid personnel.

In 12 school districts, case studies were conducted of the programs, but this information was confounded by the fact that these were the "demonstration" districts which were trying out different funds allocation procedures. They were not typical districts. A closer examination of their programs revealed that the Title I students spent 136 minutes a week in language arts compared to 122 minutes for regular students. There was a great deal of variation from district to district, however. In these districts Title I students spent the same percent of time receiving instruction as individuals (15 vs. 13 percent for regular students), more time in small groups (24 vs. 9 percent), the same time in medium groups (32 vs. 32 percent), and less time in large groups (29 vs. 46 percent). Small groups were defined as 2-5 students, medium as 6-20 students, and large groups as more than 20 students. Clearly, it was in the small group instruction that the Title I students had the advantage.

Only 4.6 percent of the total budget was spent on auxiliary services in 1975-76. The federal emphasis on basic skills had resulted in yearly declines. About 1/3 of this amount was spent on parent involvement, another 1/3 on guidance and social work, and the other 1/3 on health, food, and transportation. Health services consisted of nurses, screening, immunization, referrals, and physical exams. Health and food costs together accounted for only one percent of the budgets. The Office of Education had emphasized that Title I be an educational rather than a welfare program.

The nature of auxiliary services was determined by OE emphasis away from health and welfare, by federal emphasis on parent-advisory committees, and by the type of evaluations that were conducted The OE guidelines demanded quantitative measures of educational outcomes, and school districts did not know how to assess health and other auxiliary services using these measures. Opinions of parents and others were considered too subjective. Consequently, districts dropped these services in favor of services they could measure with achievement tests, according to the NIE study. This is a case of programs being changed to serve the evaluation rather than vice versa, and I would condemn this effect of evaluation more strongly than do the NIE researchers.

How good were these compensatory programs? The NIE survey provides some criteria by which the programs can be judged -- if one is aware of other educational research on class size and so on. First, most money goes into salaries for instructional personnel. More money provides more instruction for more students. In this sense, the benefits are directly proportional to the money spent.

The classes themselves are small, averaging 9 students in reading and 12 in language arts and math. From Glass and Smith's (1979) meta-analysis of the effects of class size on achievement, one could expect a standardized differential achievement of .256, equivalent to about 10 percentile points, quite a significant gain. That assumes, however, that all the students' time was spent in classes of such size. Actually, only one-quarter was so spent. For classes of 12 students, one would expect a gain of about 5 percentile points. Also the expected gain would be slightly lower than this for elementary students, which most Title I programs service, and slightly higher for secondary students. Other things being equal, tutorials of one person compared to classes of 40 students could make a difference of 30 percentile points, a difference substantially greater than that demonstrated for any other instructional technique.

The fact that students in compensatory programs are spending more time in reading, language arts, and math than are students in regular instruction is also indicative of a high quality program since more time on task is associated with increased achievement (Rosenshine, 1978). Unfortunately, the NIE data are not sufficiently detailed to permit more specific estimates of gain.

Two other factors -- individualization and pull-out procedures -- are more problematic. Individualization is variously defined, and the research on its effects is mixed. The next section of the review will demonstrate this weakness. Pull-out procedures in which the children are physically removed from the classroom for special instruction probably have some harmful effects, to be discussed in detail later.

The information on teachers provided by the NIE survey I find useless as far as judging the quality of the programs. What teachers are called makes little difference in quality. If an evaluation does not arrive at a defensible judgment of worth, it should at least strive to provide information that the reader can use to make such judgments. That teachers are selected on the basis of training and previous experience is good, but the training appears to be slight on average. One wonders whether the teachers are really prepared. Also very little was spent on in-service training. One would think that there would be far more attention to improving teacher skills in such an important and huge program. An average annual district expenditure of $600 leaves much to be desired.

Finally, the federal de-emphasis on auxiliary services is acceptable if children are provided medical services, referrals, etc., from other sources. Correction for near-sightedness is likely to result in far mor educational achievement than most things one can think of. Especially since medical services are so expensive, one wonders whether the children are receiving basic physical care. The Title I purposes include concern about comprehensive development of the child. The evaluation should have investigated why the Office of Education has de-emphasized auxiliary services and whether the children were being taken care of elsewhere. This is one of the serious deficiencies of the study.

To be fully assured that the compensatory programs are of high quality, one would have to investigate the classrooms in more depth. This was only one aspect of the study, and one cannot do everything. Yet, one longs for a deeper understanding of the compensatory classrooms, the "complete understanding" aspired to by the evaluators themselves. Nonetheless, I believe the NIE evaluators had their priorities essentially correct as to where to put their resources.

Student Development[7]

The third fundamental purpose of compensatory education, according to NIE, was to contribute to the cognitive, emotional, social, or physical development of the participating students. The NIE substudies which addressed this purpose were more typical of the way such evaluations are usually done, and less satisfactory than the rest of the NIE study. The evaluators rejected the notion of a grand national summary evaluation of Title I because the past evaluations had been failures. These failures had occurred, they said, because of the diverse nature of the programs, the masking effects of a grand summary measure, and the limitations of measurement instruments. Instructional programs are not unique, nonoverlapping treatments. This was good thinking on their part.

Instead, they chose a sample of districts to investigate. The sample was selected to provide a broad array of instructional variables that could be related to achievement gains. Generally, studies that have attempted to relate quantified instructional variables to achievement gains have not fared well. The main variables here were instructional time and content, amount of individualized instruction, and the difference between instruction in regular classes and pull-out classes -- classes in which Title I students are withdrawn from the regular classroom for instruction.

The Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills was administered to students in 400 classrooms in 14 different districts in the fall, spring, and following fall. The sample was not chosen to be representative of Title I classes as a whole, so the results cannot be generalized to all Title I classes. The investigators did claim considerable diversity of programs in the sample.

From fall to spring, a period of seven months, students in the first grade gained 12 grade equivalent months in reading and 11 months in math. Third graders gained 8 months in reading and 12 months in math. The average pupil in the norm group gained 7 months in the same time. These gains were quite high compared to other evaluation studies of compensatory education. A follow-up study in the fall found the students holding these gains on average, a finding again contrary to expectations.

One must wonder about the sample of students and the test. On the pretest the first graders averaged at the 22nd percentile in both reading and math, and the third graders averaged at the 13th percentile in reading and the 5th percentile in math -- two quite different groups of students. Besides having no experimental controls, the same tests were administered to the students on three occasions, providing opportunity to learn the test items. The results are strikingly positive but not convincing as to the effects of Title I programs.

Glass and Smith (1977) questioned these results. The pretest raw score mean for first-grade reading was 2.38, close to the chance raw score of 24.8. The first-grade math raw score mean was 15.6, about three points below the expected mean of 18.7 if students guessed randomly. This raises the specter that Level B of the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills was too difficult to use as a pretest for the first graders, and that the achievement gains were spuriously high. This could account for the unusually positive results. This suspicion is strengthened by the low pretest and post-test correlations on the same test for first grade (r = .50 in reading and .39 in math compared to .86 and .78 in third grade).

As in most such studies, the focus of measurement was narrow -- only reading and math at a few grade levels. The evaluators felt that there was inadequate instrumentation to assess the other areas of student development. In this they were probably correct, but nonetheless judgments about the program were made on this narrow basis. Interviews with students, parents, and teachers would have been valuable in assessing development. The researchers report in a footnote that student attitudes were high in the fall and the spring but give no further information about this aspect of the study.

How these instructional variables related to gains in test scores was also ambiguous. The first graders gained more in the regular classrooms, in both reading and math, but the third graders in the pull-out classes did better in math and the same in reading. Was this because the students were different or because of spurious measurement? One thing is clear: student gains were large when the instruction emphasized the skills measured by the test. It was possible to measure the overlap with the curricula by analyzing the test items and the video tapes of classes, instructional materials, and interviews with teachers. This was an important precaution that is seldom taken, and one of the best features of the study.

Classroom processes were measured by indicators of opportunity to learn, individualization, "instructional events," motivators, and teacher background. Taken as a whole, these classroom processes accounted for a significant amount (.14 to .27) of the variance in achievement gains in first and third grades. In this analysis the evaluators quite properly used the classroom rather than the individual student as the unit of analysis. These figures and others are taken from a later and more detailed commentary than that provided in the original report (Cooley and Leinhardt, 1980).

When the five classroom process indices were taken separately and in combination, only a few accounted for modest proportions of the achievement gain. "Opportunity" accounted for .22 of the variance in first grade reading, .09

in math, .09 in third grade reading, and .13 in third grade math. Most contributions were in the range of .01 to .04 of the variance in test gain.

When one looks more closely at the "opportunity to learn" index, it is dominated by the overlap measure between the test and curriculum. This is a combination of two scores, one an estimate by teachers of whether they had taught the test items and the other based on an analysis of the curriculum by experts. Zero-order correlations of this variable with the test gain were .40, .25, .29, and .38 (in reading and math at first and third grade). Clearly, test overlap accounted for a substantial portion of the "opportunity" index. Furthermore, when one examines all the other single variables, the highest correlations were with "time opportunity," "student mastery," and "matching" in variables. The latter two measure test-taking practice in the curriculum.

The investigators concluded that what is taught is more important (in affecting test scores) than how it is taught. Children will do much better on tests if they are exposed to both the form and content of the test itself. The researchers recommended an intensive examination of the match between the content of curricula and tests. Future evaluation, they suggested, should contain a measure of curriculum fit to the test.

I agree with this recommendation but would turn their suggestion around. The most parsimonious explanation of these results is not that the curricula are in error somehow, but that the tests are. They are far too narrow in scope. If one insists on evaluating curricula with narrowly focused tests, the results will largely reflect the degree to which the curriculum teaches these particular test items. One can indeed develop a curriculum to teach those test items and do better on the tests, but such education would be strange indeed, and perhaps worthless. It is an inverted logic which insists that schools teach what standardized tests measure. One can envision an entire society giving itself tests and succeeding on them as it becomes progressively removed from reality and experience.

The main finding of the study, as seen by the investigators, was that classes with individualized instruction (as defined in the study) were no better than those without. The investigators expressed the opinion that there was a low degree of individualization in most classes, in their opinion. Apparently, the Congress was considering mandating such techniques in 1974 and was deterred by the lack of positive evidence about individualization here and elsewhere. This is another mandate that we are far better off without, and the study was certainly valuable if it helped prevent such an action.

Overall, in spite of some interesting ideas about how to measure and analyze instructional variables in a way closer to classroom experience, the study did not provide a very full or convincing picture of student development in compensatory classes. Gains in the classroom seemed to be related to certain activities, but one can't say much more. The study becomes one more equivocal essay of its type. It is more suggestive than persuasive. The results are not satisfying.

Because of the flaws, limitations, and mixed results, the NIE study is also inconclusive about pull-out programs. This is an important issue for compensatory programs because the majority of Title I students received instruction in pull-out classes. Fortunately, the Office of Education commissioned a policy study by Glass and Smith (1977) on the issue, which proved to be more persuasive. Although this study is not part of the NIE study, the issue is so important for Title I that I mention it here.

To address the issue, Glass and Smith conducted an analysis and meta-analysis of research studies from related areas such as ability grouping, mainstreaming, and desegregation. Combining these studies, they found that labeling students as "slow" or "weak" reduced their academic performance by one-quarter standard deviation below that for comparable pupils not so laeled. Teacher attention and support for the pupils was reduced by one-third standard deviation and teacher judgment of student success by a half standard deviation. From their analysis "the pull-out procedure _per se_ has no clear academic or social benefits and may, in fact, be detrimental to pupils' progress and adjustment to school." (Glass and Smith, 1977, p. 7). This study is more persuasive because it relies on the combination of many strands of research rather than attempting to base its conclusions on one study with all its idiosyncracies and weaknesses. Also, in this case the findings from various areas are consistent in indicating that the pull-out procedure might be detrimental. The dependent measures are all cognitive, however.

Glass and Smith took the position that I advocated earlier: _all_ pupils in poor schools deserve compensatory services. Any child in a school with a high concentration of poor pupils is put at an educational disadvantage. By aiming funds at schools with large concentrations of poor children, the beneficial effects of categorical aid could be retained and the invidious effects of pull-out procedures avoided. Only a matter of administrative convenience in monitoring has led to the pull-out practice. In fact, the management of the program would be better if the unit were the school.

This is an acute case of officials being so concerned that someone ineligible might benefit that those who rightfully should benefit are deprived, a case of monitoring working against the intent of the program. While the zealousness of concern for the poor is laudatory, one must be careful when pursuing such policies that they are not counter-productive. Professional judgment, research, and common sense argue against the pull-out procedure.

In this particular case, the OE study succeeded where the NIE study did not. However, the overall effects of these compensatory programs on student development remain unassessed. Educational measurement continues to be inadequate to the task of assessing braod student development, there are no magic solutions; evaluators should be more honest about what they cannot do.

Summary

From reviewing the NIE compensatory education study, I have two strong impressions. One is that the compensatory programs, especially Title I, are very good programs.[8] The second impression is that it is possible to evaluate such programs intelligently, usefully, and validly. That these enterprises were the responsibility of the federal government is striking, for the federal performance on these matters has not been good over the past several years.

My impression of Title I is that it is a categorical program that has worked. The purpose was to help the children in low income districts, and they are being helped. Funds go to the regions, districts, cities, and schools with lowest incomes. Compared to other federal and state programs, it is perhaps the most redistributive of all, an impressive accomplishment.

Of course, it will not eradicate poverty. The resources are too meager for that, and probably poverty stems from quite different sources than the schools. Eradicating poverty is too much to expect. The funds are enough to make a discernible difference in the education of the children in poor areas, however. Other methods of allocation would be less equitable and further removed from the purposes of the program, as well as less accurate and less efficient.

I am persuaded by the NIE study that most of the funds allocation requirements are necessary and not overly restrictive. The program development requirements, on the other hand, edge toward over-regulation and the mandating of

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practices for which there is little supporting evidence, scientific or professional. This seems to me to be an all too typical misguided foray into prescribing practices that experienced people on the scene would not endorse.

Unfortunately, many government planners cannot seem to tell the difference between requirements that are necessary because local incentives work against them, as with funds allocation, and requirements that are detrimental to sound educational practice, which is determined by experience as in any craft. The worst example is the mandating of particular types of evaluations that are contrary to the expertise of the evaluation community.

I am persuaded that the management of the compensatory program at all levels is reasonably efficient and effective, although I suspect that much of the time of state and local administrators is spent meeting requirements that have little to do with classes for children. I suspect that the real job is done by extra personnel at the school and classroom level who do what they can. Most of the funding supports these extra personnel.

The monitoring of these programs appears confused and conflicted because of the impasse on criteria for monitoring inside the Office of Education. This situation might have been partially resolved, and the monitoring made easier, by making entire schools eligible in low income areas. Such a policy might have countered the apparently deleterious effects of the pull-out procedures, which were instituted for fear of violating unclear and ambiguous federal guidelines. Overall, the programs appear to be of high quality, primarily because of the employment of more personnel. They focus on the basics in reading and math. Exactly what they consist of is not clear, though one might question the effectiveness of pull-out procedures and individualized instruction.

I am not persuaded as to how students are developing in and as a result of these programs. Although the test score gains were very impressive over a one-year period in the sample classrooms, there are a number of problems with the study of student development. In addition, even if the gains were real and indicative of overall quality, the aspects of development investigated were narrowly construed. Both the exact nature of the compensatory classrooms and the specific development of children in these classes remain hazy.

For better or for worse, I have gathered these impressions primarily from the NIE study. I have had little first-had experience with these programs or classes. The persuasiveness of the NIE study is partially dependent on its validity. It is well-conceived as a series of substudies addressing a large number of issues.

In its intensive investigation by interview, observation, and inspection, it seems to be accurate. Loose ends are pursued, alternative hypotheses examined. In other words, the study is generally conceptually well-reasoned. The possible exception here is the work on student development, which leaves a number of questions unanswered. There are too many flaws for these conclusions to be persuasive.

The NIE study as a whole is also credible. Its enthusiastic reception by Congress is one indicator of its relevance and credibility to its major audience. It was done by an agency external to the program and by different researchers and groups, many of them well known. The results are also internally consistent. The final report could have been more coherent by drawing the many disparate strands together.

Finally, the evaluation was just and fair and democratic. A just evaluation should attend to the interests of all groups, particularly to those who are most affected by the programs being examined. In this case in particular the study should attend to the interests of the poor and disadvantaged. The NIE study accomplished this by examining in great detail how the resources and services were distributed. Justice is concerned with distribution, with who gets what. Through examination of the program administration, the investigators also determined how recipients and participants were treated. Consistency and the quality of these relationships were important concerns. Of course, in hindsight, all of these things could have been improved, but in my opinion they were remarkably well handled in this study.

I believe the foregoing fundamental considerations -- the truth, credibility, and correctness of the study -- account for its validity. Validity in turn means that the evaluation is acceptable and that the audience, Congress in this case, can act upon it. Of course, Congress may not act upon it. There may be reasons, legitimate or otherwise, that prevent Congress from acting.

Because an evaluation is valid and acceptable does not mean that it is accepted. Perhaps key Congressional leaders know that another fund allocation scheme would benefit their own districts more than the scheme favored in the study. The self-interest of their district might override their concern for the poor. Or perhaps some important factor changes while the study is in progress -- the funds disappear. Or perhaps the study is lost someplace in the vagaries of the legislative process. For various reasons the study may be valid and acceptable but not used.

If the study is used, however, there is normally a presumption of its validity. Certainly the Congress does not examine the implicit validity claims as I have done. Rather, as expressed earlier, its concern is not with technicalities but with whether the information can withstand a professional critique and give it some guidance as to what to do. The Congress presumes validity.

It might also be in highly politicized situations that people cynically use only that information which will benefit their cause. Even in this circumstance, however, the information is only effective if the people on whom it is used believe that it is valid. It is not enough that an evaluation be used; it must be valid. And ordinarily it will not be used unless it is at least presumed, rightly or wrongly, to be valid.

In this case there was no problem. The NIE study was valid, according to standards I have enunciated, and it was used by the Congress to very good effect. In this case it served the Congress well and was a good evaluation from both a Congressional and a professional evaluator's point of view.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hill pays special tribute to the help of David Wiley and Jim Vanecko in the conduct of the study.

2. Unless otherwise noted, all facts and figures about Title I are taken from the NIE study, which was published in seven separate volumes. These figures are from Volume 2.

3. The information in this section is primarily from Volumes 3 and 4.

4. Congress did eventually reject the notion of allocation by test score. One factor, according to Hill, was that the study did not permit the estimation of allocations for individual Congressional districts. Not knowing what their districts would receive under a new allocation scheme, Congressmen retained the old allocation procedure.

5. The information in this section is from Volume 5.

6. The information in this section is primarily from Volume I.

7. The information in this section is primarily from Volumes 6 and 7.

8. The Title I programs have undergone substantial changes since these studies were begun in 1974, partly as a result of these studies. I am not well informed enough about the current program to suggest exactly what these changes have been.

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Evaluating Compensatory Education

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Particulars About the Point of Departure

I have in my office four big files of newspaper clippings from the New York Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Palo Alto Times on educational issues at the national, state, and local level collected during the academic year 1965-66 which I spent at the Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I tried to take advantage of my year at this "think-tank" to deepen my knowledge of American education, a process that had started more than ten years earlier when I visited half a dozen universities and later spent some time as a visiting professor at the Graduate School of Education at the University of Chicago. One of my thick files contains clippings from 1965-66 on Head Start, urban education, segregation, vandalism, education of the minorities, etc., in short, social-pedagogical problems. The articles emanate from the heydays of the new legislation of the Johnson administration on compensatory education passed under the auspices of the Great Society.

I did not envisage, when this material was collected, that it would prove useful in providing a time perspective for the review of U.S. federal policies for the education of the disadvantaged launched by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris as one of the so-called country reviews on educational policies that OECD sponsors in cooperation with the government whose policies are under scrutiny. Nor did I envisage that I should be serving as the rapporteur of the review team which implied that several additional months had to be spent both before and after the site visits on covering, hopefully, relevant documents and research literature and, of course, writing the report. The latter is now available in print (OECD, 1980).

The present review has been commissioned to focus on the NIE reports requested by Congress in 1974. I shall, however, view the reports in the wider perspective provided by, among other things, the experiences gained during the OECD policy review. Reference will also be made to some of the 35 projects which form the basis for the six NIE reports listed above and which in addition to the interim reports form the basis for the final report on compensatory education that NIE submitted in September 1978 shortly before Congress was about to take final decisions on a 5-year re-authorization of the various programs, and in particular about those under ESEA, Title I.

Since the OECD policy review provides the framework for my attempts to review the NIE studies of compensatory education programs, it would be in order to give a brief account of how this exercise was carried out. In the case of the United States it was on the whole conducted according to the same procedure as other OECD country reviews with the important difference that it was limited to the education of the disadvantaged. Two previous country reviews, France in 1969-70 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1971-72 (OECD, 1971 and 1972), in which I also participated, covered the entire field of national educational policies. The following steps can be distinguished in a country review procedure:

1. The initiative to conduct a policy review can be taken by the government of a particular country which wants its policies to be critically scrutinized by outside people not entangled in its own internal political controversies and who are free to raise issues which can not easily be raised within the country. The OECD secretariat can also initiate a review of policies in a particular country, which is considered to be of common interest and benefit to the member countries. Once the decision has been taken to conduct a review, the OECD secretariat in contact with the Government concerned appoints a team of reviewers, as a rule persons who are not only knowledgeable about the

educational systems of the country but also carry a reputation in the international community of scholars that lends sufficient weight to their work.

2. The government under review prepares a National Report which essentially is an attempt to collate relevant legislative, statistical, and research information pertaining to its educational system. In the case of the U.S. review of compensatory education the U.S. Office of Education (OE, 1979) prepared six extensive case studies of compensatory education programs, such as Title I, the bi-lingual programs, the basic Educational Opportunity Grant program, etc. The reviewers received in advance piles of legislative, executive, and research documents. The task even to cover the most relevant ones was enormous, particularly for the rapporteur who in the U.S. case, assisted by Dr. Lawrence Saha of the Australian National University, had to prepare an issues paper. A few examples will illustrate the gigantic documentation problem. The review of Head Start research since 1969 and the bibliography that goes with it commissioned by HEW and published in 1978 is a 158-page document (Mann _et_ _al_., 1977). The Abt Associates, Inc. evaluation of the Follow Through Planned Experiments is reported in seven volumes, etc. In addition, HEW through the Office of Education submits a voluminous annual evaluation report to Congress on its programs.

3. Site visits and interviews with key people in the country under review are conducted by the entire review team. In the case of the U.S. the team spent about one week interviewing people in Washington, D.C., beginning in the White House, proceeding with the Office of Education and other Federal agencies and with the relevant Congressional committees. It also tried to meet representatives, as many as possible, of the countless "advocacy groups" that are based in Washington, D.C. We then traveled to 15 different places in nine states and had a wrap-up session in Washington, D.C. This was what we were able to achieve in a 3-4-week period. The rapporteur spent another four months working on the report, being during that period based at the National Humanities Center in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina.

4. The reviewers at the wrap-up session decided on a series of issues that they wanted to raise with the representatives of the Federal government. After a few months a preliminary report was made available to the partners involved along with a list of major issues broken down in specific questions. The report and the section on issues formed the background document for a "confrontation meeting" at the OECD headquarters in Paris under the auspices and presence of the OECD Education Committee consisting of representatives of the 24 member countries. The discussion as usual took place in a kind of

seminar setting with one reviewer introducing one major issue or question at a time, whereupon in this case the U.S. team representing the Federal government responded. Members of the Education Committee can and actually did also take the floor and posed questions to the responding team. The report, together with an account of the proceedings at the confrontation meeting, is then printed in English and French.

Again, in preparing the present review of the NIE reports on compensatory education I have quite naturally drawn heavily on the parts of the OECD report which I wrote up. The more technical aspects of the evaluation studies were for the most part not considered in the OECD report but have of course been included here.

The NIE Evaluation Exercise

In connection with the passing of the 1974 ESEA Amendments, the 93rd Congress requested NIE to conduct a comprehensive study of the compensatory education programs. The Institute was instructed by Congress to "undertake a thorough evaluation and study of compensatory education programs, including such programs conducted by States and such programs conducted under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965." The Institute was specifically instructed to conduct

"(1) an examination of the fundamental purposes of such programs, and the effectiveness of such programs in attaining such purposes;

(2) an analysis of means to identify accurately the children who have the greatest needs for such programs, in keeping with the fundamental purposes thereof;

(3) an analysis of the effectiveness of the methods and procedures for meeting the educational needs of children, including the use of individualized written educational plans for children, and for programs for training the teachers of children;

(4) an exploration of alternative methods, including the use of procedures to assess educational disadvantage, for distributing funds under such programs to States, to State educational agencies, and to local educational agencies in an equitable and efficient manner, which will accurately reflect current conditions and insure that such funds reach the areas of greatest need and are effectively used for such areas..." (NIE, 1977f, p. 42).

In order to achieve the purposes under the four clauses cited the Institute was instructed to carry out "not more than 20 experimental programs" which could be commissioned to agencies eligible for grants.

NIE in accordance with the legislative provision in 1977 submitted six interim reports (NIE, 1977 a-f) and a Final Report (NIE, 1978) to Congress in September 1978 shortly before the Education Admendments were on the floor.

This was, indeed, an overwhelming charge typical of the aspirations held by policy makers when turning to researchers. As I have spelled out in another connection (Husén, 1978), the problems as formulated by policy makers must be broken down in manageable units in order to become researchable. Therefore, NIE apparently has tried to narrow down the package of tasks without deviating too much from the letter of the law. It has attempted to restrict its charge in two respects. "In response to this request, NIE implemented a study of compensatory education programs, focusing on Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965", is the laconic interpretation that NIE makes in the introductory section of its final evaluation report (NIE, 1978). But within Title I there was a limitation to "four major study areas": funds allocation, service delivery, student development, and program administration, all technical in nature and amenable to down-to-earth empirical studies. One should, for reasons just given, not criticize NIE for opting for such limitations. Already the task it decided to undertake was enormous. Notwithstanding this, one nevertheless lacks the wider perspective on the compensatory education programs that the OECD review team, given its wider terms of reference, was free to adopt. Thus, in the reports one does not find any considerable concern with the "fundamental purposes" envisaged by the Law. Apart from the immanent difficulties stemming from the breadth of such a task, one should consider its political sensitivity. To question basic purposes and strategies is to place oneself in the middle of political controversy. The limitation to Title I can, of course, be defended on the ground that the overwhelming portion of the compensatory education funds goes into Title I programs.

The six interim reports, as well as the major portion of the Final Report, are based on 35 research projects conducted for NIE by various research organizations, such as Abt Associates, Inc., National Opinion Research Center, and the Syracuse Research Corporation.

Even given the considerable restrictions the NIE has imposed on itself in conducting the Compensatory Education Study under congressional instruction, its reports cover a wide range of problems pertaining to program administration, service delivery, fund allocation, and student development. In reviewing the study I shall not focus on technicalities but take the liberty of applying the same broad, policy-oriented perspective as did the OECD team and thereby draw heavily on my experiences from this review as well as on the material I prepared as rapporteur. Considering the audience for which the OECD report was prepared, the technical and scholarly aspects of the execution of the Compensatory Education Study were dealt with briefly and cursorily only. In the present review they take a more prominent place. However, it would be highly presumptuous even within the space allotted to the present review to claim a thorough critique focusing on the massive efforts made in the various commissioned projects launched to evaluate specific aspects of the Title I programs. In addition to the 35 projects, on which the NIE Compensatory Education Study in the first place has been based, there is an enormous scholarly literature pertaining to compensatory education programs of various kinds.

I shall not review the NIE reports one by one but make casual references as I move along. After having "established my credentials", by indicating what kind of background I bring to the review task, I shall as a background present the main features of the compensatory education legislation. A large portion of my review will focus on what the legislators referred to as the "fundamental purposes", that is to say, the philosophy and strategies behind compensatory education. On the basis of such an analysis I shall discuss the targeting of Title I funds, both its horizontal and vertical coverage. Finally, I shall deal with the massive evaluation efforts that have been conducted particularly of the Follow-Through Planned Variation Experiments.

I have already mentioned the conspicuous lack of studies of the "fundamental purposes" and hastened to indicate that this is something that a government agency, such as the NIE, could not easily deal with. It would rather have been the task for an institution, such as the National Academy of Education. Within the restrictions that NIE has set for its research efforts and -- not least -- within the limits of what it could reasonably be expected to achieve within the given time-frame and resources, its Compensatory Education Study has considerable merits. One has succeeded in collecting relevant research either already conducted or commissioned to outside agencies and in conducting in-house studies. All these together present what is essentially a good descriptive picture of how Title I compensatory education is operating and what its main technical and administrative problems are.

The report (NIE, 1977 f) on the use of achievement test scores to allocate Title I funds presents a sound empirical basis as well as a good analysis of the technical problems involved in switching from census-based poverty criteria to achievement criteria. Not least the financial implications, particularly important to legislators, have been well spelled out. It is, however, difficult to avoid the impression that the difficulties that have to be overcome in a switch to achievement criteria have been given stronger emphasis than the disadvantages of the present system. The mistargeting and its conceptual determinants had deserved more thorough studies. Since congressmen eagerly watch how changes in allocation criteria affect their constituencies, findings that too conspicuously reveal inadequacies of present practices are easily felt as stepping on their toes. The vested interests in status quo in a multibillion enterprise, such as compensatory education programs, are indeed strong. Congress did in its 1978 Education Amendments not make any considerable change in previous practices of allocating funds. The only major changes enacted were those dealing with the administrative procedures, which were simplified, hopefully on the basis of findings from the NIE study of administration of compensatory education (NIE, 1977 a).

Strategies for Compensatory Education

The role Americans traditionally have assigned to education is that of a vehicle for upward social mobility. Education has more strongly than in any other country been conceived as an instrument of realizing the American Dream. Coupled with the strong belief in education as a promotor of individual careers has been the confidence in it as a means of solving social problems by making people more competent and knowledgeable. Horace Mann, one of the architects of the American public school, conceived this school as a tool of alleviating inequalities and the disadvantages of the working classes. He wrote in 1848: "Education.... beyond all other devices of human origin is the great equalizer of the conditions of men -- the balance wheel of the social machinery." (quoted after Hechinger, 1976). The confidence in education as a catalyst in changing society was behind the progressive movement in education between the two wars. Thus, at the core of George Count's reconstructivism was the concept of education as an instrument in bringing about social reform.

The belief in education as a means of reducing and, in the long run, eliminating social inequalities was an underlying force behind the Great Society legislation. The President's Task Force on Education, chaired by John W. Gardner, seems to have played an important role in preparing subsequent legislative programs for compensatory education of the disadvantaged. Not only did the Task Force confirm an adherence to the traditional tenet by saying that it would be a major task for the Nation to "provide every child with as much education as his talent and drive warrant", but it also recommended steps to be taken to give children of disadvantaged background access to normal educational facilities. The Task Force pointed out the great inequalities between the States and localities in paying for education and even recommended general Federal aid to school education on the basis of some equalization formula, taking, however, a dim view of its "political feasibility" (Report, 1964).

The Presidential Task Force pointed out that the American school so far had done well with children who belonged to the mainstream but had neglected those at both ends of the spectrum, the exceptionally talented at one end and the poor and physically or mentally handicapped at the other end. It pointed out that the handicapped were left out of the picture with regard to Federal support and that it would be a Federal obligation to take care of the "poor children...(who)...are to be found in our rural and urban slums, and these slums breed conditions that do in fact diminish the teachability of the child" (ibid.).

The Task Force recommended two educational strategies by means of which one should try to come to grips with the poverty problem. First, since children from poverty areas already at school entry had fallen behind their age mates, experiments with pre-school programs would provide stimulation that could make up for environmental deficiencies. Secondly, work-training programs could be launched at the high school level.

The Federal government's commitment to what was called compensatory education began with the passing of the Vocational Education Act of 1963 and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. The Civil Rights movement rapidly gained momentum in the early 1960's at a time when social scientists began to explore the "other America". The Head Start program focusing on pre-school children in the form of enrichment programs was part of the overall anti-poverty program.

The big breakthrough of Federal commitments to the education of the disadvantaged was the passing of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. In signing it, the President commented: "No law I have signed or will ever sign means more to the future of America." High hopes were indeed held about what education could do in rectifying injustices and inequalities in American society. The legislation embodied in ESEA could also be regarded as a breakthrough for "categorical" Federal aid on a large scale to local school agencies, although the National Defense Education Act of 1958, aiming at upgrading science, mathematics and technology, presaged further major thrusts. Since the American Constitution lacks specifications of Federal responsibility for education, it has by default been concluded that support of public education is a prerogative of the States and the localities. The role of the Federal Government is viewed as that of a partner with the States and local agencies in supporting clearly defined purposes considered to be of great importance to the nation as a whole, such as education for national defense, improving vocational education, equalization of access to higher education, and the education of the disadvantaged.

The strong emphasis put on the categorical nature of the Federal aid that it should "supplement and not supplant" explains the meticulous measures taken in order to ascertain that the States and localities did not use Federal funds as a source of general support of school education. This in turn accounts for the enormous amount of bureaucratization that has gone into the system and the resistance on its part to undergo changes, for instance, switch from economic to achievement criteria in allocating funds.

Objectives of Compensatory Education.

In instructing the NIE to "undertake a thorough evaluation and study of compensatory education programs" it also called for "an examination of the fundamental purposes of such programs" (NIE, 1977 f, p. 42). The Institute wisely ducked the responsibility to investigate the "fundamental purposes" which, to be sure, are politically highly sensitive. The central issue here is simply how tenable the rationale behind the legislation is. Both the OECD team in general, being charged to conduct a policy review, and the present author are more protected when questioning certain assumptions behind the compensatory education legislation.

In his State of the Union message to the Congress in 1965 President Johnson had a section on aid to low-income school districts which he suggested should be given high priority. He pointed out that lack of formal education means "lower wages, frequent unemployment, and a home in an urban and rural slum." He added: "Poverty has many roots, but the taproot is ignorance." Francis Keppel, at that time U.S. Commissioner of Education, shared the conviction about the role formal education could play in reducing poverty and increasing life-chances of the offspring of the poor. He turned against the "myth" that "slum children were somehow of a lower social order of capacity than children in other sectors of our economy." Labels, such as "culturally deprived" and "socially disadvantaged" easily become "alibis for failure to find effective ways to educate these children."

(Keppel, 1966, p. 39).

Speaking of labels, the term "disadvantaged" appears since the mid-60's to be the one most frequently used in referring to children served by programs providing in the words of the ESEA "financial assistance to meet the special needs of children of low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have in the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs." (H. R. Report No. 95-1753, p. 11-12). However, one finds that the terms "underpriviledged" and "deprived" are often used more or less synonymously with "disadvantaged." A typology suggested by Martin Trow (1978) appears to be useful in making a proper distinction between "disadvantaged" and "deprived." Trow classifies children according to two main dimensions: (1) material and financial resources of the family needed to enable the children to develop their potential, and (2) adequacy of socialization and education effecting the children at home and in school. The two dimensions generate a typology, where one could distinguish between four groups: (1) advantaged children with both adequate material background and socialization, (2) disadvantaged children with adequate socialization but inadequate material resources, (3) alienated children with adequate material resources but inadequate socialization, and (4) deprived children with both inadequate financial resources and socialization. The important distinction between the second and the fourth group has not always been clearly made, sometimes with serious consequences for programs of social intervention. Such a distinction is of particular importance in dealing with young people during the later years in high school and in transition to working life. The reason some of them cannot hold jobs after completion of schooling is not just lack of cognitive skills, which was the main belief expressed when major compensatory education programs for teenagers were drawn up. Deficient socialization bringing about lack of motivation and reliability is of equal importance.

Briefly, the rationale behind the compensatory education programs was -- and among many legislators still is -- the following. Failure and/or underachievement in school is mainly due to poverty. The poor tend to aggregate in certain areas, "slums" or "poverty pockets", particularly in urban ghettos. In order to alleviate their plight and provide them with equal opportunity to achieve on par with their materially more priviledged schoolmates they should be given extra assistance. The desired outcomes of such programs of special aid should be more equal life chances among children from all walks of life in American society.

Critique of the Rationale Behind Compensatory Education.

The logic behind compensatory education could be summarized in a simple syllogism presented in the OECD Report (OECD, 1980):

1. Poverty and school achievements are closely linked.

2. Social mobility and life chances are closely linked to educational attainments.

3. *Ergo*: Concentrated efforts by way of increased school resources, purchased by increased financial resources targeted on disadvantaged students, will "break the poverty cycle."

When President Johnson declared his War on Poverty he is quoted to have said: "We are going to eliminate poverty by education....people are going to *learn* their way out of poverty."

The two basic propositions on a close relationship between poverty and educational failure as well as between educational attainment and life chances can on the basis of empirical evidence be questioned. Doubts raised about the propositions, of course, challenge the validity of the conclusion.

Surveys, among them the Title I programs, indicate that material resources in the home, as measured by family income, are weakly correlated with educational achievement at the level of a 0.3 correlation coefficient (NIE, 1977e, cf. Husén, 1975). This means that the overwhelming portion of variations in school achievements is accounted for by non-economic factors. The considerable spread at any given income level of school achievements was one reason why Congress instructed NIE to investigate the possibilities of using achievements instead of poverty measures as the basis for allocating compensatory funds.

More important, in the light of recent studies, not least the ones conducted by Jencks and his associates (Jencks _et al_., 1972; Jencks _et al_., 1979) one could further question the capability of the school as an institution to make up for the handicaps caused by material and/or cultural poverty at home. This is a pervasive issue in public policies which aims by means of social intervention to improve the life chances of young people. At issue is: to what extent can compensatory _education_, consisting mainly of additional teaching, targeted on economically handicapped children, serve as a substitute for reforms that would affect the social and economic order at large? After all, one does not need to be a Marxist to realize that education does not operate in a socio-economic vacuum!

Another overriding philosophical issue, to which the NIE Reports did not address themselves, but which is germane to the "fundamental purposes" of the programs, is equality in education and in life chances, what this means, and how it can be achieved. What kind of equality is intended: equality of opportunity or equality of results? To what extent is formal equality in educational opportunities conducive to equality in life chances? Provisions of formal equality of opportunity in education does by no means guarantee equal results. Some children are, to use an Orwellian travesty, from the outset "more equal than others," for instance, by being born by parents possessing privileged status, not to speak of possessing more favourable genes.

The traditional confidence in what education can do has led Americans to the belief that by removing educational disadvantage one would bring about more social equality. At the level of sophistication where legislation was conceived, equality was of the classical, liberal brand. Equality of opportunity is traditionally conceived in terms of conditions that prevail in the student's background: his social class, ethnic group, sex, etc. None of these should be allowed to be an advantage or disadvantage in shaping a person's educational and vocational career. Merit, that is to say, proven ability not background, should count in getting access to education and to subsequent jobs. Thus, public policy in education should try to remove the economic and other barriers that prevent those who grow up under disadvantaged conditions to obtain in the first place the formal education that matches their innate potential. The dilemma, which one has not until recently begun to recognize more clearly, is that all criteria of merit -- test scores, achievements in examinations, and school marks -- are significantly correlated with social background. This means that whatever selection or self-selection that takes place for entry to an educational institution as well as achievements in that institution is correlated with home background.

The legislative programs on compensatory education launched in the mid-1960's aimed at bringing about more equality of results, in terms both of educational and vocational attainments. This should be achieved by providing extra funds for children in poverty areas who were lagging behind in their school results. What actually could be achieved by providing extra funds was limited by two conditions. In the first place, children meeting the poverty definitions are to a large extent found in localities where all students in public schools are disadvantaged with regard to initial financial support. Extra funds to poverty-ridden districts and schools therefore do not make up for the initial inequality. But there is also a fundamental limiting condition. In the debate stimulated by OECD programs as well as through recent empirical studies (Jencks _et al_., 1972; Sewell _et al_., 1976; Jencks _et al_., 1979) it has been shown that equality of opportunity brought about by formal equality in access and removal of economic barriers is no guarantee that other forms of equality will follow. Programs designed to ameliorate, or even eliminate, obstacles against access to further education are not enough in overcoming inequalities. Again, some are from the outset, not least by family background, "more equal than others."

Compensatory Education Programs: A Brief Overview.

I shall not here try to give a detailed description of the Federal programs for the education of poor and disadvantaged students in America. The National Report (OE, 1979) prepared for the OECD review identified some 50 programs serving the educationally disadvantaged and in six excellent case studies dealt with ten of them in detail. The NIE evaluation studies are, as pointed out above, almost entirely limited to the Title I program which is absorbing some 80 percent of funds going into compensatory education and therefore deserves to be treated as if it were the only major program. It should, however, be pointed out that the Head Start program is still operating, with funds that are, if not absolutely so, relatively heavily reduced in comparison with the resources ten years ago. Among the compensatory programs in elementary and secondary school the Title VII program, bi-lingual education, is of pivotal importance for Hispanics, who tend to become the biggest minority in America. The National Report deals with two programs in higher education, namely the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants program and the Special Services for Disadvantaged Students. Given the scope of my assignment to review the NIE reports on compensatory education, which have by and large been limited to Title I, I shall also limit myself to the Title I program, originally launched within the framework of the ESEA.

The by far largest compensatory education effort under Federal auspices has been the Title I of the ESEA passed by Congress in 1965. Title I provided funds for special educational efforts in schools located in areas with high concentration of poor students according to four criteria: (1) number of children aged 5 to 17 in a given county who are below the Orshansky poverty line, (2) two-thirds of the children in the same age bracket who receive payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), (3) children in the same age bracket who live in special institutions, and (4) the average level of school expenditure in the State.

The amount of funds going into Title I programs has been substantial, not to say staggering. During the 1968-78 period Congress allocated 18.4 billion dollars. By 1975 Title I funding comprised 84 percent of the total ESEA funding. By late 1970's the funding level had risen to 2.5 billion from 1.2 billion ten years earlier. Title I alone accounts for about 3-4 percent of the total national expenditures for public elementary and secondary education.

The NIE study on the efficiency of Title I found that by 1976 90 percent of the school districts received Title I funds (NIE, 1978). Studies under way, conducted for the Office of Education, show that slightly more than 90 percent of the schools with high concentration of students with minority background receive some kind of compensatory aid, either Federal or State funds. Of the Nation's elementary schools 68 percent obtained Title I aid. An additional 14 percent received other funds, mostly State funds with the same purpose. Of eligible children in eligible schools 67 percent were reached. By and large, the Title I funds to a remarkable extent were targeted on schools with a high concentration of poor students. But the fact that a considerable number of educationally disadvantaged were not beneficiaries, as well as the fact that quite a few who were well off were serviced, raises questions about the adequacy of the allocation criteria, a matter to which I shall return later.

Title VII of ESEA, the Bi-lingual Education program, deserves special mention. It was launched in 1967 at the initiative of legislators from California and Texas with the aim of improving education of children from non-English speaking homes, mostly Hispanics. The provisions were designed to support schools in providing bi-lingual instruction. Although in theory funds were targeted for children with limited proficiency in English, the Bi-lingual Education Act has popularly been identified as a Mexican-American project because of its emphasis on teaching children of Mexican (and Puerto Rican) background.

During our site visits, particularly in New Mexico, it was apparent that the term "disadvantaged" and even more the term "compensatory" were resented in connection with bi-lingual education. A child from a Spanish-speaking home in New Mexico who comes from a family that for centuries has lived there and who accordingly has a strong cultural identity is not necessarily "disadvantaged" in terms of lacking basic material and cultural assets. Nor can one say that it has to be "compensated" for not having English as a mother tongue.

There are among those who operate the bilingual programs, and to some extent among those who are beneficiaries, two opposing philosophies about the main objectives of the program. On the one side, there are those who argue that children from non-English speaking homes should become proficient in English as rapidly and efficiently as possible even at the price of losing contact with their home language and what that implies of alienation from their cultural heritage. On the other hand, there are those who rgard bi-lingual education as a means of maintaining their cultural identity. A similar controversy has emerged in Western Europe where many millions of children of the "guest-workers" have forced the educational authorities to take steps in providing adequate education for them (Rist, 1978).

Considering the fact that the Hispanics soon will constitute the largest minority in the United States it would have been in order if the Bilingual Education Act had been included in the efforts to evaluate compensatory education.

While the OECD review team in the fall of 1978 conducted its site visits, the 95th Congress was in its final phase of discussing the amendments to the various titles in the ESEA, which was up for a 5-year reauthorization (Education Amendments, 1978). In the first place, the Amendments aimed at simplifying the paper work which, as was repeatedly noticed during the site visits, was sometimes excessive, detailed, and burdensome to the local authorities. Instead of submitting applications annually it can now be done triannually. The Amendments of 1978 aim at better targeting than before on areas with high concentration of needy children. Thus, the basic Federal grants to the States are supplemented over and above the 1979 appropriations by extra funds in relation to the number of families in the State with an income below the National median according to the 1975 survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census. Furthermore, the basic allocation formula will, beginning in 1980, take 100 per cent of the children from families receiving AFDC instead of only 2/3 which has been the provision since 1965. Special grants are made available to school districts with a high concentration of children from low-income families. Thus, counties where the number of such children exceeds 20 per cent of the total are eligible for such grants.

Federal legislation on compensatory education has right from the outset been very strict on two principles: Federal funds should "supplement not supplant", and the States and local educational authorities should be able to demonstrate "maintenance of effort", that is to say, not slacken their efforts in terms of general funding of elementary and secondary education.

A meticulous control of the pursuance of these principles has resulted in excessive red tape. Exclusion from the first principle can now occur under the new provisions, in case State funds are used for compensatory education programs similar to Title I. The waiver provision for maintenance of effort has been modified to allow waiver from one fiscal year in case of "exceptional and unforeseen" circumstances. Thus, a disruption from one fiscal year to another of a useful program, simply because a district or a school happened to lose a fraction of a percent of eligible children and thereby falls below the level required to receive funds, is avoided.

Parental participation, a cornerstone in the original ESEA legislation, did not always work out according to anticipation. This might have been the reason why it was included in the NIE Compensatory Education Study (NIE, 1977f) which in turn was based on the 1975-76 NIE National Survey of Compensatory Education, which in its turn was based on efforts by the Stanford Research Institute (1971), Vanecko et al. (1977) of Abt Associates, and Goettel and Kaplan (1977) of the Syracuse Research Corporation. Parental Advisory Councils (PACs) have had considerable difficulties in finding their identity and have in many places become mere formalities. In other places they have become the focus of political patronage and struggle. Therefore, the regulations in the 1978 Education Amendments require certain procedures for selection of parents on the PACs, a minimum number of meetings per year, and a minimum number of individuals to serve on the PACs.

Sometimes there has been an overzealous formalism with regard to which children in a given school or class may be served. There has been a tendency to categorize certain teachers as Title I teachers versus the "regular" ones. In order to reduce such tendencies, all children in a school where 75 per cent of them are eligible for compensatory education can be served. In a similar vein, teachers who are employed mainly for compensatory programs are required to spend a certain amount of their time on other activities which belong to their teaching role, such as consultations with other teachers and with parents and students.

Targeting of Compensatory Education.

The difficulties in implementing Federal commitments to the education of the disadvantaged can be fully appreciated only if one realizes the enormous complexities involved all the way from policy making, preparation of regulations, assessing needs for support, distribution of funds, planning programs at the local level, and evaluating and accounting upwards. Federal aid in education on a massive scale has a short history. The planning of legislation and the launching of the ensuing programs occurred within a short time span in the early 1960's. As always, once certain practices have been established and entrenched, it is difficult to change them. Any more deepgoing change in the administrative machinery is felt as an intrusion upon established empires and spheres of influence. In addition, politicians take particular interest in programs that in a tangible way affect their particular constituencies. The OECD team could not avoid noticing how keenly aware congressmen were about the effects that proposed changes in the allocation criteria and regulations could have on their constituencies. This explains the reluctance to change existing practices of distributing funds.

Compensatory education funds under Title I of ESEA are distributed according to an allocation formula Congress agreed upon in the 1960's and which, with minor modifications, is still employed. The poverty statistics are obtained from census data that could be more than ten years old. This means that in certain areas the composition of the population might have changed rather drastically in a society as mobile as the American. Funds are first allocated to the State, which in its turn allocates them to the various school districts which then allocate them to the various school sites.

The number of poor, as assessed by census data at the county level, is the first criterion of identification. Schools within districts are ranked according to incidence of poverty. Available funds are then distributed according to this rank order. This means that a considerable number of disadvantaged children, beyond those who live in areas or districts not eligible according to the poverty criterion, are not serviced. Thus, there are two categories of educationally disadvantaged children who are not covered by Title I provisions: (1) children in schools not eligible or not covered by the program, and (2) children in eligible schools for whom funds are insufficient. The NIE (1977c) study that addresses itself to this problem found that about one-third of the eligible children were not served by Title I programs.

Let me take one example from the site visits paid by the OECD team. When interviewing people at the Board of Education of the Los Angeles Unified School District we were told that by 1978 in L.A. only 172 out of more than 400 elementary schools and some 30 per cent of the eligible children were served by State programs. The criterion for distributing State aid to schools for compensatory education, which in California at least until then was comparatively high, was in L.A. a composite of (1) AFDC, (2) number of free school lunches, (3) property assessment, and (4) family income. After the eligible schools had been identified by poverty criteria, students to be served were determined by the grade 6 reading scores over the last 4 years.

A survey on a national, representative sample conducted by the Systems Development Corporation (SDC), still under way when the OECD team visited Los Angeles, found that two-thirds of all elementary schools obtained Title I funds.

There is evidently a trade-off between horizontal coverage and concentration, which has a bearing on the practice of letting all children who score below the 50th percentile in eligible schools become eligible for services. We were informed that a study subcontracted to SDC shows that 50 percent of the children who are poor and score below the 50th percentile are serviced as compared to 35 percent who according to the formula are not poor and score in the same range. This gives reason to question the adequacy of poverty measures for identification of needy children.

Another aspect of mistargeting related to level of reading competence is the following. I learned at the interview session with SDC that the survey had shown that 12 per cent of the poor who score above the 50 percentile were serviced. The cutoff point was set at the 50th percentile, which seemed to be remarkably high and was brought in question at the "confrontation meeting" in Paris. The 50th percentile as cutoff score is not consistent with the definition that the Office of Education employs in its 1977 Annual Evaluation Report to Congress: "The term (disadvantaged) applies to children and adults who typically cannot succeed in the traditional education systems and programs." (op.cit., p. 4). It would seem more in line with the intentions of the legislation to place the cutoff point for educational failures somewhere between the 15th and the 25th percentile. Such a practice would also be more compatible with the standards set in the minimum competency testing programs.

Unfortunately, the NIE evaluation studies have not addressed themselves to the problem of horizontal coverage and to what could be gained in services for the most needy with more concentration on them by a lower cutoff score. Again, the resistance from many school districts, who at least get some "sprinkling" of the funds, might have been very strong with repercussions on the respective congressmen.

The OECD group noted a striking lack of continuity in the vertical coverage of Title I programs and therefore in sustained efforts throughout the eligible students' entire school career. Compensatory education funds are concentrated at two completely separated stages of the educational career. Title I funds are about 80 percent used in grades K through 3. In spite of the fact that there are no legislative barriers against using it at later stages, the funds under Title I provisions are almost entirely spent in the elementary school through grade 6. Very little is spent on compensatory education measures at the secondary level, where poor students from deprived background represent a serious problem. As long as students are in elementary school, attention is paid to the development of their basic skills in, for instance, reading. This objective seems to get out of focus at the junior high school level, and many students enter senior high school with very low reading competence, a fact which in many States has inspired recent legislation on minimum competency testing.

I have earlier pointed out the trade-off between horizontal coverage and concentration in distributing compensatory education funds. There is also a trade-off related to vertical coverage: the number of students that can be covered versus continuity and sustention of services. Looking back at the experiences education Ralph Tyler pointed out that "improvements in learning can be maintained and "improvements in learning can be maintained and increased when the program provides for a sequence of three to four years rather than one-shot efforts to help." (Tyler, 1974, p.

170). He estimated that bringing learning gains of the disadvantaged up to the national average would require a 50 percent higher per pupil expenditure than for the average student. Statements on the effect of increased sustention of efforts have been made by experts on early childhood education with particular reference to Head Start programs (Bronfenbrenner, 1974). It would seem that sustention could be bought at the price of reducing horizontal coverage by lowering the cutoff score.

During the 1970's five national commissions in the United States have dealt with problems of secondary education (Coleman _et al_., 1974; Brown _et al_., 1973; Martin _et al_., 1974; NASSP, 1972; Weinstock, ed., 1973). One official in HEW referred to the junior high school as the "disaster area in American education." It is the stage when neglect of basic skills begins to be strongly felt. At the end of this stage dropouts take place. But even before, the increased absenteeism means that dropout has de facto started.

Problems of dropout and unemployment among young people in the age range 16 through 21 are issues with serious implications for American education, as has been evidenced by the committee set up by the National Academy of Education and chaired by Clark Kerr (NAE, 1979). Bridges between the formal educational system and the world of work have to be built in order to bring young people, who have grown up in a weak and unsupportive environment and who with Trow's typology are really deprived, into productive work. One notes that the Youth Employment Demonstration Act of 1977 conducts experiments in five cities with programs where young people are guaranteed either work or a place in school. It should also be mentioned that under the provisions of the Youth Act considerable funds are available for innovative projects linking school and work. Establishment of vocational-technical centers and the quest for building "life-role competencies" in senior secondary school are other examples of efforts in the same direction.

To achieve such objectives as better vertical coverage by sustained efforts and including upper elementary school as well as secondary school, a program integration which goes far beyond the confines of both the Office of Education and HEW has to be achieved. The establishment of a Department of Education has in this particular respect been a step in the right direction. But compensatory programs at the secondary level would require a better coordination between programs which until now have been operated in separation by HEW and the Department of Labor, respectively.

In the Instructional Dimensions Study NIE

(1977d) reports a 7-month follow-up of students in grades 1 and 3 in 14 school districts. Certain practices, such as "pullout instruction" as compared to "mainstream instruction," were studied. Since, as was noticed by the OECD team, pullout is overwhelmingly used, the results of such a comparison have central strategic importance. The study was also designed to assess the increments in student competence from the beginning of the fall through the end of the spring semester.

The study came out with two main findings. In the first place, it was found that compensatory education students, in the wording of the NIE Final Report, "make significant achievement gains over a school year period" (NIE, 1978, p. 79). These effects were larger than those obtained in previous studies of Title I students In interpreting this finding one should, however, keep two important conditions for the study in mind. Although the sample contained students from 400 classrooms in urban and rural districts it was by no means nationally representative and did not purport to be so. The Final Report points out that the "programs examined were purposely selected for certain instructional features and cannot be considered a representative sample of Title I reading and mathematics services." (NIE, 1978, p. 80). Secondly, and probably more important, 10 percent of the compensatory education students, whose initial test scores were above average, were excluded from the follow-up. As justification for doing, so it is pointed out that the rates of gain among the excluded students were "similar" to the ones among the rest. If compensatory education should make sense, those who score far below average ought to show considerable gains by being subjected to special treatment. We are now left without evidence about the effects that this special treatment leads to over and above those being achieved by regular instruction.

Evaluation of Compensatory Education Programs.

Needless to point out, evaluation exercises are by their very nature beset with value problems as well as with technical problems. It is difficult enough to identify and operationalize criteria supposed to measure the objectives one sets out to achieve in social intervention programs. But an even more troublesome problem, although of another kind, is encountered in the attempts to identify the objectives and the values embedded in these criteria. They are usually anchored in the middle of political controversy. Let me take one example from Sweden that relates to the legislation in the 1950's on a common, comprehensive school in Sweden (Husén, 1962). When an education bill proposing a change-over from a dual or parallel school system of basic education to a common, comprehensive 9-year school was discussed by the Swedish Parliament in 1950, it met, as could be expected, resistance on the part of the conservatives. A Special Education Committee reviewed the Bill and presented its review to the Parliament, where unanimity was bought at the price of clarity. The first recommendation made by the Committee had the following wording: "Actions should be taken within a certain time, which is to be decided upon by the Parliament,...to introduce a comprehensive school based on nine years of mandatory school attendance. This school should, according to the extent the planned experiments prove its suitability, replace elementary school, the continuation school", etc. In order to achieve consensus the Committee Chairman had inserted the words "according to the extent...". The proponents of structural change thought that a decision had been taken to introduce the comprehensive school and that certain modifications could be envisaged depending upon the outcomes of the 10-year pilot program which was included in the Bill. The conservatives interpreted the recommendation to the effect that adoption of the very idea of the comprehensive school should depend on whether the pilot program proved to be "superior" in terms of making its students more "competent" than the previous types of schools, particularly the selective academic lower secondary school. Since a decision was taken that the pilot program should be accompanied by extensive comparisons between the new and the traditional types of schools, the ensuing evaluation surveys during the 1950 s were followed with keen interest by both opponents and proponents. The comparisons were made in terms of student cognitive competence in certain key subjects, and nobody questioned the validity of comparisons between school types within certain respects quite different objectives. The Social Democrats wanted a school which contributed to equalization and conceived the comprehensive school reform in social terms, whereas the conservatives discussed the reform in terms of instructional and pedagogical efficiency.

Similar problems were encountered in evaluating the Title I programs. I have earlier discussed the philosophy behind them. Extra funds to support disadvantaged children are expected to improve their educational attainments. This would in turn improve their coping power as adults, make them better prepared for working life, and lift them out of poverty. Therefore, the ultimate criterion of how "effective" Title I is would be adult occupational status and/or earnings of students serviced by the programs. This would require a longitudinal study which would administratively be difficult and costly to conduct - not to mention that it would not be attractive to politicians who prefer instant results within the short perspective. The length of their term of office tends to determine the length of their perspective.

Therefore, practically all evaluation efforts have opted for short-range criteria, thereby using the one that is close at hand: student achievement. In most cases one has tried to assess what happens to the children in the program over one school year. Even that can be a tricky exercise, considering the high turnover of children in the categories serviced by Title I. When the turnover is about one hundred percent, which occurs in some schools, the quest for "sustained efforts" indeed tends to become an empty phrase.

The research literature on evaluation of various compensatory education programs, particularly Head Start, Follow Through, and Title I, is, indeed, extensive. If one includes the annual reports submitted by the local educational authorities and by the U.S. Commissioner of Education, the documentation is enormous. In addition, commissioned studies, many of which were designed in grand format and at great expense, have been conducted. It would be highly presumptuous to pretend to cover even the major relevant publications. Nor could I possibly pretend to come up with my own evaluation of studies into which impressive competence and considerable sums of money have been invested. I shall therefore mainly confine myself to general observations and to raising some issues.

There have been many small-scale evaluations of Head Start programs. The first more extensive and significant attempt to assess the impact of these programs was the Westinghouse Report of 1969. Little and Smith (1971), who were commissioned by OECD to conduct a study of the strategies of compensation employed in the United States, conclude from the Westinghouse Report: "The overall findings of the study suggested that the summer programs had little sustained effect; in general no differences could be distinguished between Head Start and non-Head Start children." (p. 52). Although Head Start children were slightly ahead of non-Head Start children at the beginning of grade one, by grade two there were no significant differences in school achievement. Similar results were obtained with regard to affective outcomes. As usual in studies of this kind, it was beset by methodological flaws, such as lack of pretest scores and one-sided emphasis on achievements. Tremendous variations between programs defied attempts to relate specific treatments to specific outcomes. Thus, so far the Head Start evaluations have not yielded any consistent and/or conclusive results that could serve as guidelines for policy makers. One should remember, however, that in this respect attempts to evaluate effects of treatments similar to the ones that go on in the regular school setting have also given inconclusive results, leading to the desperate conclusion that "schooling does not seem to make any difference."

A massive attempt using a longitudinal research strategy has recently been launched by the Education Commission of the States. Preliminary findings seem to indicate more positive effects of early childhood intervention than found in previous investigations.

The impressive resources put at the disposal of the researchers commissioned to conduct evaluation studies have not been able to offset the shortcomings that stem from being put into the straight-jacket of policy makers and planners. The demand for quick and "relevant" results has tended to sterilize much of this research. The evaluation of the "planned variation" field experiments conducted under the auspices of the Follow Through and criticized by House *et al*. (1978) serves as a good illustration and shall therefore be dealt with somewhat more in detail.

The Follow Through program was launched as an attempt to sustain the effects achieved by Head Start in providing continuing help to former Head Start children as they entered regular school. Follow Through was originally conceived as a program providing additional compensatory education in Kindergarten and in the first three grades of elementary school for children who had previously participated in Head Start. In 1968 it was decided to make the program more experimental and to try out various models in early childhood education that should subsequently be evaluated (cf. Rivlin and Timpane, 1975). It was decided to try out about a dozen models, and 15 million dollars were allocated to the entire program. By 1978 the annual allocation had increased to 59 million. The total program costs over the decade since the inception amount to roughly 500 million dollars. Over the entire period 20 sponsors had worked with projects on 180 school sites. The Abt Associates, Inc. was commissioned to conduct the evaluation that comprised a sample of some 20,000 students who were followed up over a 4-year period. The total evaluation costs have been estimated to be somewhere between 30 and 50 million dollars. The evaluation exercise reported in half a dozen massive volumes has been subjected to criticism by House *et al*. (1978). Their report, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, as well as rebuttals from the researchers responsible for the Abt Associates evaluation have been published in a special issue (No. 2, 1978) of the *Harvard Educational Review*. This issue makes an extremely interesting reading, because it amply illustrates the point above on the relationship between educational research and educational decision-making. Researchers were in the first place called upon to make their contribution *ex post facto*, when the models had been decided upon and with little possibility of influencing either the design of the "planned experiments" or the way they were conducted. Very often the conduct of the experiments was arbitrarily changed due to particular local circumstances and interests that had little to do with the aims of the "experiments".

A host of troublesome methodological problems were encountered in the attempts to evaluate conclusively the Follow Through programs. A few major problems and flaws deserve to be mentioned. In doing so I am largely drawing upon the report by House _et_ _al_. (1978). There was no systematic selection of school sites and/or teachers within schools. The control groups were grossly mismatched with the experimental groups. Adequate evaluation instruments were not developed from the outset and focused mainly on cognitive competence. On the whole the outcome domains were poorly covered. The goals implicit in the various experiments within the same models were so diverse that it was very difficult, not to say impossible, to develop common instruments that could adequately cover the entire range. The aggregation level represented another matter of concern: the student instead of the classroom was used as the unit of analysis. This was inconsistent with the statistical technique used in adjusting the means of the control groups by means of analysis of covariance. Half the original sample of children was lost during the 4-year follow up. The hopeless situation for the evaluators was reflected in the fact that the variation in mean achievement within models was greater than between models. This reflects the role played by *contextual* factors for the outcomes. Such conclusion is drawn by the Abt Associates, Inc. researchers (Anderson *et al*., 1978) in their reply to the criticism leveled by House *et al*. (1978):

> "None of the seventeen models in the evaluation demonstrated that it could compensate consistently for the academic consequences of poverty... (We) conclude that the Follow Through strategy of externally sponsored curricular change is not a *reliable* tool for raising the test scores of poor children... Local circumstances and behavior clearly have more to do with children's test performance than do the intentions, theories, and rhetoric of outside interveners.... Taken as a whole, the evidence presented in our report (Stebbins *et al*., 1977) suggests that if a local school system has the potential for effective compensatory education, then outside resources of the Follow Through kind can sometimes catalyze this potential. But if not, intervention seems likely to be somewhat disruptive and counterproductive." (Anderson *et al*., 1978,

p. 162).

This statement is in line not only with common sense but also with findings from research on the determinants of educational innovations. The contextual factors, the ecology of the educative process going on in the school, have to be taken into account. The involvement of the parents and the extent to which they in cooperation with the school are participating in the education of their children is of pivotal importance.

Congress in its 1974 Education Amendments requested, as mentioned earlier, the National Institute of Education to conduct a study of compensatory education, its "fundamental purposes and effectiveness." In time for consideration in connection with the reauthorization of the compensatory education programs a final comprehensive report was submitted in September 1978 (NIE, 1978). The NIE reports reflect a shift towards a widened perspective in conducting evaluation. The NIE compensatory education study is in the first place not an "in-house" one in terms of original research endeavor with what that implies of research design, data collection, and statistical analyses, but rather an attempt to collate the extensive research conducted in some 35 projects, most of them commissioned by the Federal Government and conducted by outside organizations.

As has been repeatedly pointed out, most of the evaluation projects have mainly been preoccupied with the effects of the compensatory education programs on student cognitive development as measured by achievement test scores in the basic skills. This has to be seen in the context of the emphasis on such skills not only in the legislation but also in the actual operation of Title I programs.

The bulk of the Title I resources has gone into remedial reading. Recent "back-to-the-basics" battle cries have reinforced the tendency to look at the outcomes in terms of student performance, particularly in reading and mathematics. Thus, the effective and social development of the students, which, of course, is less tangible and therefore more difficult to measure, has tended to be neglected. Not least the Follow Through evaluation exercise points at the importance of changes in the "ecology" or "climate" in schools and communities where compensatory programs have operated. Parental involvement in the education of the children was enhanced by the Follow Through, where parents twice as often as in the control group volunteered to help in the school. Many low-status parents became interested in improving their own education. Another important by-product seems to have been that some workable comprehensible models of primary education were developed under the auspices of Follow Through.

The program could thereby serve as a kind of curriculum and instrument development laboratory. A third by-product seems to have been the opportunity that various planned variations experiments have provided for effective on-the-job inservice training for teachers.

During a visit to Systems Development Corporation the OECD team had the opportunity to meet with the researchers commissioned to conduct a comprehensive study of the sustained effects of Title I basic skills. Base line data collected for a nationally representative sample of students and parents of a considerable size make it possible to survey on the basis of what criteria services in the Title I programs are delivered. This is an impressive attempt to overcome some of the technical shortcomings that have beset some previous studies. It also tries to map out what goes on in the home between parents and children which, regrettably, because of the size of the sample, has to be studied rather extensively. In our conversation with the researchers we learned that the longitudinal emphasis, which was a major purpose for launching the study, might because of the high costs have to be played down. One must regret this if it occurs and hope that it might be possible to conduct a follow-up study on at least a subsample in order to assess the sustained effects of the compensatory education programs.

Concluding observations.

Both in reviewing policies for compensatory education and in the attempts to evaluate the outcomes a certain amount of generosity -- and humility -- on the part of the researcher has to be exercised. Legislation and its implementation in terms of regulations are outcomes of political compromise, a process where representatives of States and districts have tried to maximize the benefits accruing to their own constituencies. One cannot, therefore, in the legislative wording expect the same clarity and consistency of definition as in a graduate seminar of, for instance, what is meant by "equality" or "disadvantage" and how these terms should be operationalized when it comes to social intervention.

In looking back on the development of American education over the last two decades one is deeply impressed by the considerable strides that have been made, not least by Federal initiatives, which have contributed to putting vital issues, particularly the education of the disadvantaged, on the national agenda. In spite of frustrated expectations, setbacks of programs, criticism of falling standards, and concerns about the young people who leave school as functional illiterates, the faith in education among the American people has remained remarkably unaffected. As an observer from abroad, one cannot avoid noticing that the Proposition 13 movement is not directed against education as such but against big government (as has also been evidenced by opinion polls). One indication of the sustained faith is the fact that the 1978 Federal appropriations for education went up 16 percent, which was far beyond what was needed to make up for inflation.

With regard to evaluation I would like to make two observations. In the first place, a broader perspective has to be employed in looking at the outcomes of intervention programs than in some of the commissioned studies. By and large the employment of a wider range of criteria of evaluation is called for. Irrespective of whether one accepts or rejects the traditional experimental model as feasible and adequate in assessing the outcomes of planned intervention in the educational and social welfare demand, the problem of keeping the relevant factors "under control" is, indeed, formidable and is among other things reflected in the enormous costs incurred in evaluating the Follow Through models. I agree with the conclusion made by the group of researchers commissioned to evaluate the Follow Through program in saying: "Poor children still tend to perform poorly in school even after the best and the brightest theorists -- with the help of parents, local educators, and the federal funds....have done their best to change the situation." (Anderson et al., 1978,

p. 163). Secondly, even taking into account the difficulties of conducting longitudinal studies because of the high turnover of students and of keeping track of people who move, I think that wellplanned, small-scale longitudinal studies conducted as case studies where different models of compensatory education are operated, would prove more than largescale surveys.

We are, in spite of all efforts by educational research, just at the beginning of our attempts to assess what the school is doing to its students. Until now, our methods have been extremely crude and limited to easily measured cognitive performances. Our notions of what makes a difference in student competence have also been rather crude because of our failure to assess what, for lack of a better expression, could be called the "climate" of the school or the classroom. The study of a group of inner London schools conducted by Michael Rutter (1978) marks a turning point in this respect. The rather meager, not to say, discouraging results from the evaluation exercises should not give rise to pessimism. In his final remarks at the Paris "confrontation meeting" the Chairman of the OECD team Peter Karmel pointed out that we lack methods of assessing the "chemistry" or "climate" of the school. Furthermore, we tend to overlook that increments in educational outcomes usually are very small. We cannot expect minor changes in input to produce dramatic results. The compensatory education programs constitute after all small changes in the larger context of formal education.

Finally, it should be recognized that the educational system cannot bear the whole burden of bringing about social change. Educational reforms cannot have an impact and cannot successfully be implemented if they are conceived as if they were operating in a social vacuum. In order to succeed they have to be parts of overarching social reforms, for which they cannot substitute.

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NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION

CONSTITUTION AS AMENDED*

ARTICLE I

Name

The name of this corporation shall be "The National Academy of Education."

ARTICLE II

Purpose

The purpose of the National Academy of Education shall be to promote scholarly inquiry and discussion concerning the ends and means of education, in all of its forms, in the United States and abroad. To this end, the Academy shall serve as a forum for conversation, debate, and mutual instruction; a rostrum for the communication of accurate information and informed opinion; and a stimulus for imaginative and fruitful research. The Academy may also, to the extent it deems wise and feasible, serve as a source of counsel for such public and private agencies as require and request it.

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*Originally enacted on March 21, 1965. Amended May 19, 1968; October 10, 1969; October 18, 1975; and October 21, 1978.

ARTICLE III

Membership

Section 1: The Academy shall consist of a maximum of seventy-five members, including those named in the Act of Incorporation, and such others, citizens of the United States, as shall from time to time be elected to membership.

Section 2: The Members of the Academy shall be predominantly persons whose scholarly and scientific writings bearing on the subject of education are judged outstanding. The Members shall be arranged in four Sections, each of which shall have a maximum enrollment of fifteen: (1) The History and Philosophy of Education; (2) The Politics, Economics, Sociology, and Anthropology of Education; (3) The Psychology of Education; and (4) The Study of Educational Practice. In addition, a maximum of fifteen persons, whose accomplishments in the field of education are judged outstanding but whose writings need not identify them with one of the Sections, may be elected Members-at-Large.

Section 3: Upon reaching the age of 70, a Member shall become a Member Emeritus in the Academy, and his place on the Roster of Membership shall be declared vacant by the Secretary. Members Emeriti shall have the privilege of attending the meetings of the Academy and taking part in its business (without vote), of reading and communicating papers to it, and of receiving its publications, but shall not be subject to its assessments. In exceptional circumstances, the Academy may, upon nomination of the Council, elect Members directly to Emeritus status.

Section 4: The Academy may elect not more than twenty-five Foreign Associates, who shall have the privilege of attending the meetings of the Academy, of reading and communicating papers to it, and of receiving its publications, but who shall take no part in its business, and shall not be subject to its assessments. Upon reaching the age of 70, a Foreign Associate shall assume Emeritus status in the Academy, and his place on the roster of Foreign Associates shall be declared vacant by the Secretary; but he shall continue to enjoy all of his former privileges. In exceptional circumstances, the Academy may, upon nomination by the Council, elect Foreign Associates directly to Emeritus status.

ARTICLE IV

Officers

Section 1: The officers of the Academy shall be a President, a Vice-President, and a Secretary-Treasurer, all of whom shall be elected by a majority of votes cast at the Annual Meeting, or by a majority of votes cast by mail ballot shortly before the Annual Meeting. The terms of the President and the Secretary-Treasurer shall be four years, and the term of the Vice-President shall be two years; and no officer shall be elected to succeed himself in the same office. In case of a vacancy, the Council shall elect a successor for the unexpired portion of the former incumbent's term.

Section 2: Each Section shall have a Chairman, who shall be elected by the Section's membership by ranking on a mail ballot shortly before the Annual Meeting. The term of the Chairman shall be two years; and all Members of a Section except the retiring Chairman shall be eligible for election.

Section 3: The officers of the Academy, the Chairmen of the Sections, and the immediate Past President of the Academy shall constitute a Council for the transaction of such business as may be assigned to it by the Constitution of the Academy. The Council may elect a Member-at-

Large to serve on the Council for a term of two years.

Section 4: The President of the Academy, or in the case of his absence or inability to act, the Vice-President, shall preside at the meetings of the Academy, and of the Council; shall name all Committees, except such as are otherwise especially provided for; shall refer investigations which the Academy undertakes to Members specially conversant with the subject, and report thereon to the Academy at its next Annual Meeting; and shall, with the Council, direct the general business of the Academy. It shall be within the authority of the President in special cases to appoint to Committee membership experts or individuals of remarkable attainments who are not Members of the Academy.

Section 5: The Secretary-Treasurer shall conduct the correspondence of the Academy, reporting to the Academy at its Annual Meeting. It shall also be his duty to give notice to the Members and Foreign Associates of the place and time of all meetings, to make known to the Council all vacancies in the list of Members and Foreign Associates, to keep the minutes of all business proceedings of the Academy and the Council, and to maintain all other records of importance, including the terms of service of the officers. As Treasurer, he shall attend to all receipts and disbursements of the Academy, giving such bond and furnishing such vouchers as the Council may require. He shall collect all dues from Members, and keep a set of books, showing a full account of receipts and disbursements. He shall present at each stated session a list of the Members entitled to vote, and a general report at the Annual Meeting. He shall be the custodian of the corporate seal of the Academy.

The Secretary-Treasurer may delegate any or all of these responsibilities to appropriate Academy staff while retaining his role as a member of the Executive Council and as the responsible agent for the nominating procedures noted in Article VI.

ARTICLE V

Meetings

Section 1: The Academy shall hold an Annual Meeting at such time and place as the Members of the Council may determine.

Section 2: The names of the Members and Foreign Associates present at each meeting shall be recorded in the minutes; and the Members present at any meeting shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

Section 3: The stated meeting of the Council shall be held at the time of the Annual Meeting of the Academy. Special meetings shall be convened at the call of the President, or of three members of the Council.

Section 4: The stated meetings of the Sections shall be held at the time of the Annual Meeting of the Academy.

Section 5: A Member who has not paid his dues shall not take part in the business of the Academy.

ARTICLE VI

Elections and Regulations

Section 1: All elections shall be by ballot, unless otherwise ordered by this Constitution.

Section 2: Whenever any election is to be held, the presiding officer shall name a Committee to conduct it, to collect the votes, count them, and report the result to the Academy.

Section 3: Nominations for officers shall be made by a Nominating Committee, to consist of one Member from each of the four Sections, appointed by the Section Chairman after consultation with the Section's Members. The Secretary-Treasurer shall initiate the constitution of a Nominating Committee at least sixty days in advance of an Annual Meeting at which officers are to be elected, and shall name a chairman from among the membership of the Committee. The Nominating Committee shall seek the counsel of Members of the Academy by mail.

Section 4: With respect to the election of members, each section each year shall nominate to the Academy not more than three persons judged worthy of membership on the basis of their scholarly and scientific writings. Thirty days before a regularly scheduled meeting of the Academy, the section chairmen will solicit names for nomination from each member of his/her section. At the next meeting of the Academy, the sections will meet to discuss the names nominated. A list of names will be approved for nomination. Ballots listing these nominations will be prepared by the central Academy accompanied by c.v.'s and any other supporting statements that have been submitted for consideration for an "Elect" or "Do Not Elect" vote. Final tallies will be prepared by the central office to be presented to the Executive Council at the next regularly scheduled meeting of the Academy for final decisions on election to membership.

By vote of the Executive Council, the annual accretions of new members may be increased for any particular year if in the eyes of the Council the number of openings in any section of the Academy's membership is deemed excessive.

Section 5: Every Member elect shall accept his membership in writing, within ninety days after the date of his election. Otherwise, on proof that the Secretary has formally notified him of his election, his name shall not be entered on the roll of Members.

Section 6: With respect to the election of Foreign Associates, each Section each year may nominate to the Academy not more than two persons whose scholarly and scientific writings on the subject of education are judged outstanding; form the list presented by the Sections to the Annual Meeting, the Members may select by majority vote not more than four new Foreign Associates until a total of twenty has been reached; thereafter only as many may be elected each year as there are vacancies due to death, resignation, or transfer to Emeritus status. In addition to those thus elected, the Members may, at each Annual Meeting, elect from a list of nominees presented by the Council not more than two Foreign Associates, whose accomplishments in the field of education are judged outstanding.

Section 7: Every Foreign Associate elect shall accept his invitation in writing within ninety days after the date of his election.

Otherwise, on proof that the Secretary has formally notified him of his election, his name shall not be entered on the roll of Foreign Associates.

Section 8: A diploma, with the corporate seal of the Academy and the signatures of the officers, shall be sent by the Secretary to each Member and Foreign Associate on his acceptance of election.

Section 9: Resignations shall be addressed to the President and acted on by the Council.

ARTICLE VII

Scholarly Communications, Publications, and Reports

Section 1: The President, with the advice of the Council, shall give attention to preparations for each meeting, especially to the scholarly matters to be placed before the Membership.

Section 2: Members and Foreign Associates shall have the right to communicate papers on educational subjects to the Academy. Members and Foreign Associates shall also have the right to communicate to the Academy papers from persons who are not Members or Foreign Associates, and shall not be considered responsible for the facts or opinions of the authors, but shall be held responsible for the propriety of the papers. Persons who are not Members or Associates may be invited to communicate papers to the Academy.

Section 3: The Academy shall provide for the publication, under the direction of the Council, of Proceedings, Memoirs, and Reports.

Section 4: Proposals for investigations or reports may originate with individual Members or with the Sections to which the subjects belong, and be, by them, submitted to the Academy for approval. Proposals for investigations or reports that originate from sources outside the Academy shall be received and acted upon by the President and the Council.

Section 5: An Annual Report shall be prepared by the President and submitted by him, first to the Council, and afterwards to the Academy at its Annual Meeting.

Section 6: Medals and Prizes may be established, and the means of bestowing them accepted, by the Academy, upon the recommendation of the Council, by whom all the necessary arrangements for their establishment and award shall be made.

ARTICLE VIII

Property of the Academy

Section 1: All investments shall be made by the Treasurer in the corporate name of the Academy.

Section 2: No contract shall be binding upon the Academy, which has not been first approved by the Council.

Section 3: Assessments upon Members required for the support of the Academy shall be fixed by the Academy on the recommendation of the Council.

ARTICLE IX

Additions and Amendments

Additions and amendments to the Constitution shall be made only at a regularly scheduled session of the Academy. Any proposition for such a change shall be referred to the Council, which may amend the proposition, and shall report thereon to the Academy at its next regularly scheduled session, with a recommendation that it be accepted or rejected. Its report shall be considered by the Academy in Committee of the Whole, and immediately thereafter acted upon. If the addition or amendment receives two-thirds of the votes present, it shall be declared adopted, and shall have the same force as the original law.

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